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This is an investigation into the history of masculinity in spaceflight during some
of the tensest years of the Cold War era. This dissertation asks why the U.S. did not
counter the Soviet launch of the first woman into space. Scholars have pieced together
the story of American women’s fight for spaceflight. The dissertation adds another layer
to this narrative by analyzing the construction of the astronaut image from 1958 to 1972,
a period characterized by a widespread masculinity crisis.
Scholars of Cold War America suggest that Americans saw communism,
conformity, feminism, homosexuality, bureaucracy, corporations, male consumerism,
leisure, automation, and the dreaded “organization man” as a threat to masculinity. The
astronaut was not only a way for Americans to display their superiority over the Soviets;
he also represented a widespread domestic reaction against the threat of automation. I
build on the scholarship of the Cold War masculinity crisis by focusing on how the crisis
played out within the public discourse of the astronaut image. I begin with a narrative of
the Cold War masculinity crisis. Using print media, congressional records, and astronaut
accounts, I explore how the masculinization of spaceflight created a public image of the
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astronaut that mirrored the Cold War masculinity crisis. As the average American man
struggled for individuality and control in his own life, the astronaut struggled to exert and
maintain individual control over the space capsule. Continuing through the Apollo
program, the discourse surrounding the astronaut shifted away from depictions of him as
a rugged individual exerting control in space toward an emphasis on the astronaut as a
team player who shared control of the capsule with computers, the scientist-astronauts,
and Mission Command. In the end, the astronaut struggled to represent a superior
masculinity as he increasingly became the corporate organization man, symbolizing the
masculinity crisis. The struggle to resolve the masculinity crisis continued as teamwork
replaced individualism, hyphenated scientist-astronauts flew into space, and NASA
commissioned the first passenger space shuttles.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On 16 June 1963, a working-class textile employee and parachute enthusiast,
Valentina Tereshkova, boarded Vostok 6, and the Soviets launched the first woman into
space. Walter McDougal argues in The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the
Space Age (1985) that Tereshkova held absolutely “no astronautical training.” Therefore,
her ability to go into space “proved the superfluousness of the test pilots on the other
flights.” McDougal maintains that the flight of the female cosmonaut was supposed to
demonstrate the “routinenesss” of Soviet spaceflight. Upon her return, both Tereshkova
and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev reprimanded American society for claiming that
women were the “‘weaker sex.’” During her world tour, Tereshkova brazenly announced
that her flight in space confirmed the equality of the sexes in the Soviet Union, but also
“‘the ever-growing superiority of the socialist order of society over capitalism
altogether.’” 1
The United States did not follow the Soviets by launching a woman into space.
Tereshkova’s launch had some Americans asking, “Why Valentina and Not Our Gal?” 2
The United States, some believed, had women who were more qualified than Tereshkova
to go into space. In fact, in 1959, while working as a consultant for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Dr. William Randolph “Randy”
Lovelace Jr., founder of the Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research,
had conducted tests to see if women would make viable astronauts. Lovelace believed
1

that sending women into space would be cheaper due to their smaller size and weight. In
conjunction with the famed Women’s Army Service Pilot (WASP) of WWII, Jacqueline
Cochran, Lovelace compiled names of women deemed the best female flyers in the
United States. At the Lovelace clinic, nineteen women underwent the same tests that the
male astronaut candidates endured. Thirteen of them passed. Next, Lovelace attempted to
put the women through jet piloting tests at the Naval School of Aviation Medicine in
Pensacola. The military blocked his request because of their ban on women flying
military jets. In that same year, 1962, the House of Representatives convened the
Subcommittee on the Selection of Astronauts of the Committee on Science and
Astronautics to hold a hearing on sexual discrimination within NASA. The subcommittee
found that even though women could not fly jets for the military, the NASA astronaut
requirements of military jet test piloting experience did not mean that NASA
discriminated against women. 3
Margaret A. Weitekamp was the first historian to piece together the Lovelace
program in her work Right Stuff, Wrong Sex: America’s First Women in Space Program
(2005). She argues concerning gender roles within NASA during the early Cold War:
The engineers and pilots who founded NASA in the late
1950s brought with them their military culture and its
embedded assumptions about women’s and men’s proper
roles. As such, the military ethos of the young civilian
agency did not welcome women in the dangerous role of
astronauts. 4
Weitekamp’s work suggests that Lovelace’s assertion that women were better equipped
than men for space travel challenged the American belief that women were the weaker
sex. Lovelace’s program attracted American’s attention in the early 1960s because it was
on the eve of a “breakthrough in thinking about women’s public roles.” 5 Weitekamp’s
2

work has inspired scholars and journalists to delve deeper into gender roles within
NASA. This dissertation adds another layer to Weitekamp’s analysis by looking at how
the public discourse of the Cold War masculinity crisis influenced the construction of the
astronaut image. The connection between the masculinity crisis and the astronaut image
adds to the understanding of why the United States did not send a woman into space to
counter the flight of Tereshkova.
Historians have seized on spaceflight’s connection to broader themes in American
culture. Increasingly they have shifted their focus from the well documented
programmatic, technological, and political history of spaceflight to the roles that popular
culture, the media, propaganda, and average Americans played in both shaping and
reflecting the image of the astronaut. 6 Previously, scholarship such as James L.
Kauffman’s Selling Outer Space: Kennedy, the Media, and Funding for Project Apollo,
1961-1963 (1994), and Susan Landrum-Mangus’s dissertation, “Conestoga Wagons to
the Moon: The Frontier, The American Space Program, and National Identity” (1999),
have focused primarily on how the political discourse of spaceflight drew upon a popular,
albeit mythical, past of rugged pioneers conquering the frontier of the American West. To
sell spaceflight, politicians fashioned the astronauts as the pioneers of the New Frontier. 7
Newer scholarship such as Howard E. McCurdy’s Space and the American
Imagination (1997), Roger Launius’s “Heroes in a Vacuum: The Apollo Astronaut as
Cultural Icon” (2008), and NASA’s Societal Impact of Spaceflight (2009), have
contextualized NASA within the Cold War. 8 These scholars also looked to how
politicians and the American media have shaped spaceflight. McCurdy argues that
American fascination with Cold War science fiction added to the allure and fantasy of
space. While focusing on the construction of the astronaut image, Launius proposes that
3

the media and NASA portrayed space flyers as both ordinary and extraordinary. Launius
explains that the men were to symbolize the “epitome” of masculinity. For instance,
Space Task Group member, Charles Donlan, said that while choosing the first American
astronauts, the Mercury 7, he looked for “real men.” 9 Launius argues that for the
astronauts to symbolize American masculinity, NASA took great pains to control the
public image of the astronauts. NASA’s Officer for Public Affairs from 1958-1960,
Walter T. Bonney, suppressed any news of the astronauts’ wild parties or affairs with
women. Launius maintains that Bonney turned the “hard-living, hard-drinking lot” into
“God-fearing” family men who represented the American “everyman.” 10
Launius analyzes how NASA controlled the public image of the astronaut. This
dissertation looks at how the public discourse of print media, politicians, astronauts, and
at times NASA, shaped the image of the early American astronaut as representing the
Cold War masculinity crisis. The dissertation defines public discourse using Joan
Wallach Scott’s argument on the importance of language. The public discourse
surrounding the astronaut flights were not simply “words people say to one another.”
These words invoked meaning. The public discourse “conveyed the idea of meaning as
the patterns and relationships that constitute understanding or a ‘cultural system.’” 11
Those within the public discourse emphasized that the astronauts exercised rugged
individuality and control over their capsules. Cold War journalists, politicians,
academics, and average Americans championed a return to rugged individualism and
control as a way for American men to conquer the masculinity crisis.
Historian and engineer David A. Mindell focuses on the issue of astronaut control
over spaceflight technology in Digital Apollo: Human and Machine in Space Flight
(2008). Mindell contends that the relationship between the astronaut and the space
4

capsule forced NASA and the nation to come to terms with the relationship of people to
machines in an age of technology. Much like Kauffman before him, Mindell argues that
to sell Apollo to the American public, the press, and Congress, President John F.
Kennedy “drew upon American imagery of exploration, individualism, and geographical
conquest.” Mindell deviates from other academics of the astronaut image by arguing that
for the astronaut to have been representative of American technological strength, “the
astronauts had to be in control. Frontiersmen could not be passengers.” Finally, he
suggests, “Astronauts’ accounts continually reaffirm that what it means to be a man is
related to control and interpret threats to pilots’ control as threats to their manhood.” 12
The astronauts wanted to master the capsule and prove that they could fly.
According to Mindell, the introduction of more software and technology within the
Apollo capsule reinforced astronaut control over the capsule. He contends that in regard
to the new Apollo Guidance Computer (AGC), “As Apollo’s machines were designed,
built, and operated they called the very nature of ‘heroism’ into question. What did it
mean to be in control?... Can it be ‘manly’ to control a machine by simply pushing
buttons?” 13 The dissertation argues the opposite. As NASA introduced more software and
technology into the Apollo flights, the astronaut moved farther and farther away from
controlling his technology. As average American men attempted to control their own
lives, astronauts struggled to control the capsule.
Americans constructed a discourse that emphasized (if not at times fabricated) the
astronaut’s control over the capsule. However, the Soviets strove for the opposite. Soviet
space historian Asif A. Siddiqi argues that the Chief Designer for the Soviet space
program, Sergei Korolev, stressed the importance of automated capsule control over pilot
control. Korolev suggested:
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As has been repeatedly demonstrated in our automated
flights…, our technology is such that we do not require, as
the American Mercury project does, that our early
cosmonauts be highly skilled engineers. The American
astronaut must help control the rocket systems at every
stage of the flight. 14
Siddiqi maintains that Korolev’s statement “was an indication of the depth to which
automation was an intrinsic factor in the early Soviet piloted space program.” 15 Unlike
the Soviets, the Americans resisted the image of automation or a cog mentality. The
image of the astronaut controlling the technology was important to fighting the Cold War
masculinity crisis.
The alarm over automation was not the only cause for concern regarding
masculinity. Scholars of the Cold War masculinity crisis point to other reasons for a postWorld War II “male panic”: communism, conformity, feminism, homosexuality,
bureaucracy, corporations, male consumerism, too much leisure, and the dreaded William
H. Whyte Jr. “organization man.” 16 Peter Filene’s Him/Her Self: Gender Identities in
Modern America (1974) underscores the 1950s feminization of the work place as a main
reason for the crisis. By the term “feminization” Filene means that during the Cold War
white middle class employment stressed “cooperation, collective effort, and social skills.”
In Homosexuality in Cold War America: Resistance and the Crisis of Masculinity (1997),
Robert J. Corber calls cooperation and conformity feminine characteristics that
represented the organization man. 17 Anthropologist David Gilmore’s Manhood in the
Making: Cultural Concepts of Masculinity (1991) also identifies the white middle class
work place as central to the construction of Cold War gender. He argues that the shift in
production from white males as producer to consumer caused a shift in the images of
American masculinity. Gilmore suggests men were no longer taking on traditional
masculine roles as producer. Instead, they were performing the traditional feminine role
6

of consumer. 18 E. Anthony Rotundo took Gilmore’s masculine shift from producer to
consumer a step farther in American Manhood: Transformations in American Masculinity
from the Revolutions to the Modern Era (1994). He argues that the transition of white
middle class males into white-collar jobs based largely on consumerism caused a major
transition in the American image of masculinity. Rotundo labels this shift the transition
from the “self-made manhood” to “passionate manhood.” 19
Michael Kimmel, the founder of “men’s studies,” follows suit in Manhood in
America: A Cultural History (1996) in which he combines the ideas of Rotundo and
Filene. Kimmel argues that in the nineteenth century, Americans constructed masculinity
as the image of a self-made man, a true rugged individual. Much like Rotundo, Kimmel
stresses a transition from the self-made man into the organization man. 20 Men found it
difficult to continue to self-identify in a team atmosphere. In order for men to retain their
individual identity, Kimmel proposes that a new masculine image emerged that fluctuated
between the self-made and organization man. Kimmel calls this masculinity “democratic
manhood.” As if to compromise between the two extremes, Kimmel creates an image of a
resonating string, bouncing back and forth between the two identities. 21
Kimmel maintains that masculinity is socially constructed and not monolithic. He
believes in the importance of understanding multiple masculinities, but controversially
argues that “All American men must also contend with a singular vision of masculinity, a
particular definition that is held up against which we all measure ourselves.” In Kimmel’s
dominant vision of masculinity, he writes that “manhood is less about the drive for
domination and more about the fear of others dominating us, having power or control
over us.” Kimmel argues that masculinity plays a central importance in men’s daily lives.
He suggests that a driving force for men is their “quest for manhood—the effort to
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achieve, to demonstrate, to prove our masculinity….” 22 During the early Space Race, the
discourse of space journalists, politicians, astronauts, and at times NASA administrators
created the symbol of American masculinity through the image of the astronaut as in
control over his capsule, or in other words, through his ability to fly into space.
James Gilbert agrees with Kimmel’s emphasis on the central importance of
masculinity in male behavior. He addresses different images of masculinity during the
Cold War in Men in the Middle: Searching for Masculinity in the 1950s (2005). The
dissertation will use Gilbert’s definition of the Cold War masculinity crisis as a particular
time period in which norms of masculinity were challenged by both social and
psychological shifts within a culture. Gilbert proposes that during the Cold War
masculinity crisis “the effects of conformity, suburban life, and mass culture were
depicted [in popular culture] as feminizing and debasing, and the proposed solution often
lay in a renewal of traditional masculine vigor and individualism.” Gilbert argues, like
Judith Butler, Joan Wallach Scott, and Kimmel before him, that masculinity is constantly
changing, thus masculinity is difficult to isolate as only one archetype in the 1950s. 23
Gilbert analyzes the masculine images of David Riesman, Alfred Kinsey, Ozzie Nelson,
Billy Graham, Tennessee Williams, and Playboy literary editor, Auguste Comte
Spectorsky. 24 Different time periods in American history experienced an “obsession”
with masculinity. However, since the dissertation focuses on the early astronaut image,
the dissertation will concentrate on the Cold War masculinity crisis. 25
The dissertation adds to the historiography by analyzing how the Cold War
masculinity crisis affected the public image of flight, specifically, spaceflight. The public
discourse depicted the epitome of American masculinity as the taking back of rugged
individualism and control, both physical and mental. Throughout the dissertation
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masculinity that is centered on rugged individualism and physical and mental control will
be referred to as Cold War masculinity. Space journalists, politicians, and astronauts
constructed the astronaut as symbolizing this image of Cold War masculinity. Regardless
of the reality of whether or not the astronaut actually “flew” in space, journalists,
politicians, and astronauts were very adamant about the astronaut’s ability to control the
capsule. The dissertation argues that in completing a gendered analysis, the assumption
that the astronaut could “fly” the capsule insinuated an American masculinity of
individualism apart from Soviet conformity. Through his ability to fly, the American
astronaut represented Cold War masculinity.
This image of a superior American masculinity was challenged throughout the
early race. In 1965, NASA introduced computers and hyphenated scientist-astronauts into
spaceflight. The public image of the astronaut started to change. Moving into Apollo, the
public image of a rugged individual astronaut left alone to control his capsule was
replaced by automation and teams in space. The astronaut image was slowly becoming
the organization man. The following dissertation is important because it demonstrates
that not only was the crisis of masculinity important within the public discourse of the
astronaut image, but also that the rugged individual astronaut did not resolve the
masculinity crisis. Instead, he represented the crisis as he struggled for individualism and
control into the age of the passenger space shuttle 26
The dissertation is a chronological narrative of manned spaceflight from 1958
through 1972. The second chapter begins with an analysis of the Cold War masculinity
crisis. This chapter argues that at the center of the crisis rested the fear of the loss of
rugged individualism and control. The intersection of the Cold War masculinity crisis and
flight is also introduced in this chapter. Through the use of airline advertisements, the
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Cold War masculinity crisis is highlighted within the transition of flight from death
defying feats of lone wolf pioneering pilots to the commercialization, routinization, and
domestication of flight.
The third chapter demonstrates how the early dialogue of spaceflight, 1957-1964,
highlighted the Cold War masculinity crisis. It is in this early dialogue that Americans
constructed space as a masculine sphere. In looking at the public record—such as
statements from Richard M. Nixon, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, news
articles and features in the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, Life, Newsweek, Time,
and the Washington Post—as well as rhetoric employed by major players within NASA,
Americans strove to combat the “crisis” of an apparent willingness to shun individuality
in American culture for the ways of collectivism. Through the militarization of space,
Americans deliberately focused on individuality and control of space. In doing so, the
narrative of space created a masculine pioneer. Americans turned to the jet test pilot as
their representative of rugged individuality and control in space.
The fourth chapter argues that during Project Mercury American space
journalists, politicians, and astronauts constructed the astronaut image as representing
Cold War masculinity through their ability to “fly” their capsules. For example, when the
Chicago Tribune reported on Alan Shepard’s flight, the paper contended that he became
not only America’s first spaceman but he did so “in the world’s first pilot controled [sic]
space ship.” 27 Likewise, when Congressmen Phil Weaver (R-NE) commented on
Commander Shepard’s flight, he took great pains to show the critical issue of control.
“Shepard was able to control his capsule from an interior instrument panel,” argued
Weaver, “whereas the Soviet ‘cosmonaut’ [sic] flight was completely controlled from the
ground.” 28 The New York Times speculated that “Judging by [these] accounts, Gagarin
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rode almost as a passenger.” 29 In creating a rugged individualistic space flyer, Americans
projected an image of not only Cold War masculinity, but also “firsts” in space that
marked them as superior to the Soviets.
The fifth chapter demonstrates how the Lovelace women attempted to enter the
male sphere of spaceflight. Female pilots argued that women should not be passive actors
in spaceflight, but rather, that they should be active participants in the conquest of space.
Due to the dangers of spaceflight, NASA spokespeople deemed the exclusion of women
as astronauts necessary. Women were too weak or fragile to take on the characteristics of
Cold War masculinity. Analysis of the public discourse on women space farers provides
further evidence that Americans saw spaceflight as a masculine sphere where women
could only exist as helpmates and not as active participants. 30
Chapter six argues that as NASA transitioned into Project Gemini, space
journalists, politicians, and astronauts continued to emphasize the importance of manual
control of a space capsule. After the March 1965 launch of Gemini III, Life proclaimed,
“For the first time, rather than being nearly helpless riders aboard an intractable
projectile, the Astronauts really [totally] controlled their craft.” 31 Journalists, politicians,
astronauts, and at times NASA reinterpreted their past in a way to reinforce the idea of
the astronauts’ ability to fly into space. Even as the Soviet Union performed an extravehicular activity (EVA or spacewalk) first, journalists and politicians touted the
American astronaut’s walk in the cosmos as being different from that of the Soviets.
Americans argued that they were “first” with astronaut control of an EVA. Americans
continued to praise pilot control of spaceflight. 32 However, the rugged individual
astronaut image confronted obstacles. The computer on board the Gemini capsule
confused who held control over spaceflight, man or technology.
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NASA’s introduction of the hyphenated scientist-astronauts also challenged the
rugged individual image of the pilot astronaut. Matthew H. Hersch maintains in “Return
of the Lost Spaceman: America’s Astronauts in Popular Culture, 1959-2006” (2011) that
the various media and astronaut accounts surrounding the new hyphenated scientistastronauts demonstrated that not everyone took a liking to the new image. 33 In his
dissertation, “Spacework: Labor and Culture in America’s Astronaut Corps, 1959-1979”
(2010) Hersch argues that during the first decade of the Space Race, the public image of
the astronaut remained “largely unchallenged.” The introduction of the hyphenated
astronauts challenged the “authority” of the pilot astronauts. The new scientist-astronauts
not only changed the workplace of the astronaut, but so too did the national space policy.
In turn, the new NASA management forced the astronauts to change not only the work
they did, but the amount of control they exercised within the organization. 34 Adding to
Hersch’s analysis, I highlight the importance of gender in the public construction of the
astronaut image. The computer and a newer squarer image of the space pilot refashioned
the image of the astronaut from one of a rugged individual jet test pilot controlling space,
to one of a scientist performing experiments in space.
Almost always characterized as the men behind the men in space, Mission
Controllers fought to join the public discourse of the spaceflight image. The controllers
were team players, and corporation men. They were at odds with the public image of the
rugged individualist astronaut. The seventh chapter suggests that during Project Apollo,
the Cold War masculinity of spaceflight shifted from rugged individualism to teamwork.
The image of the astronaut as a symbol of an idealized masculinity during the Cold War
masculinity crisis was floundering. Three manned missions symbolized the permanent
shift in the public discourse. The Apollo 1 fire and subsequent deaths of three astronauts
12

revealed a complete lack of control by astronauts, scientists, engineers, and technicians.
Apollo 13 highlighted the loss of individual astronaut control and stressed astronaut
reliance on technology, teamwork, and Mission Control. Finally, Apollo 17’s launch of
the first scientist-astronaut demonstrated the ability of non-jet test pilots to penetrate the
highly exclusive cult of the astronauts, forever changing the image of the rugged
individual pioneer. The commissioning of the space shuttles as passenger vehicles further
suggested that spaceflight was safe. In the role of passengers in space, the astronauts
continued to face the Cold War masculinity crisis.
The astronaut, once constructed as the epitome of American masculinity, labored
for control of space. As it became easier for non-jet test pilots to fly into space, the
symbol of the astronaut as possessing a superior masculinity struggled. The print media
and politicians no longer stressed the astronauts’ rugged individualism or control.
Instead, they stressed astronauts as not only pilots, but also engineers, scientists, all who
worked in teams with the men at Mission Control. The image of the astronaut that once
symbolized the taking back of American masculinity during the Cold War masculinity
crisis had failed. Space journalists, politicians, and NASA suggested that space was now
safe. There was no longer a need for an emphasis on rugged individualism and control. In
the end the astronaut image became that of the organization man and the Cold War
masculinity crisis continued within NASA.
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CHAPTER II
RUGGED INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATION MEN: THE COLD WAR
MASCULINITY CRISIS
On his 1959 CBS program, journalist Mike Wallace interviewed Ayn Rand
regarding both her personal philosophy of “objectivism” and that which she presented in
her book Atlas Shrugged (1957). Rand called her philosophy not “Randism” as suggested
by Wallace, but rather the “cult of morality.” She explained that this cult was not based
on Christianity or any other religion, but rather on realism and logic that for man came
from “the independent judgment of his own mind.” Of man’s function on earth, Rand
philosophized, “His highest moral purpose is the achievement of his own individual
happiness.” She balked at the modern American need for majority rule, suggesting that
every person had a right to their “individual happiness.” Wallace seemed perturbed by
what he referred to as her “selfish” philosophy. 1
The two discussed whether or not it was the responsibility of man to be “his
brother’s keeper.” To this, Rand ridiculed the idea of a welfare state, suggesting that
Americans were finding themselves closer to socialism and social collectivism. She
argued that within the new American welfare state “everybody is enslaved to everybody.”
Rand detested government power, taxes, unemployment compensation, regulation, and
even rent control. She said that with government regulation, the American people had
never been given “a choice.” Wallace asked of her opinion toward America’s past before
government regulation. Specifically, he wanted her opinion on Robber Barons of the 19th
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century. Rand insisted that the term Robber Baron was inaccurate. Rather, these business
pioneers were “independent men.” 2
While Rand’s thinking was quite extreme for the time, the words and images of
individualism and choice reflected other authors of post-World War II America. In fact,
sociologists David Riesman and William Whyte Jr., authors Sloane Wilson and Betty
Friedan, and even politicians John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon echoed Rand in
their celebration of American individualism. In order to understand the development of
Cold War masculinity within both flight and manned spaceflight, it is important to trace
the public discourse of the post World War II masculinity crisis. From the 1940s and
lasting through the early Space Race, writers, academics, doctors, politicians, and various
leading popular culture magazines emphasized a crisis of masculinity. They argued that
communism, conformity, feminism, homosexuality, bureaucracy, corporations, male
consumerism, too much leisure, automation, and the organization man threatened
American masculinity. This dialogue permeated not only American culture but also the
commercialization of flight.
Scholars such as Michael Kimmel and James Gilbert have suggested that the
American experience in the military during World War II helps explain the need for a
reinvigorated Cold War masculinity in the 1950s. Around 16 million American men and
women served in the war. These men, and at times women, returned home to ticker tape
parades, a burgeoning economy, and their own personal advancements through the 1944
G.I. Bill or Serviceman’s Readjustment Act. As men, they had served their country,
fought in battle, risked life and limb for others, and survived. In turn, some of these
former soldiers became part of a growing white middle class America. White men proved
themselves as providers and protectors on the field of battle and upon returning home
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established themselves as providers in the corporate office. Michael Kimmel writes that
“Men had been able to prove on the battlefield what they had found difficult to prove at
the workplace and in their homes—that they were dedicated providers and protectors.” 3
Newspapers and magazines filled their pages with individual and collective tales of
courage and vigor. Through military services American men exercised masculinity. If
these men displayed such heroics on the battlefield and were victorious, why would a
crisis of masculinity exist in a time of such blatant masculine prowess? While the war
reinvigorated American masculinity, the war also challenged white male control.
In American culture, white maleness had long been the standard by which
masculinity was measured. 4 Lorry M. Fenner and Marie De Young argue in Women in
Combat: Civic Duty or Military Liability? (2001) that white males performed masculinity
through military combat and economic, political, and social privilege. In essence, in
American society, white males retained the rights of citizenship, not minorities or
women. With these privileges, white men controlled the public sphere of society. 5 In
World War II, minorities and women challenged white male hegemony by performing
citizenship in the military and by entering the public sphere of outside employment. Over
one million African-Americans joined the military during the war. They made up roughly
8 percent of the total military personnel. Similarly to World War I, the American military
segregated units and jobs. Seventy-eight percent of African-Americans held service based
jobs, such as cooks, waiters, and porters. Due to a shortage of white combat troops, the
military allowed African-American males to fight in the air and on the ground. This
challenged white protectorship. 6 Through their military service African-Americans
demonstrated masculinity.
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Women also challenged the role of male protectorship and white masculinity.
World War II became the first war in which American women officially joined as
soldiers. While serving in segregated branches, women comprised roughly two percent of
the total American military personnel. 7 As middle class women eagerly entered the
public sphere, they made their own decisions, traveled alone for the first time, and held
outside employment. Like men, women found themselves under fire in combat zones.
White male inability to protect female soldiers from strafing challenged white masculine
protectorship and thus, white masculinity. 8
Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Americans further defied
white male control. Even with institutionalized racism in the military and at home,
minorities eagerly enlisted. 9 Despite advances made by minority groups, discrimination
continued. For the most part, the public image of the American soldier remained that of a
white male. While white males could maintain their manhood on the battlefield in World
War II, the proxy wars of the Cold War, Korea, and Vietnam, proved more difficult. One
of the first challenges to the white male soldier/protector image came in the form of
President Truman’s Executive Order 9981. 10 This order desegregated the military,
allowing—hypothetically anyway—non-white males to fight on equal footing with white
males.
Military participation was not the only threat to white masculinity. The study of
character type and sociology emphasized a possible masculinity crisis. James Gilbert
argues that the “relentless and self-conscious preoccupation with masculinity” in the
1950s was largely due to the fascination of sociologists and historians with “social
character” and the beginnings of “masculinity as a subject for contemporary study….”
Gilbert suggests that historians began to look at their field as a “process of evolving
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psychological states and character types.” 11 Social character became important in its
relation to current events.
As Americans concerned themselves with social character, gender norms were at
the forefront of the discussion. In 1949, the U.S. Army Medical Department released a
report that suggested during combat “most men have anxiety.” The conclusion appeared
obvious, but their findings shocked Americans. Army psychiatrists estimated that around
75 percent of American infantrymen during World War II were unable to pull the
trigger. 12 Similarly, a 1952 article in Colliers entitled “Why Half Our Combat Soldiers
Fail to Shoot” exposed the perceived weak underbelly of American fighting men in both
World War II and Korea. 13 Kimmel suggests that “a large number became incontinent in
battle, and many men would ‘feign emotional disorder’ in order to get out of the line of
fire.” 14
Cold War sociologists and contemporary historians looked at individual
cowardice as evidence of a lack of masculinity. Novels such as Norman Mailer’s The
Naked and the Dead (1948) and Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 (1961) adequately portrayed,
and at times normalized, such anxiety and lack of control on the battlefield and in the
air. 15 Michael C.C. Adams maintains that the American military faced high rates of
mental instability among soldiers, thus pointing to an increasing loss of control during the
war. Adams proposes: “About 25-30 percent of World War II casualties were
psychological cases; under very severe conditions that number could reach as high as 7080 percent.” 16
Scholars insinuated a masculinity crisis even before the end of the war.
Academics pointed to overbearing motherhood as an explanation to white male anxiety.
In his Generation of Vipers (1942), popular writer Philip Wylie described this fear as a
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pre-war disease known as “momism.” Wylie chastised mothers for the overprotection of
their sons, claiming that such coddling directly led to unmasculine behavior. Wylie
pointed to two necessities for the restoration of American masculinity: the destruction of
the overprotective mother and the return of the nuclear family. 17
Dr. Benjamin Spock disagreed with Wylie. In Baby and Childcare (1946) he
encouraged mothers by suggesting: “You know more than you think you do.” Spock even
persuaded fathers to have more confidence in their ability to take on motherly roles, such
as changing diapers and feeding the baby. He hoped to convince dads that they could be
“warm fathers” while still being “real men.” Spock influenced mothers to “enjoy their
babies,” and “respond to the baby’s needs.” Mothers were to be “lovingly” not “sternly.”
To Spock, not being afraid to love one’s baby taught babies “confidence.” 18 By trusting
some of their own instincts, Spock empowered women. Drawing inspiration from Wylie,
David Levy published Maternal Overprotection (1943). Dr. Edward Strecker followed
with Their Mother’s Sons (1946). 19 They disagreed with Spock. They believed mother’s
acted too emotional toward their children.
On 27 April 1945, Strecker delivered a speech known as “the Mom lecture”
before physicians at Bellevue Hospital. He told the audience that the military referred to
those who experienced mental breakdowns as “‘mommies’ boys.’” He warned of the loss
of “self-preservation” brought on by momism. 20 To Strecker, the loss of self-preservation
created a loss of male control. Anthropologist Margaret Mead disagreed with Wylie and
his followers. She asked in And Keep Your Powder Dry (1942) “Have we made it a
condition of success that a man should reach a higher position than his father’s when
such an achievement (for the many) is dependent upon the existence of a frontier and an
expanding economy?” Mothers were not to blame for the male panic. Mead suggested
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that American men suffered from “contradictory cultural messages” that wanted men “to
be tough and to stand up for themselves, and, at the same time, teach them that
aggression is wrong….” 21
Pulitzer Prize winning Harvard history professor, and Democratic Party supporter,
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., preferred to view male “anxiety” not in terms of the mother
but rather through Cold War ideology that separated men into “hard” and soft”
personalities. He professed that the “Western Man [sic] in the twentieth century is tense,
uncertain, adrift. We look upon our epoch as a time of troubles, an age of anxiety.”
Capitalism, science, and technology have led the charge in detaching people from morals
and individual self-fulfillment. Industrialization was responsible for the downfall of the
individual. Schlesinger argued that as capitalism and corporations grew, “Man longs to
escape the pressures beating down on his frail individuality;…the surest means of escape
seems to be to surrender that individuality to some massive, external authority.” 22
Schlesinger blamed human suffering on corrupt corporations and impersonality.
This detachment forced people into communism. In fact, suggested Schlesinger,
communist states were not communist at all, but rather totalitarian dictatorships. He
supported Jacksonian democracy and New Deal politics. He abhorred those who believed
that progress could be created through “science, bourgeois complacency, Unitarianism,
and the faith in the goodness of man.” Striving for a “heaven on earth,” these people
focused on “sentimentality” in “politics and culture.” He called this group of politicians
“progressives.” Schlesinger advocated liberal democracy with a strong central
government. To make his point, Schlesinger employed gendered symbols. He viewed
progressives as “soft,” “sentimental,”—a “Doughface” movement. On the “progressive of
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today,” Schlesinger warned, “His sentimentality has softened up the progressive for
Communist permeation and conquest.” 23
Modern scholars such as K. A. Cuordileone have completed a gender analysis on
Schlesinger’s argument. Cuordileone argues in “‘Politics in an Age of Anxiety’: Cold
War Political Culture and the Crisis of American Masculinity, 1949-1960,” (2000) that
the Vital Center “reflects a political culture that put a new premium on hard masculine
toughness and rendered anything less than that soft and feminine and, as such, a real or
potential threat to the security of the nation.” To Cuordileone, Schlesinger did not simply
employ words. Instead, “The power of the hard/soft opposition in political discourse lay
here, in the gendered symbolic baggage that gave such imagery meaning and
resonance.” 24 His words reflected a greater public discourse of the growing panic of
changing gender roles in the post World War II era.
Schlesinger attempted to depict masculinity as hard and weak as soft or
doughfaced. However, a post-World War II scientist disputed the idea of traditional
gendered symbols and images. An entomologist at Indiana University, Alfred Kinsey,
shocked the nation with his own analysis of social character. Kinsey tested the limits of
male sexuality in his Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (1948). Kinsey claimed that of
males surveyed between the ages of 16 to 20, 27.3% had engaged in “homosexual
activity to the point of orgasm.” Kinsey professed that the number rose to 38.7% in male
respondents between the ages 36 to 40. He alleged to have interviewed 12,000 subjects,
6,300 of who were male, 5,300 of those were white. Kinsey warned readers that the study
had underrepresented blue collar workers. He maintained that at the present time, he
could not make any conclusions regarding the sexual behavior of the male “negro.” 25
Therefore, Kinsey’s study pertained to the sexual behavior of middle class white males.
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John D’Emilio and Estelle B. Freedman note in Intimate Matters: A History of
Sexuality in America (1988) that despite the tedious scientific language of the book, in its
first twenty-seven weeks on the New York Times best-seller list, retailers sold 250,000
copies. 26 Americans had Kinsey fever. The Times summarized Kinsey’s findings as
“showing how unrealistic and even barbarous is the legalistic conception of sex relations
which has prevailed for centuries….” According to the paper, Kinsey claimed that 85%
of males have had premarital sex, 70% have had sexual relations with prostitutes, 30-40%
were unfaithful in their marriages, with 37% having some sort of homosexual experience
between adolescence and late adulthood. The statistics challenged American conventions
on both traditional sexual relations and gender norms. Kinsey forewarned that this did not
mean the country was “loose” or that “the world is going to the dogs.” 27 Kinsey’s work
added to the growing public discourse on proper gender roles during the Cold War. His
work questioned the normalization of heterosexual relationships. Could a man still be
masculine if he engaged in sexual activity with another man?
Mixed reviews plagued Kinsey’s findings. Sociology professors at the University
of Pennsylvania, A. H. Hobbs and R. D. Lambert, accused Kinsey and his researchers of
using flawed statistical analysis. They charged Kinsey and his team of interviewing
married men of 30 years old about both their sexual conduct as married men, and their
sexual escapades as adolescents. To the professors, sexual engagement by married men
when they were adolescents a generation ago did not necessarily speak to the adolescents
of present day. They also alleged that Kinsey had used testing methods on humans that he
previously used on animals. 28 However, taking a closer look at his introduction, Kinsey
explained, “Before it is possible to think scientifically on any of these matters, more
needs to be known about the actual behavior of people, and about the inter-relationships
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of that behavior with the biologic and social aspects of their histories.” 29 What becomes
clear, at least within the academic world, is that social scientists were disgusted that
Kinsey would treat human test subjects as mere animals. Sociologists and psychologists
accused Kinsey of ignoring the individuality and humanity of his test subjects.
Kinsey received further criticism from academics when in late March 1948
psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, and anthropologists met at a conference to
discuss social hygiene. Scholars at the conference attempted to “throw the book” at
Kinsey. Although disappointed that the entomologist was not invited, Margaret Mead
lambasted Kinsey for not factoring in the human emotion of sex. Psychiatrist Dr. Jule
Eisenbud suggested that Kinsey’s ardent evangelical background biased his study.
Eisenbud agreed with Mead that Kinsey ignored human individuality, and he added that
as a biologist, Kinsey “wants to give us the impression that the range of sexual function is
primarily biological in origin, ignoring that there are many men driven by compulsive
need to demonstrate their masculinity.” 30
On 5 June 1948, Kinsey responded to critics. He defended himself against the
accusations that he thought culture was unimportant to human sexual behavior. Speaking
before the American Psychological Association, Kinsey professed that societal norms had
more impact on sexual behavior than society’s laws. Strongly acknowledging individual
choice in sexual relations, Kinsey alleged that “‘Heredity also might be a cause, but not a
strong one.’” 31
In the Cold War era when sexuality was considered a choice by both the public
and the medical community, Kinsey’s study suggested that sexuality was the ultimate in
individual choice. However, most scientists and Americans viewed homosexuality as a
mental disorder, thus, suggesting a lack of control. 32 Men who succumbed to unnatural
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sex urges were weak or soft. America’s first transsexual, Christine Jorgenson further
challenged rigid gender roles. 33 On 1 December 1952, newspapers announced that after
the world’s first successful sexual reassignment surgery in Denmark, WWII veteran
George William Jorgenson Jr. became “an attractive blonde.” 34 Jorgenson’s surgery not
only suggested that biological sex was not fixed, but that neither were gender roles. Her
surgery displayed the ease in which one could change both sex and gender.
The need to project a traditional American image of masculine heterosexual
control proved necessary during the communist scares of the Cold War, particularly
during Senator Joseph McCarthy’s communist witch-hunts. These inquisitions were not
about communism alone, but also about reasserting heterosexual dominance. According
to one of McCarthy’s aides, the senator linked subversives together as “‘pinks, punks,
and perverts,’” who lingered as employees of the State Department, affecting the very
safety of Americans. McCarthy referred to these “‘subversives’” as “‘a veritable nest of
Communists, fellow travelers, homosexuals, effete Ivy League intellectuals, and
traitors.’” 35 McCarthy was not alone in his sentiments. Head of the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI), J. Edgar Hoover, saw the problem as a lack of self-control. 36
Another ardent anti-homosexual politician, Arthur Miller (R-NE), helped write
several of Washington D.C.’s “sexual psychopath” laws. His mission was to make it
illegal for homosexuals to be employed within the federal government. On 31 March
1950, Miller passionately declared before the House: “I would like to strip the fetid,
stinking flesh off the skeleton of homosexuality….” He congratulated the State
Department on its recent resignation of 91 homosexuals. But where are they now, the
Congressman asked. They were walking the streets of the District of Columbia. Police
figures estimated that between six and eight thousand lived in the city. Homosexuals
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were roaming the streets, according to Miller, gathering for “sex orgies” acting as
“pimps” and other “undesirable characters.” Wondering aloud to the group, Miller asked,
“how many of these homosexuals have had a part in shaping our foreign policy?... It is a
known fact that homosexuality goes back to the Orientals,…. the Russians are strong
believers in homosexuality.” 37 Americans believed that homosexuality disrupted gender
roles and threatened masculinity.
Representative George H. Christopher (D-MO) condemned Miller, insisting that
the talk over homosexuals in government gave them “free advertising.” Congressman
Harley Staggers (D-WV) demanded that if these homosexuals were suspected of treason,
they should be given a fair trial. To these statements before the House, Representative
Richard W. Hoffman (R-IL) pointed out that the Democrats had been in control for the
past 13 to 15 years. And yet, they allowed homosexuals to run all over Washington. “For
the last 10 years practically everybody in Washington knew about all this [sic]
disreputable, dirty, nasty bunch on the Federal pay roll… Now the gentleman objects to
their being exposed. If he wants to take them home and live with them, all right; but you
have no right—. [sic]” Representative Christopher asked Hoffman to “yield” but he
refused and continued blaming the Democrats for the onslaught of homosexuals in
government. He suggested of Christopher: “Maybe the gentleman likes them
[homosexuals]; I do not; neither do my people.” 38
Fears of homosexuals infiltrating the government, if not the country, only grew
louder as the summer approached. In July 1950, Senator Kenneth S. Wherry (R-NE)
stated “You can’t hardly separate homosexuals from subversives….” 39 Pundits lambasted
Presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson for his un-masculine behavior of being both
“‘soft’” on communism and an “‘egghead’” supported by “‘Harvard lace cuff liberals.’” 40
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Papers such as the New York Daily News went so far as to take shots at Stevenson’s
voices calling it “‘fruity.’” Michael Kimmel summed up popular culture’s obsession with
masculinity as,
The trappings of gender failure were all around us in the
1950s, and American men discovered what happened to
men who failed, especially the sons of men who failed as
breadwinners and fathers. They became homosexual, they
became juvenile delinquents, they became Communists—
soft, spineless dupes of a foreign power, who were
incapable of standing up for themselves. 41
During a 30 September 1950 Republican fundraiser in Atlantic City,
Representative Leonard W. Hall (R-NY) accused the Democratic Party of being run by
“‘fuzzy-minded pinks.’” 42 Republicans consistently accused Secretary of State Dean
Acheson of being a homosexual. Republicans called for more firings of suspected
homosexuals in the State Department. They wanted to get rid of Acheson’s men. 43
Attacks against homosexuals continued in Congress.
On 1 May 1952, Representative Katherine St. George (R-NY) warned Congress
of a possible “Homosexual International,” an international conspiracy theory coined by
popular writer, R.G. Waldeck. Waldeck cautioned that homosexuals were organized
internationally and were working in foreign affairs offices. They liked to “staff” their
foreign officers with their “own people,” she warned. The real threat, wrote Waldeck,
came in the form of an “alliance between the homosexual international and the
Communist International [that] started at the dawn of the Pink Decade.” Today, the
homosexual international works are “a sort of auxiliary of the Communist International.
This is more alarming since the homosexuals are multiplying as the sand upon the
seashore.” To combat this upsurge in homosexuals, Waldeck demanded the American
government fire all homosexuals, educate the American people, get rid of this “love—
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and—let—love” attitude that “lulls society into a false sense of security” and finally,
above all, teach Americans the “admirable art of self-control.” 44
The pink panic was widespread. On 6 November 1953, the New York Times
reported the firing of 1,456 government workers, 384 from the Department of State alone,
under the Eisenhower Administration’s crackdown on security risks and governmental
employees. The administration aimed these firings at “homosexuals, alcoholics,
‘blabbermouths,’ as well as Communists and Red Sympathizers.” 45 What the flourishing
subcultures of gays and lesbians and the frenzy over the Kinsey studies show is a fear of
the loss of self control. The need for Cold War masculinity in the 1950s was a theme
surrounding American life and thought.
Fears of homosexuality and collectivism ran deep. To combat the masculinity
crisis, Americans wrote widely of the rejection of collectivism and a return to American
individualism. Ayn Rand’s works such as The Fountainhead (1943), Atlas Shrugged
(1957), and Anthem (1961), portrayed the debate between the individual and the
organization. For example, The Fountainhead’s hero, modernist architect Howard Roark,
struggled to invoke his architectural vision in his firm. In the 1949 movie, Roark railed
against “soulless collectivism” while declaring that “Greatness comes from the
independent work of independent minds.” 46
In the public discourse, 1950s Americans took the myths of the nineteenth century
individual and struggled to create a Cold War pioneer. As they fought to create this image
of Cold War masculinity, another target for the masculinity crisis became the fear of
automation. Intellectuals suggested that the Cold War man pushed buttons, while the
nineteenth century pioneer tamed the unsettled wilderness. In 1950, sociologist David
Riesman supported the return to the nineteenth century pioneer image. Riesman
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introduced American sociology and popular culture to the struggle between individual
identity and conformity throughout the entirety of American history in his work The
Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character. He argued that in early
American history, man did conform to his society. However, in the time period in which
the United States experienced its greatness, to Riesman the nineteenth century, men were
rugged pioneers, controlling their environment.
For example, Riesman suggested that American character originally began with
the tradition-directed man. This man’s character held fast to familial and cultural
traditions, leaving him with little autonomy to make decisions outside his cultural norms.
His ability to follow tradition decided his conformity. However, the industrial revolution
in the mid-nineteenth century caused a shift toward the inner-directed man whose
individuality of character was highly developed. While, like the tradition-directed man,
the inner-directed man did conform to certain societal standards, these standards alone
were not fulfilling. For the inner-directed man, “personal choice” is not dictated by
societal norms, but rather “is solved by channeling choice through a rigid though highly
individualized character.” As man exercised individuality, he began to control his own
life. To gain control, the inner-directed man needed to “master resource exploitation on
all the fronts of which he is conscious.” In essence, he is the entrepreneur, the captain of
industry, the pioneer, and frontiersman. 47 To Riesman, the technology of the industrial
revolution had refashioned American culture. The interconnectedness between
technology and culture formulated Riesman’s second shift in American culture.
During the twentieth century, as working in agriculture, manufacturing and
industries declined, a third archetype emerged, what Riesman referred to as the otherdirected man. Riesman observed that an education geared toward differences in cultures,
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services, leisure, and the consumption of words and images from the new mass media,
popular culture, and peer groups gave rise to the new American character. He
hypothesized that the other-directed “Captains of Non-Industry, of Consumption, and
Leisure,” replaced the “inner-directed Captains of Industry.” The other-directed man
received direction from his contemporaries, whether that direction was from his family,
friends, popular culture, or from media outlets. These directions shifted depending on
what “signals,” “actions,” and “wishes,” he received from others. Riesman admitted that
all peoples throughout time, at one point or another, “want to be liked,” but it is the otherdirected man who makes it his primary goal. By wanting to be liked, the other-directed
man did not show individuality or control. It should be noted that Riesman does not
explicitly suggest that either the traditional, inner, or other directed “people” only refer
to the characters of men. However, since he alluded to the economic emancipation of
women as reasons for these shifts in American character, it can be inferred that
Riesman’s three characters are images of masculinity. 48
In 1962, David M. Potter argued in “American Women and the American
Character,” that since women traditionally have been dependent, they cultivated
sensitivity to the mood and expectations of others. In their dependence, women quickly
adapted to these moods and expectations. Therefore, women have always been otherdirected. 49 Consequently, they could not have had an inner-directed character. Similarly,
James Gilbert argues that Riesman’s three character types represent a fear of “besieged
masculinity.” Riesman’s character shifts insinuated transformations in “male culture
through American history—in fact, as an implicit warning that men were becoming like
women, which is to say, other-directed.” Gilbert argues that the most compelling part of
Riesman’s work “was its potential for understanding the most serious questions of the
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1950s: how to remain an individual—how to be a man in an increasingly feminized world
of mass culture consumption, and conformity.” 50 In the public discourse, the answers to
these fears of a besieged masculinity depended upon the creation of an invigorated Cold
War masculinity of rugged individualism and control.
In 1951, sociologist C. Wright Mills followed Riesman’s work. Mills denigrated
the new white middle class man as weak. To Mills, men of the white middle class did
“not threaten anyone,” and failed to “practice an independent life.” Mills saw men as
weak and conformist. Mills professed that the men of the nineteenth century,
businessmen and farmers alike, were “individuals” and “their own men.” In the twentieth
century, the “white-collar man has never been independent as the farmer…as the business
man. He has always been somebody’s man, the corporation’s, the government’s, the
army’s; and he is seen as the man who does not rise.” Blaming what he saw as the
downfall of free entrepreneurship on male conformity, Mills stressed the “rise of the
dependent employee” and the “decline of the independent individual.” 51
William Whyte Jr. took the fears of this new Cold War conformist man and
named him “the organization man.” Whyte’s organization men not only worked for the
institution but they belonged to it as well. “They are the ones of our middle class who
have left home, spiritually as well as physically, to take the vows of the organization life,
and it is they who are the mind and soul of great self-perpetuating institutions.” Like
others before him, Whyte sought for a return to the characteristics of the mythical
nineteenth century pioneer image. He argued that this long ago pioneer embodied the
“Protestant Ethic” of which Whyte defined as, “there is almost always the thought that
pursuit of individual salvation through hard work, thrift, and competitive struggle is the
heart of the American achievement.” He bemoaned the end of the Protestant Ethic and
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the loss of “self-reliance.” He claimed that the organization man preferred “safety to
adventure.” 52 These fears of safety over adventure found themselves within the
transformation of flight in the Cold War era from rugged individual pioneering to the
creation of large feminized corporations.
Popular culture writers appeared to fear the organization man’s perfectible society
of organization, preferring instead, a society in which Cold War masculinity triumphed
over conformity and weakness. The year the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, 1957,
journalist Richard Gehman wrote a scathing editorial for Cosmopolitan entitled
“Toupees, Girdles, and Sun Lamps.” The article lambasted American men and women
for the blurring of gender roles as men domesticated themselves within the home. 53 That
same year, Norman Mailer pointed to the hipster as the new the pop culture icon in his
essay “The White Negro.” Mailer warned of the “slow death [of the individual] by
conformity with every creative and rebellious instinct stifled.” Looking back at the fear of
dissension that encapsulated the Germans in World War II, Mailer mourned, “One could
hardly maintain the courage to be [an] individual, to speak with one’s own voice,...” 54
Mailer’s hipster rejected organized mainstream society in favor of escaping into the self.
The hipster embodied not only the self-reliance of Whyte’s Protestant Ethic and
Strecker’s self-preservation but also Cold War masculinity, the individual man striving to
gain control of his life back from the group.
In a much bolder thesis, Schlesinger once again lambasted Cold War gender roles.
After the launch of Sputnik, he wrote “The Crisis of American Masculinity.” The article
appeared in both the 1958 edition of the men’s magazine, Esquire, and the predominantly
women’s magazine, Look. Schlesinger detailed the growing independence of women and
the increasing domestication of the American male. While Schlesinger found that more
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men became a “substitute for wife and mother—changing diapers, washing dishes,
cooking meals, and performing a whole series of what once were considered female
duties”—to Schlesinger, the root of the problem was not necessarily women. While
American women were taking over more of the “big decisions” and “controlling men,”
the plight of the American male did not center on female aggression alone, but rather
with the American male’s “uncertainty about his identity in general. Nothing is harder in
the whole human condition than to achieve a full sense of identity—than to know who
you are, where you are going, and what you mean to live and die for.” Schlesinger’s
remedy for this problem dictated that every man must recover his “individual
spontaneity” and “visualize himself as an individual apart from the group.” 55
The alarm over the loss of individuality and control manifested itself into the
1960 presidential campaign. Like Schlesinger, both Massachusetts Senator John F.
Kennedy and Vice President Richard M. Nixon expressed concern over the loss of
American individuality. Kennedy lamented before the press on 1 January 1960:
We are, I am afraid, in danger of losing something solid at
the core. We are losing that Pilgrim and pioneer spirit of
initiative and independence—that old-fashioned Spartan
devotion to ‘duty, honor, and country.’ We don’t need that
spirit now, we think. Now we have cars to drive and
buttons to push and TV to watch—and pre-cooked meals
and prefab houses. We stick to the orthodox, to the easy
way and the organization man. We take for granted our
security, our liberty, and our future—when we cannot take
any of them for granted at all. 56
Kennedy’s statement suggested a longing for an imagined past. In this past, Americans
performed not only “Spartan” toughness, but were doers; they welcomed a hard life of
exploration and independent living. Kennedy compared that past with a contemporary
image; he pointed to Whyte’s organization man. The image presented there was a
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manifest softness, an America lacking individuality and control as well as a can-do
attitude, which had characterized Sparta and pioneering. To Kennedy, in the organization
man’s world, comfort and ease were pre-arranged. Instead of devotion to independence
and country, Kennedy, like Whyte, saw Cold War Americans permitting comfort, leisure,
automation, authority, and conformity to control their lives. In his speech, Americans
were not doing or leading, they were accepting and following. By utilizing Whyte’s
organization man in a political speech, Kennedy infused the discourse of popular culture
into the dialogue of American politics, security, and technology. This precise formulation
among culture, politics, and technology increasingly became part of the Cold War public
discourse. The following summer, Kennedy again spoke of the importance of individual
toughness when he wrote in Life magazine:
our national purpose consists of…striving, risking,
choosing, making decisions, engaging in a pursuit of
happiness that is strenuous, heroic, exciting and exalted.
When we do so as individuals, we make a nation that, in
Jefferson’s words, will always be ‘in the full tide of
successful experiment.’ 57
Kennedy claimed the four goals of America’s future were survival, competition, peace,
and prosperity. In order to reach these goals, the national purpose must be “The
fulfillment of every individual’s dignity and potential.” 58 To Kennedy, the root of
American greatness depended on the individuality.
Nixon countered with a speech also appearing in Life, entitled, “Our Resolve Is
Running Strong.” Nixon asserted that the greatness of America rested on its “vigor.”
Nixon stressed that the United States was “a society of individuals. Our institutions
project outward from people, not downward to people. The individual initiates, society
imitates. The individual follows his endless curiosity; society builds roads that follow his
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footprints.” 59 Nixon continued with the theme of an individual society when in
November 1960 he encouraged America’s youth, “to take the right road, the high road of
individual initiative and dependence on one’s self.” 60
Pundits in popular magazines jumped at the chance to pinpoint growing fears of a
masculinity crisis. A December 1950 article in Better Homes and Gardens asked
American parents “Are we staking our future on a crop of sissies?” The author, Andre
Fontaine, lamented that “You have a horror of seeing your son a pantywaist, but he won’t
get red blood and self-reliance if you leave the whole job of making a he-man of him to
his mother.” Fontaine’s article instructed parents on how to make their boys grow up to
be “independent, mature men.” Much like Dr. Spock, Fontaine implored fathers to also
take part in the child’s rearing during the first two years of the child’s life. He suggested
the father hold, feed, and changes the baby so that instead of looking solely to the mother
as one to identify with, the impressionable child will also look to the father. In order to
prevent the boy from becoming a sissy, Fontaine implored a refashioning in gender
parenting roles in which men engaged in the “women’s work” of taking care of the
children. Connecting both technology and culture, Fontaine hypothesized that one reason
American boys were more prone to becoming sissies in the industrial age was because the
country was no longer a land of farmers. He explained, “On the farm, a boy went into the
barns and fields, working alongside his father. The more he learned, the more
independence and self-confidence he had, because he was doing men’s work.” 61
Fontaine warned of the growing threat of automation and corporations. Other
popular magazines carried the same messages. Life ran a two part series by Ernest
Havemann that criticized “The Emptiness of Too Much Leisure.” He professed that too
much technology made American men weak. Havemann blamed the onslaught of male
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leisure in the 1950s to an “automatic and a shrinking work week.” He cautioned that
mechanization “brings a real threat to all of us.” 62 In 1960, Senator Kennedy also warned
against “the steady replacement of men by machines.” 63 Sociologists, psychologists, and
psychiatrists all feared that if men found themselves with too many hours of free time
they would become “restless, jittery, bored, and irritable, personally miserable and
intolerable….” Fearing a cog mentality, Dr. Richard Bellman, a mathematician at the
Rand Corporation, believed that “automation has already shown a truly remarkable
capacity to replace human muscle and brainpower….” 64
Dr. Paul Haun, chairman of the American Psychiatric Association’s committee for
the study of leisure, argued that the age of leisure was brought on by automation that
created more mechanical comforts such as air conditioning, automobiles, and mass
production; however, there was an upside to this automatic movement. While automation
suggested the lack of individual identity, the products from automation created avenues
for Americans to express their individual identity. Americans demonstrated individuality
and choice through the consumption of products. For every job lost to automation, each
man is able to “take part in a great renaissance of personal service and attention to
individual taste…” Haun insisted that luxuries such as expensive houses, jewelry, mink
coats, and fancy automobiles acted not as symbols of conformity but actually as symbols
of “hard work, virtue, social prestige, [and] standing in the community.” 65
The articles in Life pertaining to the apprehension of growing leisure were a
response to the 19 July 1963 Life article, “The Point of No Return for Everybody.” The
article captured the main fear of American automation’s “mixed blessings” as “it
produces goods at lower cost, making it possible for more people to buy them and thus
spurring the economy. But it displaces men.” The article describes a machinist’s new
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profession as “All he has to do is press the button to start the machine and then monitor
it. All he has to know is what his machine looks like so he can find it when he comes to
work.” 66 While Americans consumed personal identity through leisure, their work
identity became as passive as pushing buttons.
Communications Workers president, Joseph Beirnes, argued in New Horizons for
Labor that the future the job of U.S. factory workers will be that of “‘people in white
coats baby-sitting for push buttons.’” 67 Articles that forewarned the loss of male
productivity to machines represented the fears of a growing masculinity crisis. Flight also
faced the dilemma of loss of male production to machinery and technology. Male
passengers in flight outnumbered male pilots. Men’s relationship to flight technology was
changing. Men were becoming passive actors. Modern flying with machines and
computers created a new dialogue of flight in the 1950s. This dialogue highlighted Cold
War conversations about masculinity. Were men doers or were they passengers? Those
within American popular culture debated whether or not the machine took the control
away from the pilot, thus demasculinizing flight, or whether flight represented the
ultimate in Cold War masculinity, that of individual control through individual choice.
Four years after World War II, the Washington D.C. Aero Club presented Charles
Lindbergh with the Wright Brothers Memorial Trophy. In a speech that was broadcasted
throughout the country, the forty-seven year old flyer said that back in his “log-cabin
days” of flying, piloting was simpler. “Today, the world has created the atmosphere as a
‘hothouse’ threatening the very survival of the human race.” For survival, according to
Lindbergh, man needed to “balance science” with “body,” “spirit,” and “mind.” To the
flier, these were characteristics one could not develop if “he lets mechanics and luxury
translate him too greatly.” Lindbergh asked the audience what happened to the days of
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“iron men and wooden ships?” The downfall of aviation, Lindbergh suggested, began
with the “self-starter” and “closed cockpit.” He argued, “We must not let science
hypnotize us into believing that simply by sitting in front of desks and drawing boards
and instruments all day we are contributing to the character of man.” 68 Lindbergh wanted
men to be outdoors, physically controlling the machine.
The main speaker of the evening, a former designer for Ford, Senator Ralph E.
Flanders (R-VT), countered Lindbergh’s argument with his own highly masculinized
argument. Flanders argued that the modern technology of flying gave the U.S. the ability
to control the air as Britain once controlled the seas. 69 These are two very different
arguments from both men; however both men balked at the organization man in favor of
creating a masculine image of control in flight. Unfortunately for the two men, civilian
flying in the post-World War II era blossomed into a family friendly atmosphere. The
commercial image of flight promised comfort over daring.
New scientific and technical developments during World War II helped flying
become routine. Flying during the war, either as pilots or passengers, familiarized GIs
with flight. 70 The cost of flying previously regulated airborne travel to the wealthy.
However, the economic boom in the 1950s marshaled in a new mode of transportation as
well as a new relationship between Americans and the airplane. The emphasis on flying
was no longer focused on death defying stunt to display one’s masculine prowess. In the
late 1940s and 1950s, flying became a passive, if not domesticated, activity that could be
done by men, women, children, and the elderly. Even civilian pilot schools helped
routinized flight.
During the war, Cessna Aircraft Company promoted their Cessna Family Car of
the Air. The company envisioned that every middle class American family would soon
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fly instead of drive. In 1942, they predicted a $700 price tag per “airplane for the
everyman.” 71 While Cessna’s predictions never came true, the family friendly
atmosphere changed the image of the cockpit from one focused on the technology of the
plane to one centered on the family inside the cockpit. 1950s Cessna advertisements
underscored the plane’s new technology that added to the “comfort” of flying. 72
Other private plane manufacturers followed suit. A 1945 advertisement proposed
that anyone could fly a Piper Cub. In this particular 1945 advertisement, it was a woman
who wanted to learn to fly. The young male pilot showed the young female, Mary, some
“advanced maneuvers” that would make her a better pilot. She replied, “They’re certainly
easy to learn in the Piper Cub.” The advertisement even suggested one could purchase a
book on how to fly a Piper Cub because when it came to flying, “it’s that simple.” 73
A 1947 advertisement for Stinson personal planes also advertised how easy it was
to fly. The 1948 Stinson boasted higher speeds and greater payloads. The plane fits four
people comfortably hailing “roomy interiors—newly styled by the famous designer
Henry Dreyfuss,” with “plenty of luggage space.” Much like flying the Piper Cub, flying
the Stinson could be done with “ease.” For Stinson pilots, control over the craft had
become “simplified.” Stinson students could “learn to fly solo in ten hours of less.” The
new model for 1947 was the “flying station wagon.” 74 In the spring of 1965, at the height
of the Space Race, Piper announced in an advertisement, “If you think flying’s just for
supermen, read how these ordinary automobile drivers Fly Piper.” 75 Not only could
anyone, no matter their gender, fly a plane, but the ease of the new technology took the
rugged individual control out of flying.
As private flying became geared toward ordinary Americans, so too did the
largely organizational commercial flying. Flight advertisements did not focus on the pilot
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image, but rather on the image of the passengers. The importance of flight transitioned
from the rugged individual image of the pilot controlling the plane, to the feminized
image of the domesticated cabin. Cold War commercial flight advertisements highlighted
the luxury of flying. Announcements paid for by various American airlines touted their
“comfort,” “convenience,” “cleanliness,” “courtesy,” and of course their “delicious fullcourse meals.” 76 The leisure of flying also changed the pilot image. A 1947 ad for
Curtiss-Wright called its new four engines electronically timed as one as a “Symphony of
Power.” On a Douglas DC-6 passengers benefitted from a “smoother, pleasanter flight
than ever before. To pilots it meant freedom from the annoyance of making constant
adjustments.” At Curtiss-Wright, engineers made flying “more enjoyable for the
passenger” and “simpler and more economical for the operator.” 77
The public image of the flyer who once risked his life performing air acrobatics or
flying in the skies over Germany and Japan, now, looked just like everyone else within
white society. An early advertisement by American Airlines displayed a group of white
middle class Americans watching a game of golf. The advertisement asked, “Who travels
by air…can you point them out?” This article suggests that it is impossible to decipher
those who fly from those who do not because air transportation was available to a
“rapidly increasing number of people.” 78 The flyer was no longer distinctive. He was
ordinary. Advertisements for airlines appeared throughout newspapers and magazines
with catchy slogans such as “Millions on the Move…by Air!” In this particular
advertisement from the nation’s leading airlines and aviation manufacturers, the
advertisement reduced flying to a mode of transportation for everyday citizens. The Cold
War “flyer” was not the pilot, but rather, the passenger. Flying was not equated with the
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work of a rugged individual man mastering his machine and environment but rather,
“well-earned leisure.” 79
This leisure can be looked at in another way. Leisure and personalized vacations
indicated a man who had worked and was enjoying his reward for his individual initiative
of hard work. Men deserved the well-earned leisure and dependability of flight.
Manufacturers of the Douglas Super DC-3 advertised the plane as able to fly “wherever
you live.” The DC-3’s “new powerful twin engines…and a host of new conveniences”
were “dependable.” 80 American airlines ran an advertisement touting the routinization of
flight when it suggested, “Every 57 seconds, 24 hours a day a Flagship arrives or
departs.” 81 American Airlines argued that if one added up the number of miles their
passengers have flown, the airline had completed “more than 23,000 trips to the moon.”
While they professed that this noted “public confidence” in their airline, it also suggested
the normalization of flying. 82
A 1948 Trans World Airlines (TWA) advertisement suggested that TWA was
“doing the work for you.” The advertisement argued that their passengers had already
engaged in hard work. While flying for TWA, men did not have to work. As passengers,
men could relax and enjoy their own leisure time. If one belonged to TWA’s Skyclub or
stayed in one of their skysleepers, the traveler benefited from “appetizing meals, restful
appointments, a personal radio, alert attention to your every wish…nothing is omitted
that could add to your pleasure.” 83 Another advertisement wrote of the benefits of flying
in one of America’s finest fleets. The ad boasted of TWA’s delicious and complimentary
meals, careful baggage handling, and room for playing cards or checkers. 84
Martin Aircraft proposed that flying brought control and freedom because
traveling by air gave its passengers “Time…Time…Time!” 85 TWA maintained that
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flying was not for stunts anymore but for travel that gave its passengers a sense of
“luxury.” 86 With TWA, passengers had experienced just how “grand,” “glorious,”
“convenient,” and “comfortable” flying had become for the average passenger. 87 These
advertisements offered personalized choices for the individual hard work of Mr. Success.
However, Mr. Success was not controlling the technology of flight, he was a passenger.
In man’s passenger status, TWA domesticated flying.
The domestication of flight continued. TWA argued that flying should be “for the
whole family.” 88 Many advertisements did not even use men to sell flight. In a TWA
poster, a mother said “…and I thought it would be hard to take the children so far!...(until
another mother told me about TWA).” The larger center picture within the advertisement
depicted a mother flying with her two small children. The husband appeared only in a
small picture on the bottom left helping his wife decide where to take the family. Helping
the mother take care of a small child, a stewardess appeared in the main frame. 89 Flying
became so easy that even the elderly could fly. TWA suggested that “grandma leads a
fast life…and loves it!” because when she travels TWA “grandma is in good hands.” 90 A
stewardess maintained that onboard TWA she found “Old Folks at Home.” 91 Elderly
flyers did not represent the rugged individualism and control that flyers once represented.
If grandma could fly, what made flying so daring?
Despite the family friendly atmosphere presented, advertisements also targeted
single female travelers. “Who says, “It’s a Man’s World?” implored one TWA
advertisement. Flying with the safety and comfort of TWA allowed women to travel
“alone.” With airline travel, “Her horizons are broader…she’s found new freedom and
great opportunity to see and enjoy.” 92 With woman enjoying the freedom of flying, they
too exercised control within the public sphere.
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In the winter of 1957, Boeing introduced its revolutionary new 707. The plane cut
travel time greatly for passengers. Writers glorified the new jet as “winged luxury,
comfort—with a complete sense of security,” “secure and steady, despite the fighter-like
performance,” and “effortless.” 93 In contrast to the 707, Douglas touted its DC-7 as not
only the “world’s fastest airliner,” but also a plane of “unbeatable luxury and comfort”
equipped with a spacious cabin that are “pressurized, air conditioned, soundproofed” all
in an effort to make your “travel completely restful.” 94 To make the advertisement even
more family friendly, and therefore unmasculine, Douglas depicted flight in the new jet
by using a picture of white grandparents meeting their two small grandchildren. The
airline industry was everywhere and for everyone within white society. Pacific Southwest
Airlines advertised that they had more jet flights between San Francisco, Los Angeles,
and San Diego than any other airliner. 95 The routinization of flying is best exemplified in
a 1970 advertisement for Lufthansa German-Airlines. The advertisement asked, “What’s
the difference between their 747 and our 747?” The advertisement answered that like
most 747s, Lufthansa had “9 hostesses, 6 stewards, 2 aisles, 4 movie screens, 8 stereo
channels, 10 lobbies, and 3 galleys of magnificent 2-story flying machine. Just like the
others.” The difference was Lufthansa Maitre d’ served Bavarian wine and a sizeable
beer selection. 96 The message was clear; flying was easy, and above all, luxurious. To
regain the moxy that flying once had, pilots would have to fly farther, faster, and perhaps,
out of this world.
Conclusion
World War II ushered in challenges to accepted American gender roles. The war
questioned the superiority of white males as the protectors of society, but at the same
time, the war kept minorities and women as second class citizens. Cold War discourse
46

frequently emphasized psychological ailments, momism, and fears of homosexuals
infiltrating the military and government. The war touted individual control on the
battlefield, but also, lauded group conformity. To keep the booming economy going after
the war, American companies urged both men and women to consume. Corporations
grew and men donned gray flannel suits and marched from the battlefield to the office.
Intellectuals, pundits, and sociologists feverishly explored the inner workings of both the
American psyche and the American character. Civil rights movements burgeoned and, to
some, threatened the status and privileges of white males. Automation continued to
threaten the autonomy of men as machines took the place of the worker. According to
American journalists and popular culture magazines, Cold War Americans enjoyed too
much leisure. Magazines portrayed white America enjoying the good life. However,
Americans feared communism, conformity, feminism, homosexuality, bureaucracy, male
consumerism, leisure, automation, and the dreaded corporate “organization man” as a
threat to masculinity. Americans questioned what it meant to be masculine in the new
nuclear age. The American discourse suggested that Cold War masculinity meant a return
to rugged individuality and both physical and mental control. Americans wanted control
over themselves and their own identity. They wanted choice.
The history of flight did not escape the crisis of masculinity. Within the context of
the Cold War, the image of flight, of who flies and who controls flight, became
refashioned around the individual against the organization man dichotomy. The image of
who could fly continued as flight transitioned from commercial aviation to spaceflight.
As the Soviet Union launched the first man-made satellite, Americans faced a new threat
to Cold War masculinity.
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CHAPTER III
“ZERO, FIRE, IGNITION!”: CREATING A CULT OF MASCULINITY IN
SPACEFLIGHT 1
The father of science fiction, Jules Verne, argued a century before the Space Race
that “The Yankees, the first-mechanicians [sic] in the world are engineers—just as the
Italians are musicians and the Germans metaphysicians—by right of birth.” 2 Verne’s
statement did not appear accurate in the late 1950s. After the 4 October 1957 Soviet
launch of the world’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, domestic and international
opinion questioned the prowess of American engineering. Senator Lyndon Baines
Johnson asked Americans the following January: “What has been wrong? Why have we
lagged? Why do we stand now in a posture of relative weakness?” In answering why the
Americans were behind the Soviets in space he told reporters:
First and foremost, I believe that we are paying too high a
price for conformity…. America’s vigor has come from the
originality, the freshness, the vision of our people, all our
people, not merely an intellectual elite. For a decade now,
we have seen growing a climate of contempt for these
values. We are paying a price for that…. We have, for long,
held a position of strength in world affairs. That position is
no longer secure…. The Soviet has, dramatically, leaped
over our wall. 3
Johnson’s statement that the United States lagged behind the Soviets in space technology
due to “conformity” follows the arguments made in the previous chapter that the
masculinity crisis highlighted a fear of the loss of rugged individualism and control.
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Johnson’s comment linked the language of the Cold War masculinity crisis to the Space
Race.
Scholars have claimed that an “ideology of masculinity” surrounded the early
Cold War presidents. 4 Journalist David Halberstam writes in his seminal The Best and the
Brightest (1972) that masculinity played a very influential role in the character of
Johnson. Halberstam argues that “He [Johnson] had always been haunted by the idea that
he would be judged as being insufficiently manly for the job, that he would lack courage
at a crucial moment.” Desperately wanting to appear masculine, Johnson divided the
world into “men” and “boys.” In the president’s paradigm, Halberstam proposes, “Men
were activists, doers who conquered business empires, who acted instead of talked, who
made it in the world of other men and had the respect of other men. Boys, to Johnson,
were different. They were not doers, but thinkers, talkers, and criticizers.” 5
Johnson, according to other Cold War scholars, was not alone in his masculine
rhetoric. Johnson’s predecessor, President Kennedy, was certainly not lacking in
masculine rhetoric. When Kennedy became president his friends and journalists touted
that he represented “the values of the masculine mystique…toward women, sexuality,
and weakness in men.” 6 William Chafe proposes in The Unfinished Journey that
Kennedy personified masculinity. He hated “those who were indecisive, equating their
fear of taking a strong stand with effeminacy.” Kennedy maintained that the best way to
make difficult decisions was to “calculate the odds, make a choice, and ‘grab our balls
and go.’” 7 Kennedy set the stage for a reinvigorated American masculinity when he
remarked during his 20 January 1961 presidential inauguration:
Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that
we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship,
support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival
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and success of liberty…. I do not shrink from this
responsibility—I welcome it. 8
The importance of masculine toughness continued into the dialogue of the Space Race.
Kennedy and Johnson, among many others, wanted to set the tone for the United States
as a country of doers, a real example of Cold War masculinity’s rugged individualism
and control. Performing masculinity appropriately was essential to the struggle over
conformity. In doing this, they helped create what became a cult of masculinity within
NASA and the masculinization of space. Through the use of war rhetoric, space and
spaceflight became a sphere exclusively for American men.
Robert A. Divine examines the American response to Sputnik in The Sputnik
Challenge (1993). According to Divine, the American government attempted to calm the
public. Officials asserted that not only did the satellite not “surprise the American
government,” but it also did not threaten American security. Divine suggests that the
American public held two dominant views regarding the satellite. Some saw the satellite
as a hope for future adventure and technology, seeing the flight as “toward the conquest
of space,” and “opening a bright new chapter in man’s conquest….” Others viewed the
Soviet achievement as “an ominous event in the Cold War.” 9 The works of James L.
Kauffman, Howard E. McCurdy, Roger Launius, and Susan Landrum-Mangus have
demonstrated that space journalists and politicians stressed a return of the mythical
frontiersman as astronaut during the Space Race. Kauffman wrote that the language used
within the rhetoric of the race spoke of the need to “explore” and “dominate.” According
to Kauffman, Kennedy’s rhetoric created a world of “heroes” and “villains” in other
words, he fashioned a narrative of a “heroic adventure story.” 10
The following chapter argues that the same language used to combat the crisis of
masculinity can also be found in the early NASA narrative. The Space Race was not only
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a great adventure or a test of American democracy. It was also a symbol of American
rugged individualism and control, or Cold War masculinity. Adding to current
scholarship on gender, the Cold War, and NASA, I argue that during the early years of
NASA, space journalists, politicians, and popular culture writers used masculine
language such as “conquer” “explore,” “dominate,” “master[y],” “prestige,”
“aggressive,” “vigor,” “strength” and “war,” to justify American action in space. This
language helped create space as a masculine sphere.
Projecting masculinity in space meant situating the Americans apart from the
Soviets. The Americans did not simply follow the Soviets. In June 1958, editor-in-chief
of Aviation Week & Space Technology, Robert Hotz, wrote that “We must have the
imagination to chart our own course and the courage to stick to it despite inevitable
failures of early experiments and rising costs….” 11 Space journalists, politicians, and
scientists meticulously pointed out any advantage that they had over the Soviets in space.
Their language depicted the need for Cold War masculinity in the new sphere of space.
The creation of the masculine sphere of space is important because this discourse later
influenced the public image the astronaut. 12
As the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1, Americans watched with awe.
According to media and congressional reports the 183.9 pound satellite had singlehandedly led to a dramatic plummet in the international prestige of the United States. The
United States had been at logger-heads politically, ideologically, and culturally with the
Soviet Union since World War II. This cultural conflict led to the American creation of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on 1 October, 1958. Before
NASA, the United States did not have an independent space exploration branch.
However, rockets had been on American minds since 1926 when Robert Goddard
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successfully launched the first liquid-fueled rocket in Worcester, Massachusetts. 13 The
German V2 rockets created even more excitement for the future military impact of the
rocket. After World War II, various German scientists immigrated to the United States to
build rockets for the U.S. military. 14
In 1957, the United States was not ignorant to the science and technology of
satellites. In fact, in April 1955, the National Security Council (NSC) recommended to
President Dwight Eisenhower that he order the Secretary of Defense to “‘develop the
capability of launching a small scientific satellite by 1958 under the auspices of the IGY
(International Geophysical Year).’” The President had three different programs to choose
from. The Army, Navy, and Air Force were all working on rocket and satellite
technology. Eisenhower appointed the Department of Defense’s Assistant Secretary for
Research and Development, and interim secretary of the Air Force, Donald A. Quarles, to
head up a committee that decided the best satellite program to fund that did not interfere
with “the development of military rocketry.” In the spring of 1955, Quarles convened an
eight member civilian group known as the Advisory Group on Special Capabilities, or
Stewart Committee. Dr. Homer Stewart, physics professor at the University of California,
Los Angeles (UCLA), chaired the committee. 15
The committee’s purpose was to choose the best rocket to launch the first
American artificial satellite. The Air Force’s program was the Atlas intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) motored rocket. The Navy’s was the Vanguard program’s Viking
rocket. The Viking rocket had two additional stages of thrust. Under Dr. Wernher von
Braun, the Army had been working on the Redstone rocket. The Redstone booster had
three additional stages of thrust. According to the official House hearings on the matter,
the Stewart Committee was to pick the program that “‘will be the most certain of placing
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the most useful satellite vehicle in orbit,…within the IGY and with the minimum
interference to priority military programs.’” NASA historian Enid Curtis Bok Schoettle
argues that due to the program’s declassified documents, the Stewart Committee picked
Viking. Declassified documents on the rocket made the program seem more peaceful to
the international community. Schoettle proposes that the Viking program was also more
economical. Overall, the vote was split, 5-2 with Dr. Stewart abstaining. The civilian
scientists favored Vanguard’s scientific capabilities. But due to the expertise of von
Braun, the Army men preferred Redstone. 16
Von Braun brooded over the committee’s decision as the Navy set to work
building a new Viking rocket. 17 Von Braun was correct as in the case for advancement in
satellite launches, the committee made a poor decision. In October 1957 the Soviets
launched the first man-made “moon.” Papers reported that the satellite traveled at a rate
of five miles per second, completing one orbit in approximately one hour and thirty-five
minutes. According to the New York Times, the satellite flew 560 miles above the earth,
at a speed of 18,000 miles per hour. 18 The Eisenhower administration quickly announced
that no danger had taken place. In a national televised speech to the country, Eisenhower
attempted to calm Americans, stating, “‘So far as the satellite itself is concerned, that
does not raise my apprehension, not one iota. But I wish we were further ahead [on our
ballistic missiles program] and knew more.’” 19 Eisenhower did not fear the “small ball”
and neither, he thought, should the American people. The president assured Americans
that the ability of the Russians to use the satellite for spying was “a long ways off.”
Eisenhower maintained that American scientists and engineers were busy building
rockets and satellites for space. He insisted that when the United States launched their
earth satellite, “if it operates successfully throughout, according to plan, it will provide
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much more information than this one can.” 20 On 15 October, Eisenhower convened his
science advisory committee. Reminiscent of the language of the Cold War masculinity
crisis, famed U2 designer and Polaroid inventor, Edwin H. Land, suggested during the
meeting that Americans were losing the race for space because they had become “‘too
lazy and complacent.’” He advised Eisenhower to “‘inspire the country—setting our
youth particularly on a whole variety of scientific adventures.’” The president responded
that in science, “he would ‘like to create a spirit—an attitude toward science similar to
that held toward various kinds of athletics’ in his youth.” 21
For purposes of national security Eisenhower had taken an interest in science.
Other Americans had not. Engineers and Scientists threw up their arms in fits of anger
over Americans’ lack of interest toward science. After Sputnik, the popular media and
politicians focused on the opinions of prominent engineers and scientists. Scientist
Edward Teller told Time magazine that with the launch of Sputnik “we have suffered
from a serious defeat.” 22 University of Minnesota physicist, George R. Price, wrote a
scathing article in Life magazine in which he predicted a five stage Soviet takeover of the
world. Price demanded greater leaders in teaching, engineering, and science. Price fumed
that the U.S. was in desperate need of “blood, toil, tears, and sweat.” The former
Manhattan Project scientist lamented “We have frittered away 12 years while the
Communists world has been gaining on us, and the time is near when we must decide to
set a higher value upon liberty than on luxury.” 23 Similar to Land, Price’s words echoed
the Cold War masculinity crisis’s fear of too much leisure. Prominent New York
businessman, Bernard Baruch, supported Price. He told the New York Herald Tribune on
16 October that Sputnik “is more than a satellite hurtling through space, more than a
warning of leadership jeopardized and security imperiled.” The small hurtling ball
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represented a “test of democracy.” He asked American citizens, “Do we meet this
challenge—regain our leadership, assure our security? Do we discipline ourselves to
protect our freedoms? If we do not, we will bear the far harsher disciplines which our
enemies will impose on us.” 24
Some Americans thought the Eisenhower administration’s peace talks on space
depicted American weakness. On 10 October 1957, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., asked the
Soviet Union for peace talks on space. At a meeting before the United Nations General
Assembly in October 1957, Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, followed along
similar lines. He called upon the governments of “the United States, Britain, and France
to accept an honest and mutually acceptable agreement” regarding the conquest of space.
Reporter Thomas J. Hamilton depicted Foreign Minister Gromyko’s delivery as one of
the “toughest speeches” given by any Soviet spokesperson. In regard to disarmament,
Gromyko claimed Western deception. He boldly declared, “It is time to put trickery aside
in the talks, and to stop making a good face when the game is lost.” 25 The Soviet Union
threatened to stall the five month disarmament talks. They also pledged a future stake in
the moon. Americans feared that one day the Soviets and communism might rule the
universe. Reports of “Moon Trip in a Day,” spurred attacks on both Republicans and the
American educational system. 26
Space journalists, politicians, and scientists continued to profess Soviet space
supremacy, suggesting “World Seen Reaching a Balance of Terror; Soviet Achievements
in Sciences Expected to Have Wider Effect among Neutralist Nations.” Thomas J.
Hamilton drew upon fears of “U.S. Loses Control,” as the launch of Sputnik
demonstrated the superiority of Soviet rocket strength. Reporters suggested that the
Soviets would never “compromise” in space, forcing the United States to “make
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concessions” to the communists. 27 In a showing of Western unity, Queen Elizabeth II and
Prime Minister Harold MacMillan visited Eisenhower in Washington for talks. All agreed
that the West and the Soviet Union were heatedly engaged in a “struggle of ideologies.” 28
As the Western allies of Britain and the United States appeared to be united, the
Democratic Party hounded the Eisenhower administration, blaming the president “for
putting economy ahead of security.” 29
The Soviet Union launched their second satellite, Sputnik II, on 3 November
1957. It orbited with the world’s first space traveler, a female mutt named Laika. 30 The
New York Times published a selection of political cartoons after the launch. One from
East Germany depicted the moon asking the satellite: “What carried you up so high?” to
which the satellite replied, “Socialism!” 31 As the doomed Laika orbited the earth,
Londoners of the National Canine Defense League protested at the Soviet Embassy. A
protestor explained that “What horror is induced in the mind of the dog can never be
known: just as no explanation of the purpose of the journey can be made to her.” 32 The
New York Times touted that while the horrific flight of a defenseless dog marked a loss of
cultural prestige to the Soviet Union; the United States was different. The Times
underscored that the United States “Also Has Used Animals in Rocket Flight—and They
Survived.” 33 The caption included a picture of rats inside a 1952 rocket at Wright Air
Development Center in Dayton, Ohio. The article made no mention of any other animals
used in test launches. Since 1948 the Americans had been testing monkeys in rocket
flight. On 11 June 1948, the United States launched the Rhesus monkey “Albert” aboard
a V2. After the rocket plummeted toward the Earth, Albert suffocated and his lifeless
body was brutally crushed. 34
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After Sputnik II von Braun reported to media outlets that it would take five years
for the United States to catch up to the Russians. 35 The New York Times called the
Sputnik age a “vindication” for the “egghead” while Khrushchev boasted “‘These
achievements of the land of socialism, which mark a new epoch in the development in
science and technology, have literally conquered the whole world.”” 36 Eisenhower
responded again by going on television and radio and calming Americans’ fears. In his 7
November speech he extended his congratulations to Soviet scientists. He reassured
Americans that the Soviet earth satellites “in themselves, have no direct present effect
upon the nation’s security.” 37 Eisenhower answered the Soviet shot with the appointment
of Dr. James Killian, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.), to
put together a committee of scientists to advise the president of the United States. The
goal was to use space for peace. The group headed by Killian became the President’s
Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). 38
On 6 December 1957, to gain control of space, the United States hastily attempted
to launch the Navy’s Vanguard satellite. After the launch, the rocket hovered for a couple
of moments a few feet above the pad and then erupted into flames. While the four pound,
softball sized satellite was thrown from the rocket, it managed to survive. Vanguard
deputy director, J. Paul Walsh, reported that despite the blunder, the small satellite was
still working. 39 The Yuma Daily Sun described the launch as a “Flop,” and suggested that
“America’s allies around the world were openly dismayed over the abortive attempt
Friday by scientists at Cape Canaveral to put a test moon into space.” The Chicago
Tribune reported that London’s Laborite Daily Herald had christened the American
satellite, “Flopnik.” 40 New York Times space journalist, John W. Finney, claimed that not
only was the failure as devastating as Pearl Harbor, but across the globe the launch also
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created, “a self-inflicted body blow. In Paris cafes, German beer gardens and Arabian
bazaars, the U.S. satellite program has become a laughing stock and the brunt of pointed
quips.” 41 Senator Johnson announced, “I shrink a little inside of me whenever the United
States announces a great event—and it blows up in our face.” 42 One observer lamented in
the Times, “Pearl Harbor came a day early this year.” 43
A few days later, Dr. Andrew C. Ivy, professor of physiology and head of the
Department of Clinical Sciences at the University of Illinois’s Medical School, echoed
the language of the Cold War masculinity crisis. He suggested that between these two
ideological groups attempting to control space, the Kremlin “alerted many leaders to the
growing smugness, softness, and manana [tomorrow] attitude in our country.” While not
“glamorous,” Ivy argued, Americans needed to dedicate themselves to the “rough and a
stern taskmaster” of the “hard sciences.” Within the “hard sciences” of chemistry and
aerospace engineering, one could find the “toughest research ever attempted by man.” 44
American journalists feared the triumph of communism, conformity, and
automation. In December 1957, the Wall Street Journal asked its readers, “In a race
between two governmental colossi, trying to conquer space…will the ‘luxuries’ of
political freedom survive? Will individualism be deemed expendable? Is the yoke of
regimentation to be one of the sacrifices we hear we will be called upon to bear?” 45
Dorothy Thompson of the Washington Evening Star summed up the American reaction to
the Sputniks as not an embrace of the technological and scientific achievement of the
Soviets during the first IGY, but rather, as
a lead in the most terrifying and (ingenious) of weapons:
the intercontinental [ballistic] missile. The picture
immediately projected in our minds was of great regions of
the world being destroyed without warning at the push of a
few buttons. So again the grandeur of the achievement was
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eclipsed by fear, and an intensification of efforts to create
bigger and better war instruments. 46
Using the same language that one would use to describe an unstable woman in the 1950s,
a 19 January 1958 editorial feminized the United States, implying that the “creeping
hysteria” of Sputnik would lead to Washington’s “taking the lid off the national debt and
unbalancing the budget in an orgy of all-out spending in the race to capture outer
space….we cannot,” insisted the editorial, “support an emotional and unstable approach
to our problems of defense.” 47
There were also new and unusual reactions to the launch. For instance, a
restaurant in Atlanta, Georgia, created a “Sputnikburger.” The hamburger featured
Czarist Russian dressing, caviar, “topped with a large ‘satellite olive’ pierced with three
toothpicks for an ‘antenna.’ Atop the toothpicks rested a small ‘cocktail hotdog.’” 48
Restaurants and patrons across the country embraced the new Sputnik martini. To make
the drink, the bartender froze either gin or vodka to twenty degrees below zero, and then
put the drink into a glass with vermouth. 49 The music industry capitalized on the mania.
Some Americans performed the Equadors’s “Sputnik Dance” or David Carr Glover’s
“Go! Sputnik Boogie.” 50 Songs such as “Sputniks and Mutniks” by Ray Anderson and
the Homefolks (1958) graced the American top 40. The band sang: “Sputniks and
Mutniks flying through the air, Sputniks and Mutniks flying everywhere, They’re so
ironic, Are they atomic?, Those funny missiles have got me scared.” The song continued
to play on American panic over the satellites by suggesting that “Our scientists have
admitted that we’re five years behind, And if that’s true, I’m telling you, this hiding place
is mine, Don’t care if it’s roomy, just so it’s roomy [sic], And so it’s somewhere Sputnik
can’t find.” 51
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As Americans grooved to Sputnik, the Space Race heated up. The dominant theme
of the race remained predominantly one of defense and national security. The focus on
defense and national security helped create space as a masculine sphere. On the eve of the
launch of Explorer 1, the men at Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) telephoned von Braun.
To launch the satellite, they instructed von Braun to use a Juno 1 rocket instead of the
intended Jupiter-C. NASA historian Michael Neufeld argues that the decision to change
the rocket from the Roman God to the Roman Queen was to make the rocket seem more
“peaceable.”52
On the evening of 31 January, aboard a sixty-eight foot “Jupiter-C” rocket, the
United States launched its first satellite, Explorer 1, into space. 53 The satellite weighed
roughly eighteen pounds. It measured eighty-inches long and six inches in diameter. The
media reported that “the launching appeared perfect.” 54 The satellite traveled at a speed
of 18,000 miles an hour. It took 114 minutes for Explorer 1 to orbit the earth. 55 Despite
the satellite’s light weight when compared to Sputnik, the successful launch of Explorer 1
roused American pride.
American papers quickly pointed out the superiority of the American satellite.
Greeneville, Mississippi’s, The Delta Democrat-Times’ headlines proclaimed,
“‘Explorer,’ Launched by Jubilant Army Scientists, Swings around Earth above Russia’s
Sputnik.” 56 Iowa’s Cedar Rapids Gazette insisted that the successful launch of Explorer
1 “ended a 17-week nightmare during which the two Soviet Sputniks seemed to mock the
United States and its partners.” The launch of Explorer 1 enthused American allies so
much that, coupled with the success of the British scientists “Zeta” (the name of the
contraption that completed the first controlled hydrogen fusion reaction in August 1957),
a NATO spokesman raved, “‘With Zeta and Explorer, we are one-up, aren’t we?’ ‘You
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might say the score is 2-to-1 in our favor at halftime.’” 57 The New York Times reported
that “the American satellite reaches considerably greater altitude at its apogee than either
of the Soviet Union’s satellites. The first Soviet device’s maximum altitude was 560
miles, the second’s 1,056 miles.” 58 Papers reported the next day that Explorer reached a
height of 1,700 miles. 59 The press even reported that an unnamed British scientist
believed that the light weight of the satellite as compared to Sputnik I and II proved “the
United States had shown technical superiority by holding the weight of its satellite and
equipment to thirty pounds.” The article predicted that with the satellites light weight,
Americans would eventually send “small manned rockets to the moon.” 60 In the public
discourse, the American launch was somehow better than the Soviets.
In April 1958, Eisenhower argued that the importance of space technology
depended on “future progress” and the “security of our nation.” 61 In his article “Some
Need Kick in Perigee,” William Randolph Hearst Jr. exhorted: “Let’s get going, boys,
let’s shoot that moon. First. [sic]” 62 An anonymous author for the Wall Street Journal
editorial entitled, “An End to Hysteria?,” seemed relieved that all the “hullaballoo over
the sputniks” was over. 63 Von Braun appeared more serious about the launch. He told
reporters that “‘This is the beginning in the long-range program to conquer outer
space.’” 64
American enthusiasm for Explorer was quickly tested. On 15 May 1958 the
Soviets launched another Sputnik into space. Reports surfaced that Khrushchev mocked
the size of the American satellites, comparing them to “oranges.” Khrushchev insisted
that the Soviet satellite was better because it weighed around one and a half tons. 65 The
Soviet Premier lauded the new space feat as demonstrating that his communist country
“outstripped the United States in science and technology.” 66 The media compared the
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weight of the new satellite to a “Studebaker Scotsman with a man in it.” The weight
suggested the potential for Soviet manned spaceflight.
The satellite travelled to 1,168 miles above the Earth. The speed of the satellite
surpassed all the previous satellites. 67 Space journalist Finney reported that it would be at
least two years until the United States matched the size and strength of Sputnik III. The
launch of the new satellite came at a terrible time for American prestige abroad. On a
vice presidential visit to Latin America, a crowd of people in Caracas, Venezuela, hurled
stones at Nixon. “Arabs” in Lebanon, and “Frenchmen” in Algiers burned American
books. New York Times reporter Dana Adams Schmidt referred to these “communistinspired outbreaks” as more than a misunderstanding of American foreign policy and its
attitudes toward those of foreign nations. Schmidt suggested that “They were symptoms,
too, of something wrong in the life of the American nation.” 68
After the launch, Senate Democrats ridiculed the president’s space strategy. They
called it “drift and dream” and “complacent.” Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO) went so
far as to accuse Eisenhower of handing American “military superiority over to the
Communists.” Using similar rhetoric of the masculinity crisis, on the senate floor
Symington chastised the president. He declared that the government “place[ed] soft living
and budgetary considerations ahead of national security.’” 69
Both political parties blamed each other for American loss of prestige to the
Soviets. In the summer of 1958, they passed through Congress the National Aeronautics
and Space Act. The Act officially created the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration on 29 July 1958. On 1 October 1958, the new organization went into
effect, integrating its predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA). As NASA’s first administrator, Eisenhower appointed Dr. T. Keith Glennan,
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president of Case Institute of Technology and member of the Atomic Energy
Commission. With its creation, NASA acquired the following research centers: Langley
(Hampton, V.A.), Lewis (Cleveland, O.H.), Ames (Moffet Field, C.A.), and Flight
Research (Edwards, C.A.). NASA obtained the space flight centers of Goddard Space
Flight Center (Greenbelt, M.D.), Jet Propulsion Lab (Pasadena, C.A.), and Wallop
Station (Wallopp Island, V.A.). By January 1961, the organization of NASA expanded
greatly. Under its large bureaucratic umbrella, NASA controlled the George C. Marshall
Space Flight Center (Huntsville, A.L.), NASA Launch Operations Directorate (Cape
Canaveral, F.L.), and Manned Spacecraft Center (Houston, T.X.).
In December 1958, Glennan reassured NACA employees that their identity would
not be lost within NASA. His rhetoric echoed the masculinity crisis. Speaking at a Texas
banquet, Glennan stated to the crowd: “When a man has a job to do, he does it…He rolls
up his shirt sleeves and his sweat helps him get the job done.” 70 In space, American men
would be doers. While the NACA and NASA were full of good American men, it was
clear; the boys club of the NACA would become the new boys club of NASA.
On 13 September 1959, as Americans clamored to create NASA, the Soviets
launched the first object onto the surface of the moon. Headlines read: “Soviet Rocket
Hits Moon after 35 Hours; Arrival is Calculated within 84 Seconds; Signals Received Till
Moment of Impact.” The object, Luna II, weighed 858.4 pounds. It smashed into the
moon at the speed of 7,500 miles an hour. 71 The Soviets boasted that they achieved the
world’s first moon landing. They claimed to have planted a Soviet flag on the moon’s
surface. Quickly, the United States Congress objected to any recognition that the flag
gave the Soviet Union control over the moon. 72 Hugh Dryden hailed the achievement:
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“We wish to congratulate our fellow scientists and engineers on their success in this
forward step in the exploration of space.” 73
Reports within the American scientific community fought back. “Russians’ Shot
‘Easy’ Compared to U.S. Proposal,” claimed West Virginia’s Charleston Gazette. The
article reported that a scientist, who wished to not reveal his identity, charged, “‘I don’t
mean to take anything away from the Russians. It certainly was a great achievement.
However, I think if we were given the same job, we would find it a lot easier than putting
a satellite about the moon.’” 74 When interviewed, Nixon questioned the truthfulness of
the Soviet propaganda agency, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, (TAS). Nixon
told reporters that there was no need to get “hysterical.” Once again a politician
feminized the fear of the United States. He reassured the press that “Scientifically and
educationally, we are way ahead of the Soviets, and there is no reason to junk our
educational programs. In science, sometimes we’re ahead and sometimes they’re ahead,
but over-all, we are way ahead.” 75
Media headlines and speeches were not the only mediums championing American
Cold War masculinity during the early years of the Space Race. As the race and NASA
grew, so too did the field of rocketry, space science, aeronautics, and astronautics.
Advertisements and help wanted announcements reflected the highly masculinized fields
of space technology during the early years of NASA. These advertisements reinforced
NASA as a symbol of Cold War masculinity. A flight director for the Apollo program,
Eugene “Gene” Kranz, became involved with NASA by responding to a “help wanted”
advertisement in Aviation Week in 1960. 76 For engineers, scientists, mathematicians,
pilots, and welders seeking to break into Cold War flight and space technology, Aviation
Week and Aero/Space Engineering were the go-to magazines for all things space. In the
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fields of space science and technology, Robert Hotz foresaw “an influx of younger and
technically bold personnel capable of generating the enthusiasm to spark this [NASA’s]
effort….” 77 Even in pre-Sputnik advertisements, like the rhetoric of the Cold War
masculinity crisis; aerospace employers emphasized the importance of the individual.
Goodyear Aircraft touted their “respect for individual thought and effort.” 78
Likewise, Avro Aircraft Limited advertised that their projects “gives engineering people
unexcelled opportunities to utilize individual ingenuity, initiative, imaginations, and
creative qualities. …As members of a progressive design team, more concentrated job
responsibility means more recognition for individual ideas and accomplishments.” 79 The
electronics division of General Motors offered “challenging, pioneering opportunities for
ambitious men…. We may be able to supply the square hole for the square peg.” 80
System Development Corporation (SDC), formerly of the Rand Corporation, advertised
for engineers who liked “The Element of Freedom.” SDC defined freedom as “doing
what you like.” 81 Looking for a Thermodynamicist, General Electric (GE) advertised for
an “individual contributor.” 82 In December 1960, Hayes Aircraft Corporation, supplier of
parts for the Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Redstone Arsenal, ran the headline:
“Missiles and Men.” Equally important to atomic energy, Hayes suggested, was “the
human element—the skill of the men who make the machine…. It is a product of the
minds of men.” 83 Curtiss-Wright touted that their engineers “individual efforts and
accomplishments are quickly recognized.” 84 Convair-Fort Worth marketed their company
as “Best individual effort…best combination of ideas” when asking for “well-trained men
with creative ability and inquiring minds are taking a close look at the advantages of
joining a team….” 85
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The masculine sphere of flight quickly transferred to spaceflight in the postSputnik era. Much like flight advertisements looked for individuals in control, spaceflight
advertisements sought the same qualities in their workers. IBM (International Business
Machines) “Military Products” advertised that “Airborne [sic] computers challenged the
‘creative engineer’ but the engineers at IBM experience, ‘real time control.’ 86 An 18
November 1957 advertisement for Rohr Aircraft Corporation showed a man rolling up
his sleeve with the headline: “Big Job Ahead for Aircraft Engineers.” 87 In December
1957, Goodyear Aircraft proposed that it was the job of their engineers to “Master the
mystic forces of the sky—that is the purpose and the plan of all Goodyear Aircraft
Engineers.” 88 In February 1958, Pacific Automatic Products Inc., a missile engineering
contractor for the U.S. Navy, boasted that its staff of engineers “includes men with
outstanding experience in every phase of the missile business. It is no accident, therefore,
that we are the ‘take charge’ sort of people….” 89 In a 1959 edition of Aviation Week, an
advertisement for a position in Honolulu called for “aggressive man for engine overhaul
shop.” 90 General Electric, a contractor of NASA, advertised their April 1959 employment
fair in Washington D.C. as “a group of men” working in new “Teams of Specialists” who
are feverously working on “Man-Machine Relationships.” 91 Rohr Aircraft Cooperation
advertised that in “In this short-sleeve climate of opportunity for seasoned engineers Rohr
needs men now….” 92 Martin Orlando marketed their company as able to create “deadly”
missiles due to,
the gray matter…tons, if you could measure it…poured
into the Bullpup by the men of Martin Orlando. Every day
these men grab fistfuls of the future…engineer it, program
it through computers,…. Working in the finest R&D and
production facility…these men probe the limits in
electronics….And we can always use more. Come…and
bring your gray matter. 93
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The Aerospace Corporation wanted to build not only an Air Force-science-industry team,
but “the men of Aerospace marshal individual talents for the full exploration and
assessment of advanced concepts, selected for significant potential.” 94
In 1962, Northrop asked, “If you share his itch for action, come to Northrop
where action is a way of life.” Fairchild Stratos Corporation built their company around
“Top-Grade Technical Talent.” The aircraft engineering organization professed to be part
of a new “growing boldness and vision” holding true to cultivating “True technical
excellence which comes from talented individuals and small elite groups rather than
massive mediocrity.” The company offered “Recognition and reward of top individual
contributors who are challenged and stimulated to truly professional creativity.” They
wanted engineers who favored “Aggressive program direction, evaluation, and control.” 95
While working at Northrop, you will be working with the engineer who “likes to get
things done.” 96 One of the very few advertisements asking for both “men” and “women”
was an IBM applied science advertisement. However, with the majority of firms
advertised to men. The aerospace field wanted rugged individual men in control. These
advertisements helped masculinize space around the superior characteristics of Cold War
masculinity. 97
Lockheed-Georgia asked its applicants to “Tell us what you want.” They even
suggested they could “tailor a position to fit the requirements….” 98 General
Dynamics/Astronautics wanted “men who are somehow not content with the status
quo.” 99 Honeywell, an equal opportunity employer, announced that their “Engineers are
Doing [sic] Things in Florida.” 100 Honeywell’s engineers were not lazy, complacent, or
enjoying leisure. They were exercising their masculinity as doers. Sikorsky Aircraft
promised its engineers “action-filled” days. 101 International Electric Corporation,
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emphasized individuality and control by advertising that the “human decision-maker” and
“human effectiveness” counted most. 102 Federal Electric Corporation offered world-wide
assignments to its engineers and technicians complete with “individual challenge and
adventure.” 103 Martin Orlando wanted “Individuals with Inventive talents and a desire for
a challenging career….” 104 Working in a “creative climate” as well as opportunities for
personal “recognition” were themes displayed prominently in various advertisements in
the 1950s and 1960s aerospace fields. 105 One did not simply look for a “job” in the
aerospace industry. Rather, they were “assignments.” General Electric enticed readers to
“Act Now For Assignments On Project Apollo.” 106 In 1965, Lockheed-Georgia praised
the “bold thinking” of their engineers. 107
While references to teams of scientists and engineers continued into the late
1960s, the image of the individual did not disappear. The Navy asked readers if they were
tired of the “routine.” If so, they were looking for “youthful, innovative, aggressive man
who wants to tackle complex problems which need unconventional solutions” for their
new Naval Air Integrated Logistics Support Center. 108 These advertisements did not just
want any man. Aerospace jobs wanted aggressive, rugged intellectual and creative
individuals who could work in a team but still maintain an individual identity. They
wanted their men to represent Cold War masculinity’s rugged individualism and control.
The masculine language found within the pages of Aviation Week and Aero/Space
Engineering mirrored the intense congressional debates over the funding for NASA. As
the advertisements looked for men to protect the future of America, national security
became a popular cry from congressional leaders justifying money for aerospace science.
The language used to help fund space conquest also helped masculinize space. Politicians
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did not only see the conquest of space as a military expedition. In militarizing space,
Americans aimed to project peace through strength in space.
Exercising strength in space symbolized Cold War masculinity’s rugged
individualism and control. For instance, while giving the January 1958 convocation
address at Nebraska Wesleyan University, Senator Carl T. Curtis (R-NE) advocated that
within the American educational system the major goal “should never be by mass
education—rather, it should be the education of each individual in our society.”
Protesting “assembly line” schools, he argued “Their individual gifts and talents must be
found…. America is a land of individuals…capable of thinking for themselves,….We
should never undervalue the individual…. The age of space is the age of the
individual.” 109 In a January 1958 speech before CBS affiliates, Senator Johnson urged
that in the journey for peace in space “we shall make it evident that America’s Free
World leadership is not sterile.” 110
In May 1961, representative and chairman for the House Committee on Science
and Astronautics, Albert Brooks (D-LA) referred to the space program as one the United
States’ “strongest weapons” during the ideological “struggle” with the Soviet Union. 111
James S. McDonell, president of the NASA contractor McDonnell Aircraft Corporation,
suggested that the Space Race was “‘the creative substitute for war.’” 112 The masculine
rhetoric of control, war, and domination continued. Von Braun speculated that historians
and sociologists considered “that space exploration will in time become a substitute for
war. They feel that the attempts to explore space may be the idealistic ‘moral equivalent
of war,’ absorbing man’s over exuberant energies, aggressiveness, and imagination, and
taxing his resources.” 113
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The narrative of the Space Race was not only for war but also for peace. Before
Congress, Eisenhower recommended that “a civilian setting for the administration of
space function will emphasize the concern of our Nation that space be devoted to
peaceful and scientific purposes.” However, in his speech, the president emphasized the
“military potential of space.” 114 General Bernard A. Schriever warned of the use of
ballistic missiles in space. “It cannot be dismissed as Buck Rogers fantasy. The whole
realm of space science and technology is the new arena in which we must mobilize
vigorously….” 115 In 1958, Johnson declared, “Space may well be the sea in which the
human race will some day find an island of peace. To reach that island, we need more
weapons.” Johnson’s words suggested the need for Cold War masculinity in space. He
stated, “Our greatest need in this hour is to unleash the pioneering spirit and the daring
and brilliance of our people and set this Nation’s course on the pursuit of peace.” Johnson
called for a “vigorous pursuit of peace.” 116
Representative Chet E. Holifield (D-CA) lamented that the launch of the mighty
Sputniks forced Americans to play “‘follow the leader’ behind the Soviet Union.” For
forty-five minutes on the House floor, he championed “the goal of military strength—
strength which can be used if negotiations fail—strength to protect the freedom of our
own country and the strength to help our allies….” He lamented, “Have we lost the spirit,
the courage, and the will to be the center of world power, freedom, and culture?”
American men of science were “chafing at the bit. They are anxious to tackle to job. Will
the Congress accept the challenge and make the courageous decisions demanded now—
today?” 117
In 1961, Schriever echoed these sentiments. He suggested that “space power was
‘peace power.’” “‘Only by being strong,” Schriever demanded, “‘can we preserve the
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peace.’” Two years later, NASA’s Chief of Manned Spaceflight, George M. Low,
remarked that the mission of NASA was to get “‘the most out of the space program both
for national defense and for peaceful applications.’” The call for peace in space was not
feminine. In fact, their calls for peace through strength invoked masculinity into the
public image of the Space Race. In 1963, Representative H. R. Gross (R-IA) stated that in
this Cold War climate with the Soviets “‘the new battlefield is space.’” While he was
known to question space science over the military value of space technology, Senator
John Stennis (D-MS) announced during Congressional testimony in 1963, “‘I very
strongly believe that there is a great military value to this space program.’” During the
1963 NASA authorization hearings, Olin Teague (D-TX) of the House Committee on
Science and Astronautics declared, “‘I can’t see how there can possibly be any doubt that
there is a military mission in space.’” 118 Space exploration as a need for strength through
peace created a sense of urgency within congressional debates.
Representative James G. Fulton (R-PA) wanted American progress in space
“‘faster.’” He asked for “‘around the clock’” work. Representative Victor Anfuso (DNY) also demanded that NASA work faster and insisted on the accomplishment of “some
firsts.” Concerned congressional leaders feared that it would be difficult to sell NASA to
the public, especially considering the race appeared to be one specifically based upon
prestige. Representative David S. King (D-UT) said he would support any budget for
NASA “regardless of the cost” that “would place America in ‘the race to reach the moon
first.’” 119 The rush can be seen in the fight for world power between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Whoever conquered the moon, claimed the U.S. News & World
Report, “to the winner will go new power in the world.” 120 In 1962, Senator Warren G.
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Magnuson (D-WA) hoped: “I think it is a fair statement to say that we are getting into a
position where we do not have to bow to anybody.” 121
The Soviet Union saw the American drive into space differently. In the summer of
1962, the Soviet Union publicly admonished the “atom maniacs” of the United States.
They accused the Americans of trying “to obtain military superiority in space over the
Soviet Union.” In August 1962, the Soviet Union again charged the United States with
attempting to use space for war. They said the Americans were intentionally violating
Soviet “peace” efforts. They raged that “Across the ocean the enemies of peace incite war
hysteria and strive to convert cosmic space into an atomic testing area.” 122 In the 29 May
1963 issue of the New Times, the Soviet Union likened American actions in space to a
“maniacal drive for war.” The Soviet Union professed that their space technology was for
“scientific progress and would serve peaceful purposes.” 123 While the United States
government felt these charges absurd, the language of the Space Race as a military
exploit lent credence to the Soviets’ (who were also militarizing space) charges.
In the summer of 1963, Dr. Dryden addressed the American Legion convention in
Roanoke, Virginia. Using the language of American Cold War masculinity, he deftly
made a case to his audience that the science and technology of space exploration was
vital for national security. He admitted that the country had suffered a “blow to our
national pride” with the launch of Sputnik 1. However, he challenged the audience. He
espoused that the launch meant so much more to the safety and well-being of the United
States. He proposed that “our national security is inevitably involved in the progress of
the new science and technology of space.” The solution was a “vigorous” national space
program in order to “present the image of a can-do nation” to present and future allies.
Dryden demanded that “We must pursue knowledge vigorously, not for its own sake
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alone but also because knowledge is power….And we are determined that the United
States shall have that power.” In other words, to Dryden, the space program had become
“‘a matter of national necessity;’ for the world ‘has come to regard space exploits as a
measure of a nation’s strength,’ and ‘alliances and loyalty are given to the strong.’” He
reiterated the need to make “peace” in space. He concluded: “We must master this new
environment…to guard against the day when mastery of space might mean world
domination.” He challenged that “Some may believe that America may be able to survive
as a second-rate power in space. I firmly believe, however, that passively accepting a
secondary role is completely out of character with the traditions of this nation.” 124
Representative Teague repeated the masculinized rhetoric of Dryden. Before
Congress he warned, “‘Our whole future as a nation—and, indeed, as a race—depends
upon our mastery of space….lunar exploration is essential to our leadership in the free
world—in the so-called uncommitted world—and eventually, in the entire world.’” 125 In
1960, Senator Kennedy delivered a telephone address in Miami to AMVETS (American
Veterans) in which he declared that the national motto should not be “Always Ready” but
“Always First.” 126 With this Kennedy foresaw science as playing a special role in which
to impart not only American superiority in space, but also, American Cold War
masculinity. Dryden’s insistence on the need to “master” space “vigorously” before the
Soviets; the use of space as a tool for “world domination” and “power,” and finally,
Kennedy’s insistence on being “first” all pointed to the masculinization of space.
Conclusion
Sputnik challenged Cold War masculinity. The power and prestige of the Soviet
Union, both militarily and culturally, threatened American prestige at home and abroad,
menacing American national security, and ridiculing the belief in the superiority of
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American individuality. The use of military language to justify the need for Americans to
go into space framed the race in masculine terms. This was combat. In Cold War culture,
there was no room for women in combat. By depicting space exploration as a military
purpose, journalists, media outlets, scientists, and politicians depicted an exclusive cult of
masculinity within NASA and in space.
The United States used the Space Race as a symbol of a reinvigorated
masculinity. The Space Race created a culture mesmerized by the power of science and
technology. The men of the hour appeared to be scientists and engineers. Advertisements
for the new aerospace industry wanted their scientist and engineers to represent American
individuality and control. But as American men saddled up to ride rockets into space,
Americans asked: Who would fly? The answer to this question lay in the very use of
NASA as an image to impart American masculinity at home and abroad. To fly into
space Americans looked to the best representative to master and control not only
American technology but space itself. Above all, in creating the masculine sphere of
space, Americans wanted a flyer that represented rugged individualism and control. In
other words, they wanted a person who represented the “epitome” of Cold War
masculinity. 127
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CHAPTER IV
“LIGHT THIS CANDLE!:” COLD WAR MASCULINITY AND PROJECT
MERCURY, 1958-1963 1
On 5 May 1961, NASA launched its first astronaut, Alan Shepard Jr., into space
aboard the Mercury capsule Freedom 7. The feat came less than a month after the Soviets
blasted cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin into orbit on 12 April 1961. Aboard his capsule, Vostok
I, Gagarin spent a total of one hundred and eight minutes in space. He orbited the earth
once. Shepard’s flight lasted around fifteen minutes, about five of which were actually in
space. He did not orbit the earth but rather completed a suborbital flight. However,
Americans lauded Shepard’s feat as more impressive than Gagarin’s because unlike
Gagarin, magazines, newspapers, administrators, and politicians reported that Shepard
exercised control over his capsule. Even Shepard recalled in his memoir, Moon Shot: The
Inside Story of America’s Race to the Moon (1994), that while shifting his capsule he
shouted out, “we’re doing something in space on our own. We’re first with it! Manual
control of a spaceship. Dyn-o-mite!” 2
After the launch of Sputnik I, the most difficult question before NASA was who
would fly into space. In 1952, Dr. Wernher von Braun suggested in Colliers, “Here is
how we shall go to the moon. The pioneer expedition, fifty scientists and technicians, will
take off from the space station’s orbit in three clumsy-looking but highly efficient rocket
ships.” 3 In 1958, President Eisenhower dismissed von Braun’s suggestion. Former WWII
general, pilot, and hero of the Pacific, Dr. James Doolittle, echoed von Braun’s scheme
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on a smaller scale. During the 1958 NASA Act senatorial debates, Doolittle suggested
that the ideal space traveler would be a scientist. 4 He too was dismissed. While both men,
one civilian and one military, envisioned space travel for scientific purposes, the
militarization of space encouraged the projection of strength. Americans turned to a
familiar image that represented technical know-how, rugged individualism, and control.
In essence, Americans looked not to the scientists or the engineer, but to the military jet
test pilot as their cultural agent in space. 5 The following chapter traces the creation of the
masculine public image of the early American astronaut. The chapter places the image of
the Project Mercury astronauts within the context of the Cold War masculinity crisis.
Through the astronauts’ ability to fly their capsules into space, the American print media,
politicians, and astronauts emphasized the masculinity of the astronaut.
As post World War II writers, American intellectuals, sociologists, and politicians
asserted that the Cold War era ushered in an impending crisis of masculinity, leading
space journalists, administrators, and politicians constructed the astronaut image as
representing the ideal traits of American men. Americans could not simply follow the
achievements of the communists. Americans did not follow those who cherished the
collective over individuality. Soviet cosmonauts represented heroes of Soviet conformity.
The Cold War pioneer, the astronaut, had to be an individual. He had to have control.
Space journalists, politicians, and even NASA presented the idea that the American’s
conducted their space ventures apart from the Soviet accomplishments. In April 1961,
NASA director James Webb told the public, “‘This [present] program is not designed to
match what the Russians may do.’” 6 Instead, space journalists, politicians, and even
NASA administrators designed the American space program as an administration that
created its own “firsts” in space. Unlike the Soviet cosmonaut passengers, the American
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space flyers were to have control of their capsule. While President Eisenhower
deliberately chose jet test pilots for their discipline and physical and mental toughness,
the public, including NASA, the print media, Congress, and average Americans, used the
jet test pilot symbol as having the potential for American space flyers to fly their
capsule. 7 The American astronaut could potentially control his craft.
Leading and regional newspapers, magazines, politicians, astronauts and at times
NASA administrators clamored after this symbol of American control. In 1961, NASA
deputy administrator, Hugh Dryden, told the House Committee on Science and
Astronautics that “‘putting a man on the moon was not very significant.’” However, the
national effort to put him (a man) on the moon was indispensable to the country’s image.
Dryden explained, “‘This is a symbol.’” 8 Furthermore, in May 1963, Webb told a
National Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Space that science and technology “have
become a symbol to hundreds of millions of people around the world of the vitality of
any nation.” 9 To project manned spaceflight as a symbol of the vitality of the United
States, the public narrative of the astronaut remained steadfast to astronaut control of the
capsule.
The purpose of NASA’s Project Mercury was to orbit a manned space craft
around earth, investigate man’s ability to function in space, and recover both man and
spacecraft safely. 10 By the time of its conclusion, Mercury had made six launches and
landings between the years 1961 and 1963. The Mercury 7 astronauts were the hallmark
of the manned spaceflight program. Their public image was important. NASA appointed
an industrial psychologist, Robert B. Voas, a naval lieutenant, as the astronaut’s trainer.
Voas’s main job was to make sure the astronauts remained calm, cool, and collected. In
The Right Stuff (1979), Tom Wolfe described Voas’s job as to prepare the astronauts for
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psychological adaptation during spaceflight. 11 This calm mental state under pressure
represented Cold War masculinity.
However, NASA did not limit Voas’s responsibilities to the psychology of the
astronaut. Voas also worked as one of NASA’s manned spaceflight designers. In this
capacity, Joseph Atkinson Jr. and Jay Shafritz argue in The Real Stuff: A History of
NASA’s Astronaut Recruitment Program (1985) that Voas recognized the need for
astronaut control. Atkinson Jr. and Shafritz contend that Voas compiled a list of major
tasks the astronaut was to deal with in an attempt to highlight the astronaut’s control of
the capsule. Voas first identified sequence monitoring. Here the astronaut monitored the
stages of the mission such as the staging of the boosters, the separation of the escape
tower, the firing of the retrorockets, and the deployment of the parachute. The astronauts
also held the responsibility over systems management. The astronaut monitored all the
onboard systems for any machine failures. The third job Voas located was the astronaut’s
control of the capsule’s attitude. Controlling the attitude meant controlling the
relationship between the earth and the capsule. Finally the astronaut researched and
evaluated the capsule during flight conditions. 12
Atkinson Jr. and Shafritz write that on 3 November 1958, an aeromedical team
consisting of Drs. Stanley C. White, William S. Augerson, and Voas discussed the
attributes they wanted in an astronaut. According to Atkinson Jr. and Shafritz, the team
concluded the following five points: the astronaut needed to survive, perform, serve as a
backup for the automatic controls and instrumentations, and finally, act as a competent
scientific observer and engineer. 13 By 22 December 1958, NASA released its first job
announcement for an “astronaut-candidate” called NASA Project A. The announcement
read:
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Although the entire satellite operation will be possible, in
the early phases, without the presence of man, the astronaut
will play an important role during the flight. He will
contribute by monitoring the cabin environment and by
making necessary adjustments. He will have continuous
display of his position and altitude and other instrument
readings, and will have the capability of operating the
reaction controls, and of initiating the descent from orbit.
He will contribute to the operation of the communications
system. In addition, the astronaut will make research
observations that cannot be made by instruments; these
include physiological, astronomical, and meteorological
observations. 14
The age requirement demanded a man of less than 40 years old. He needed to be no taller
than 5 feet 11 inches, be a graduate of a test-pilot school, and have attained a bachelor’s
degree or its equivalent. The announcement called for a total of 1,500 hours of flying, and
a qualified jet test pilot. Conversely, Asif Siddiqi argues in Challenge to Apollo that due
to the emphasis on automated flights, the Soviets did not require as many hours of flying
experience. The cosmonaut with the most experience flying, Major Pavel I. Belyayev,
had only 900 hours of flying. In fact, since the Soviets wanted younger pilots, between
the ages of 25 and 30, most cosmonauts were not even test pilots. 15 The annual pay for
the American astronaut fell at the GS-12 to GS-15, allowing a salary of $8,330 to
$12,770. 16
The potential for the American astronaut to fly the capsule was important. Chief
of Manned Spaceflight, George Low, argued that “‘the success of the mission may well
depend upon the actions of the pilot; either in his performance of primary functions or
backup functions. A qualified jet test pilot appeared to be best suited for this task.’” 17 Of
course, one could not deny the presence of former pilots within NASA. These men
championed the idea of pilot control of a space capsule. Atkinson Jr. and Shafritz argue
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that the Director of the Space Task Group, Robert R. Gilruth, stated his opinion on the
necessary qualifications of the astronauts as:
Being an old aviation person myself, I thought there was
nothing quite like test pilots who were used to flying a
vehicle with wings instead of behind a rocket. They are
used to altitude, the need for oxygen, bends and
accelerations. They are used to high discipline and to taking
risks, so I always felt that we should draw from
professional aviators. The test pilots would be best because
they also had the technical knowledge to understand the ins
and outs of the space capsule and the rockets and
navigation. 18
The 9 April 1959 press release that introduced the world to the “Mercury 7”
maintained that over 100 American military test pilots met the astronaut qualifications.
NASA sent 69 of these candidates to Washington, D.C. to be interviewed. 80% of that
group volunteered for spaceflight. After consultations and interviews, NASA narrowed
the pool down to 32 candidates. NASA sent the men in groups for further testing to Dr.
Randy Lovelace’s clinic in Albuquerque where for “seven and a half days and three
evenings” they endured a “series of exhaustive examinations” to test their physical and
mental endurance. Tests included studies of their blood, circulation, nerves, heart, tissue,
eye, ear, nose, throat, and x-rays, as well as various “related laboratory studies.” 19
From there, NASA sent the 32 men for “psychological and stress evaluations”
under the watchful eye of Air Force, Army, and Navy personnel at Wright Air
Development Center and Aeromedical Laboratories, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
Dayton, Ohio. The men faced tests relating to “personality evaluation, stress, fatigue,
acceleration, high noise level, thermal stress, and equilibrium and vibration.” 20 Among
other “tests” each candidate underwent a Rorschach (ink blot) test. The astronauts
answered a “566-item questionnaire,” including the question, “‘Who am I?’” 21 The men
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submitted to “6 days and 3 evenings” of tests. After the series of examinations, NASA’s
medical and technical men met at NASA Space Flight Activity, Langley Field, to narrow
the group down to seven men. The press release explained that even though the majority
of the men were successful candidates, NASA decided to use only seven men so that each
astronaut “can have full participation in all phases of the Mercury development.” The
press release emphasized the individuality of each astronaut. On how NASA came to
their final seven, the release reads, “The seven ultimately selected were chosen as a result
of physical, psychological [sic] and stress tolerance abilities and because of the particular
scientific disciple, or specialty, each represents.” 22 Each astronaut represented Cold War
masculinity’s rugged individualism. NASA wanted the men to not only have control of
the capsule, but also, control over their own bodies and emotions.
On 9 April 1959, during the country’s first press conference with the Mercury 7,
when asked about whether or not NASA feared the Soviets would put a man in space
first, Brigadier General Donald “Flick” Flickinger of the Air Force’s Research and
Development branch reiterated what was becoming the dominant narrative. Flickinger
would not be surprised if the Soviets launched a man on the moon first. But, he proposed,
“I maintain that given cards and spades that the quality of our human component will be
far superior to theirs, and we will learn more from our manned flights than they will from
theirs.” 23 The American astronauts’ abilities to control spaceflight would be greater than
that of the Soviets. The American astronaut would have control.
The Cold War masculinity crisis’s fears of automation were addressed the
following October when the New York Times ran the headline: “Pilots Get Some Good
News; Group is Assured Machines Won’t Supplant Humans on Probes into Space.”
According to the report “this was music to the assembled test pilots’ ears, because their
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major theme long has been that they are not obsolete.” 24 The article helped construct a
public dialogue of the astronaut as a key necessity in space travel. In a world of modern
machines, the article assured that man’s role would not be superseded by a computer. By
emphasizing pilot control of a space capsule, politicians and the print media accelerated
the process of molding the image of the autonomous pilot in control into a metaphor of
Cold War masculinity.
On 5 August 1959, for half a million dollars, Time-Life, Inc. bought the rights to
the astronauts’ stories. NASA approved, if not encouraged the contract. The astronauts’
divided the money equally among themselves. 25 It is here that Life fashioned an image of
the Cold War pioneer. Life depicted the job of spaceflight as “daring and courageous.”
The astronauts were “physically strong of course” encountering “greater stresses than
most pilots had ever encountered, even in combat. And the men would have to have
nerves of steel. They would have to be devoid of emotional flaws which could rattle them
or destroy their efficiency when they found themselves in a crisis.” 26 In their first issue
on the Mercury 7, Life referred to the men as “pioneers.” In that same issue, John Glenn
wrote that “Space travel is the frontier of my profession.” 27 The use of the words
“pioneer” and “frontier” helped create this dialogue of Cold War masculinity that
surrounded the astronauts. These words and images connected the myths of the
nineteenth century pioneer with the white middle class men of the Cold War. They
became an amalgamation; a new man for the Cold War.
This dialogue of Cold War masculinity permeated the backgrounds of the first
seven astronauts. Of the original seven NASA astronauts: Lieutenant Malcolm Scott
Carpenter (Navy), Captain Leroy Gordon “Gordo” Cooper (Air Force), Lieutenant
Colonel John Herschell Glenn Jr. (Marines), Captain Virgil “Gus” Ivan Grissom (Air
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Force), Lieutenant Commander Walter “Wally” Marty Schirra Jr. (Navy), Lieutenant
Commander Alan Bartlett Shepard Jr. (Navy), and Captain Donald “Deke” Kent Slayton
(Air Force), all grew up during the Great Depression. Their parents raised them in small
towns like Shawnee Oklahoma; Hackensack, New Jersey; Cambridge, Ohio; Mitchell,
Indiana; East Derry, New Hampshire; Boulder, Colorado; and Sparta, Wisconsin. Some
served during World War II, and all fought in Korea. The astronauts did not spring from
blue bloods. Each of them came from working class or military backgrounds. Most were
the first of their families to attend or receive a college education. These men attended
public universities or the military academies, not private or Ivy League institutions. Their
climb from average American to a college educated heroic military fighter pilot
represented the very best of American rugged individualism; making their stories,
uniquely American. Within the American public discourse, the astronaut reflected the
parameters of an ideal American masculinity.
Similarly to the reports by journalists on the background of the early barnstormers
and pilot mail carriers, the astronauts’ backgrounds elicited romantic images of the selfreliant man. Life magazine constructed an image of self-control and autonomy even in
discussing the astronaut’s hobbies. Life pinpointed hobbies that included the
characteristics of a long ago rugged, individual, pioneer man. Riding, hunting, fishing,
boating, archery, skin diving, and guns made the list of hobbies of the Mercury 7. 28 They
preferred rugged individualism to team sports. On 20 April 1959, Time proclaimed the
astronauts as “individualists all.” 29 When the astronauts wrote their first tell-all book,
selling only 250,000 copies, Life wrote a glowing introduction, filled with the qualities of
Cold War masculinity. While the astronauts were seven men with similar backgrounds,
education, size, and shape, they were not “seven peas in a pod” but, “On the contrary,
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NASA wound up with a team of seven distinctly original personalities….” The men were
“seven highly motivated individuals, each of whom had found his way into the group
under his own power…. They were individualistic even when it came to keeping in
shape.” Not only did the media write glowing stories of the men’s individualism and
courage, but also, according to Life, their “self-sufficiency.” 30
However, while the public discourse of space journalists, politicians’ speeches
and the astronauts themselves suggested the astronauts embodied the heroic qualities of
the rugged individual pilot, some within the world of flying questioned the astronauts’
ability to fly their own capsules. Some argued that the astronauts were passengers. This
became an essential paradox of the Mercury program. Was the astronaut a pilot, or was
he as famous test jet pilot Charles “Chuck” Yeager claimed, “spam in a can?” Yeager’s
“spam in a can” image presented an astronaut who lacked control over his capsule. 31 The
astronaut image was not immune from the Cold War masculinity crisis. He faced the
crisis and through discussions about whether or not he controlled the capsule, he
represented the crisis. The American discourse during Mercury hoped to ensure that the
astronaut was not just another organization man.
However, in Life’s first article on the astronauts, the magazine presented to the
public a dual image of the astronaut. The article touted the astronauts’ individuality, but
at the same time, the piece insinuated a lack of control. The magazine presented a modern
dialogue questioning whether it is the individual controlling the technology or whether
the individual is the product of “engineers racing to perfect the capsule they will ride.”
The article further imparted the idea of the astronaut’s lack of control over his capsule by
replacing the word pilot with the feminizing term “passenger.” 32 Time referred to these
space travelers’ control “‘as passive as floating down a river on an oarless raft.’” 33 This
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lack of control and fear of failure of the auto-pilot was referred to by Grissom as the
“hairiest part of the mission.” As part of team Mercury, the auto-pilot was Grissom’s area
of expertise. Grissom described the auto pilot as controlling the,
pitch, roll and yaw of the capsule as it plunges about 100
miles downward. Every time it takes the slightest deviation
from a normal path, the auto-pilot corrects this by signaling
for the firing of small jets of hydrogen peroxide on the
outside of the capsule. But if the auto-pilot doesn’t work,
the pilot is going to have to bring the capsule down
himself…. 34
Grissom appeared uneasy in the possible role as passenger of a machine. Grissom’s
comment also suggests a link between the Cold War masculinity crisis’s fear of
automation and the astronaut image.
As the American astronauts feared the automated pilot, when the Soviets launched
Gagarin into space, American newspaper headlines helped impart a masculine dialogue
of cosmonaut pilot control over the capsule. On 13 April, the headline of the Chicago
Tribune read: “Pioneer’s Story Of Space!” The article stated: “From all over the world
came praise that compared the son of a carpenter [Gagarin] to Columbus, Magellan, and
Lindbergh.” Television announcers and Russian propaganda hailed Gagarin as the
“Soviet conqueror of the Cosmos.” The associated press even went so far as to suggest
that “the conquest of space by a man” represented “another feat of communist
superiority.” 35 Life magazine lamented that at this point, even if the Americans did get
one of the Mercury Astronauts into space, “the achievement will seem pallid.” 36
After Gagarin’s historic orbital flight, leading American newspapers focused on
whether or not he actually was a passenger or a pilot in control of his machine. The New
York Times wrote that while Gagarin’s capsule was equipped with an automatic
computer, there appears to have been “opportunity for action by the passenger if he
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wished.” What that action might have been is unclear. The article even reported that the
fundamental difference between the American and Soviet capsule was that the Soviet
capsule used wings or gliders and parachutes for landing. 37 “Emphasizing he was no
mere passenger,” Gagarin stated, “I was entirely concentrated on carrying out the flight’s
program....There was a lot of work. The entire flight meant work.” 38 However, the
Chicago Tribune reported, “The spaceship was under control of scientists on the
ground…. scientists said there were ground controlled automatic devices aboard to guide
and operate the spaceship and ‘take care of the man himself’” 39 These articles articulated
this paradoxical image of the man in control. The public used these same images to
describe the American astronauts.
However, a shift occurred. After Shepard’s flight, the language used in the
American print media to describe Gagarin’s flight became more feminized. American
newspapers described Gagarin’s flight as that of a passenger. In the narrative of the Space
Race, Shepard’s control over his flight exemplified American Cold War masculinity.
This shift in dialogue over Gagarin’s flight suggested not only a cultural war between the
United States and the Soviet Union, but also stressed a gendered war over which culture
depicted a superior masculine image of their space travelers. President Kennedy
underscored the cultural battle when after Gagarin’s flight he warned: “The Complacent,
the self indulgent, the soft societies are about to be swept away with the debris of history.
Only the strong, only the industrious, only the determined, only the courageous…can
possibly survive.” 40
Even before Shepard’s 5 May 1961 flight, newspaper headlines touted the control
of the American male. The (London) Times speculated “Judging by accounts, Gagarin
rode almost as a passenger.” 41 The Atlanta Constitution reported that of the known details
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of the flight, “The spaceship was under control of scientists on the ground.” 42 After
Gagarin’s flight, NASA director James E. Webb snapped, “the first American manned
flight will demand greater participation by the pilot than apparently was involved in the
Russian flight.” 43 For instance, Pennsylvania’s Tyrone Daily Herald ran the headline:
“U.S. Astronaut Will Have Partial Control of Capsule.” 44 The American flight would be
much shorter than Gagarin’s. However, the article pointed out, “America’s astronaut will
be given limited navigational control,” while Gagarin’s flight “was under control from
the ground.” 45
On 5 May 1961, NASA blasted the first American astronaut, Shepard, into space
aboard Freedom 7 (Mercury-Redstone 3). The New York Times ran the headline: “U.S.
Hurls Man 115 Miles into Space; Shepard Works Controls in Capsule, Reports by Radio
in 15-Minute Flight.” The paper stated that despite the fact that Shepard’s flight was
much slower than Gagarin’s, Shepard’s capsule flew at 4,500 miles an hour, and
Gagarin’s at 17,000 miles an hour, Shepard’s flight was markedly different. “Commander
Shepard maneuvered his craft in space—something the Russians have not claimed for
Major Gagarin.” The article proved this feat by including the mission transcript in which
Shepard reported to mission control that he switched from automatic to manual pitch,
yaw, and roll during his short flight. 46 Similarly, the Chicago Tribune argued that
Shepard became not only America’s first astronaut in space but he did so “in the world’s
first pilot controled [sic] space ship.” The article further contended that Shepard
“controlled the space capsule’s re-entry” by activating the retro rockets used to slow the
capsule down, igniting a parachute for the capsule to float toward its smooth landing in
the ocean. 47 An editorial in the Nevada State Journal lauded the openness of the
American flight, and condemned the Soviets for secrecy, incorrectly suggesting that
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perhaps as many as 3 cosmonauts were killed before the successful launch of Gagarin.
The editorial professed that Shepard had flown much higher than Gagarin and that he
“control[led]…his own vehicle, whereas Gagarin’s was controlled by scientists on the
earth.” 48 The Washington Post took a different route and actually suggested that
Shepard’s suborbital flight could not be compared to the great achievement of the
Soviets’ orbital flight. However, according to the Post, Shepard’s flight proved man
could have manual control of a spacecraft in a weightless environment. 49
Likewise, when Congressmen Phil Weaver (R-NE) (Appropriations committee)
commented on Commander Shepard’s flight into space, he took great pains to show the
critical issue of control. “Shepard,” according to Weaver, “was able to control his capsule
from an interior instrument panel whereas the Soviet ‘cosmonaut’ [sic] flight was
completely controlled from the ground.” 50 In his own memoir, Shepard highlighted the
fact that the Soviet’s equipped Gagarin’s capsule, Swallow, with manual controls but that
the Soviets did not want to take the risk jeopardizing the mission by allowing Gagarin to
use them. 51
Other articles focused on not only Shepard’s control over the capsule, but they
also stressed his emotional control. On 6 May 1961, the Albuquerque Journal wrote,
“‘Tough, Determined’ Best Describes First American to Soar into Space.” The article
described a “tough” and “determined” Shepard whose “brain and coordination were so
sharp he can control his own flight 115 miles into the heavens and 302 miles down range
into the sea….He is a man who seeks out danger and thrives on it as others seek money
or pleasure.” 52 The New York Times proclaimed that during, before, and after Shepard’s
flight, “He was probably the most unperturbed member of the crew.” Even Shepard’s
own mother said, “Alan has never feared anything.” 53 The 19 May 1961 edition of Life
106

contained Shepard’s own story of his flight. Shepard stated that as his launch date
approached he “began to feel some small effects of the tension that was growing
everywhere around me.” Shepard refused to call this “tension” fear. Instead he
maintained, “They aren’t real fears; if they were, you’d quit altogether. They are normal
apprehensions anyone might have before a big event.” 54
The 12 May 1961 edition of Life also accentuated Shepard’s control over the
capsule. The article stated, “He did not fly as far, fast or high as Russia’s Yuri Gagarin.
However, he controlled the flight of his capsule—which Gagarin did not—and carried
out his fantastic mission under the relentless pressure of television and worldwide
publicity.” The article continued to argue, “whereas Cosmonaut Gagarin was apparently a
passive passenger in an automatically controlled craft, Shepard’s more sophisticated
instrument panel with its imposing array of 165 dials, switches, levers, buttons, and
colored lights, gave him a degree of protection and control not [emphasized in original]
provided by Gagarin’s.” 55
The article labored in its emphasis on Shepard’s control over his capsule. For
instance, while the article acknowledged that a warning light would flash if Shepard’s
launch was in danger of failing, “the rocket could not have been launched at all unless
Shepard’s launch switch had been in the ready position.” Not only did the article profess
that Shepard controlled the launch, but it also suggested that if the automatic controls
failed “he [emphasis added] could have readjusted the temperature and oxygen supply
inside the cabin—and inside his space suit.” The article labored the point that Shepard
was in full control over his capsule:
He could have separated the capsule from the rocket and
jettisoned the escape tower. He could have fired the retrorockets and thrown off the leftover rocket pack. He could
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have opened the drag parachute as well as the main
parachute which lowered the capsule gently into the sea—
and if that hadn’t worked there was a reserve parachute he
could have sprung. He could and did take over personal
control of the pitch, yaw, and roll of the capsule through
the peak of its flight, and could turn it downward for reentry. 56
Shepard told his Life audience that when the capsule left the atmosphere and entered
space, he wanted to see if he could control the capsule. At that point, the capsule was
traveling at around 4,500 miles an hour and was free and weightless in space. “Now
using my three-axis control stick, I switched over to manual control, one axis at a time.”
The most interesting part of his story of controlling the capsule is that he managed to do
it all within his short fifteen minute flight. He ended with: “Major Gagarin may have had
a fine long ride but, as far as we can tell, he was a passenger all the way.” 57
Much like the 21 May 1927 historic flight of Charles Lindbergh, Life argued that
the “nation caught Shepard’s spirit of confidence.” 58 No other statement on this
confidence was clearer than President Kennedy’s bold declaration before Congress and
the world. He would not be happy with just one “first.” He wanted to go bigger and
bolder. On 25 May 1961, before a joint session of Congress, Kennedy openly challenged
the Soviets and the American people. In promoting “the freedom doctrine,” Kennedy
argued that the “great battlefield for the defense and expansion of freedom today” was
not only Southeast Asia, but also in space. He said that in space, “our eagerness to share
its meaning is not governed by the efforts of others.” Kennedy would not let the United
States be controlled by outside forces. The United States must assert its own
individuality, its own control, or in other words, its own Cold War masculinity. He boldly
stated: “I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this
decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth.” He
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acknowledged that it would be costly—an estimated “seven to nine billion dollars
additional over the next five years.” His justification for such an expensive mission was
that:
If we are to only go halfway, or reduce our sights in the
face of difficulty, in my judgment it would be better not to
go at all…. Now this is a choice which this country must
make….it is a heavy burden, and there is no sense in
agreeing or desiring that the United States take an
affirmative position in outer space, unless we are prepared
to do the work and bear the burdens to make it successful. 59
Kennedy called upon scientists and engineers to fulfill their duty not just as citizens of
the United States but as men with the “technical and scientific manpower” to complete
the job. “New objectives and new money,” the president asserted, “cannot solve these
problems.” Instead, he proclaimed, “They could in fact, aggravate them further—unless
every scientists, every engineer, every serviceman, every technician, contractor, and civil
servant gives his personal pledge that this nation will move forward, with the full speed
of freedom, in the exciting adventure of space.” 60 Kennedy laid down the challenge. The
Americans controlled their own destiny in space. During a private meeting with the
astronauts, Kennedy asked, “What do you want to do next?” Shepard responded to both
Kennedy and N.E. Halaby, head of the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), “‘Just let us go!
We are being protected too much with equipment.’” Halaby told the press that the
astronauts really desired “to be free to explore space with less protection and more
initiative and daring.” 61
NASA followed-up on Kennedy’s statement with a less than stellar suborbital
flight by Gus Grissom. Unlike the stiff upper lip exhibited in Shepard’s personality, when
NASA blasted Grissom into the heavens aboard Liberty Bell 7 (Mercury-Redstone 4) on
21 July 1961, in Life, Grissom admitted that he was “scared.” 62 After Grissom’s
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splashdown in the ocean, his capsule’s hatch mysteriously blew and water poured into the
craft, almost drowning the astronaut. The capsule sank to the bottom of the ocean. Due to
what seemed like a failed landing of Grissom’s flight, the press passed on the opportunity
to make another comparison between Grissom’s flight and the Soviet cosmonauts who
continued “ahead” of the Americans. 63
American enthusiasm continued to prove short lived not only due to the almost
drowning of Grissom, but also due to the 6 August 1961 Soviet launch of Vostok 2. The
cosmonaut aboard the capsule, 26-year-old Major Gherman S. Titov, call sign “The
Eagle,” orbited the earth seventeen times in 25 hours. It took Titov approximately 88
minutes to circle the earth. The capsule orbited over 435,000 miles, the estimated
distance to go to the moon and back. The Soviets claimed that not only was Titov’s flight
“more complex” than that of Gagarin’s but that Titov had exercised “manual control” of
his capsule. Titov reported to TASS, “good manual controllability of the space ship.”
However, it was reported that the manual controls did not allow Titov “to alter his course
through space. They merely made it possible to change the attitude of the craft—to pitch
it up or down, roll it one way or the other, or yaw the nose right or left.” 64
Nevertheless, he could not have controlled the capsule the entire time, as he slept
for seven and a half hours while the scientists on the ground monitored Titov and his
flight. Cosmonaut Gagarin differed with this report, claiming to the UPI in Halifax as he
flew home to congratulate his fellow cosmonaut, “Titov had complete control of his craft
and ‘could land it anywhere.’” 65 The Warsaw Communist Party paper, Trybuna Ludu, ran
an interview with Russian planetarium scientist V. Lutsky who insisted, “‘The
importance of this flight lies, among other things, in the fact that Major Titov’s flight is a
piloted one. This is the first time that a man-controlled flight in space has ever been
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made.” 66 Titov himself exclaimed that he “‘felt like a real pilot’ when he took over
manual control of his space ship.” Titov beamed “‘My space ship was a very smart
machine and it was very easy to guide. I could turn it any way I wished. I could steer it
any direction needed and I could land it wherever I wanted.” 67 Titov again
enthusiastically reported on his ability to control the capsule. He announced in Life: “‘I
felt myself the complete master of the ship.’” 68
Yet again the world praised the technological achievements of the Soviets, while
expressing concern of a weakening American space program. The director of London’s
Jodrell Bank radio-astronomy station lamented that the Soviet achievement did not shock
him. He stated to the press, “‘In comparison with the Americans, you can guess which
country appears to be struggling, and it is certainly not Russia’” as Vostok II
demonstrated “the high state of Soviet science and technology.” Similarly, the president
of the French Astronautic Society mourned, “‘I fear the lag can never be made up.’” 69
Unlike their European counterparts, the Pentagon dismissed the flight as “There is
nothing new to this flight from a military standpoint and…it doesn’t add to their military
capability.” 70 The Soviets, especially the cosmonauts, shot back at the Americans. In a
speech to the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Union (CPSU), in October 1961, cosmonaut
Titov suggested that the American astronaut only had one goal in space: “‘money and
business.’” Titov believed that American astronauts flew in space “‘To receive a space
fee, to buy a home or a store, to start a business, to become a real bourgeois-exploiter—
this is the ideal of the American cosmonauts [sic]….’” The Soviet cosmonauts, on the
other hand, were “‘transformers of nature, dreamers, and romantics who volunteer to go
into space for the sake of its conquest and the good of mankind.’” 71 Space journalists,
magazines, administrators, and politicians continued on their path to prove that the
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United States was first to have a pilot individually control a spacecraft. Their next
example of astronaut Cold War masculinity came with one of Ohio’s favorite sons.
On 20 February 1962, John Glenn completed the first American orbital flight
aboard Friendship 7 (Mercury-Atlas 6). Life reported “no man at any instant in human
history was ever less alone.” The feat of the U.S.’s first orbital flight did not rest on the
expertise of Glenn alone, but rather that “His feat was born out of a vast panorama of
human and technical effort, of the patience and the skills of tens of thousands….” 72 The
London associated press wrote of Glenn’s landing, “In restaurants people stopped eating
to listen to radio reports of the final dramatic moments as Glenn’s capsule maneuvered
for its landing.” 73 A February 1962 article of Newsweek suggested that like Lindbergh,
Glenn was an “authentic individualist.” 74
Paradoxically, in describing the debate of man’s mastery over technology, the
editors at Life suggested of the sophisticated machine, “It could steer itself, cool itself,
land itself, release dye to attract attention to itself. It was a machine designed to operate,
ideally, without the intercession of man….” However, while the adeptness of the machine
is explained, the necessity of man to control the machine is also adamant in the article:
“the singular fact of Friendship 7’s three-orbit voyage is that it would have been
impossible without the intervention of the man in the capsule and the men on the
ground.” 75 The article asserted the inability of the machine to perform without man’s
intelligence. Glenn acted as part of a team on which the success of the mission depended.
While the article referred to Glenn as merely a passenger during the first half of the
flight, man’s triumph over technology is emphasized when the automatic control system
failed during its first of three orbits. The Mercury capsule controlled its position by
shooting out hydrogen peroxide. On Glenn’s flight, the system that performed this
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function crashed, leaving the capsule unable to re-orbit automatically. The faulty machine
forced Glenn to take over the controls.
From Friendship 7’s debacle, NASA scientists and engineers learned that even
under weightlessness and pressure, the human mind can act skillfully while the machine
performs poorly. Glenn expressed his feelings of man versus machine by suggesting;
“Now we can get rid of some of that automatic equipment and let man take over.” 76
Glenn’s words did not only highlight man’s need to control machines, but also man’s
need to control his own masculine image. Like the crisis of masculinity’s fears of
automation, Glenn did not want to be a passenger; he wanted to be in control. NASA
employees wrote in the official history of Project Mercury, This New Ocean (1966), of
Glenn’s reaction to the faulty automatic stabilization and control system: “Glenn realized
that he would have to live with the problem and become a full time pilot responsible for
his own well-being.” 77 The associated press quipped of the failure of the equipment: “But
unlike the fragile scientific hardware, which broke down several times under the stress
and strain of many flight postponements, Glenn is a rugged customer who never faltered
once physically or psychologically.” 78 The Abilene Reporter-News wrote that even after
the dangerous feat in space, Glenn appeared “unruffled.” He was a man of “cool courage”
as he calmly reported to the press of his space ride. 79 Carleton J. King (R-NY) asked to
insert in the House of Representatives Daily Record on 15 April 1962 “Tribute to a Hero”
by P.C.C. Becker who wrote of the flight: “Colonel Glenn personifies the best in
American manhood.” 80
As newspapers reveled in Glenn’s flight and his “typically American”
celebrations back home, leading newspapers briefly highlighted the men at Mission
Control. Among pictures of Glenn accepting the Distinguished Service Medal of NASA,
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papers reported that Director Robert R. Gilruth—the “man who has ramrodded Project
Mercury from its conception”—also received the same medal. However, there were no
front page pictures of or parades given for Gilruth. 81 The New York Times wrote that a
picture of Gilruth did not fit the “space adventurer” image. Lost among the countless
articles dedicated to Glenn, the Times proclaimed Gilruth as “the man most responsible
for putting Lieut. Col. John H. Glenn Jr. into orbit.” Although “little known to the
public,” the paper called Gilruth the “No. 1 Space Engineer.” Unlike the tough physic of
the astronauts, the paper described Gilruth as “a ‘man of medium height and a growing
waistline, he speaks almost in a monotone with seldom a tone of excitement in his
voice.’” 82
Shortly after Glenn’s 1962 orbital flight, Richard Donner released his film X-15
starring Charles Bronson and Mary Tyler Moore. Manufactured by North American
Aviation for the Air Force, the X-15 was the first plane to fly into space. On 19 July
1963, operating under the Air Force’s program “Man in Space Soonest” or “MISS,” pilot
Joseph Albert “Joe” Walker became the first X-15 pilot to cross the 100 km altitude and
officially fly in space. 83 The X-15 film that appeared in movie theaters and drive-ins
across the country praised the image of the jet test pilot in control of his craft while at the
same time, mocking the lack of control of the astronaut. The Air Force supported the
film. Air Force Reserve General, World War II hero, and famed actor James “Jimmy”
Stewart gave the narration. He opened with: “‘the X-15 is ready, manned by a pilot who
will make all the decisions for accurate control in flight, and reentry, and recovery.’” The
film continued with the line “‘The X-15 pilot will be able to choose his angle of reentry,
and control his speed and altitude and glide to his landing area…always under the pilot
control. He has a choice.’” 84 While the film is a good example of reinforcing this
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dialogue of the masculinity of jet pilots as they exerted control over their crafts, the
paradoxical dialogue of whether or not the astronaut was fit for such an image continued.
Unfortunately, astronaut Deke Slayton missed his chance to go into space during
Project Mercury. Slayton failed to exercise control over his own body. In July 1962,
flight surgeons announced they had deemed him unable to fly after they discovered he
had an “erratic heart rate.” 85 NASA replaced Slayton with Scott Carpenter. On 24 May
1962, Carpenter flew in Aurora 7 (Mercury-Atlas 7). Before his flight, Life’s Loudon
Wainwright presented Carpenter to the public as a wanderlust pioneer, hunting, climbing,
exploring, and building (In the summer of 1943 Carpenter rebuilt “Bessie” a 1934 Ford).
The article depicted Carpenter as very much an individual, left alone most of his
childhood due to his mother’s illness. Other than his grandfather, one of his only
companions was a horse named “lady.” The article continued with words such as
“independence” and “freedom” to describe the lonely childhood of Carpenter. At the
beginning of his flight, Carpenter’s memoir in Life magazine, “I Got Let in on the Great
Secret,” carefully constructed his control over the space capsule. For instance, Carpenter
reminisced, “I turned the capsule around so that the blunt end would be headed along the
right track I would follow. On this maneuver I used the manual control system and it
worked perfectly. I then checked out the system thoroughly and found that the capsule
responded beautifully to my movements on the stick.” He emphasized his manual actions
over the automated systems. Carpenter praised the pioneering mission of Glenn before
him which he argued “showed that a man can handle the machine under very difficult
conditions….” 86
Several of Carpenter’s automatic control systems failed during his flight, and his
capsule used up all of its maneuvering fuel. This was partly due to his stabilization
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system not holding the correct pitch, yaw, and attitude. The authors of This New Ocean
stated: “As he [Carpenter] tried to determine what was wrong, he fell behind in his check
of other items. When he hurriedly switched to the fly-by-wire control mode, he forgot to
switch off the manual system. For about 10 minutes fuel from both systems was being
used redundantly.” 87 Carpenter took over the controls. He wrote in his Life article, “If we
started the re-entry at the wrong angle and the fuel was exhausted, I would be unable to
control the capsule during the descent. The chances that I would survive such an
uncontrolled re-entry were not good.” 88 However, things continued to get worse as he
had not aligned the spacecraft correctly for retrofire. Due to the glitch in the control
system, Carpenter manually pushed the button to fire his solid-fuel retrorockets that were
strapped to his heatshield. Carpenter’s capsule was not at the correct attitude, he overshot
the landing. However, officials at NASA suggested that even if he allowed the computer
to shoot the retrorockets, the capsule would have overshot its landing even further. 89 The
associated press reported, “Carpenter’s craft, struck dumb at the 12:30 p.m. reentry, never
again regained its voice.” 90
Carpenter returned to face the enraged flight director, Kraft. Carpenter’s
autonomous actions aboard his capsule incensed Kraft. The flight director scolded
Carpenter for not following the flight plan and the direction of the ground crew. The
press raised questions of who really controlled the flight: Carpenter or Kraft. Back on the
ground, the two men’s disagreement infuriated Robert Voas. The industrial psychologist
saw Carpenter’s flight as a great “public relations feature that the man had performed and
brought back a damaged craft, or a partially nonfunctioning spacecraft.” According to
Voas, Carpenter’s actions would have supported the need for a human role in space. 91
The disagreement between Kraft, Carpenter, and Voas highlighted an ever growing
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internal clash of control and autonomy between the astronauts and the Mission
Controllers. Tennessee’s The Kingsport-Times News took Kraft’s side. The newspaper
reported that while Carpenter’s flight signified another chapter in “man’s conquest of
nature…unlike the development of air travel itself, there is no individual effort of darting
men off on their own and taking chances in a competitive spirit. The conquest of space
must remain a piece of teamwork under rigid control.” 92 The New York Times praised
Carpenter. However, one particular article emphasized the control of Kraft. The article
argues that the “slightly built Virginian…calls the plays. If something is wrong with the
capsule during liftoff, Kraft controls whether or not to press the “abort button” thus firing
“escape rockets” that would send the craft back to earth. It was Kraft, who in his “nononsense terms,” told Carpenter that he was “using up too much fuel in moving the
capsule.” The paper reported that unlike the astronauts, Kraft “occasionally showed signs
of nervousness. But now he is calm and sure, even when the pressure is worst and a
man’s life is at stake.” Even though he is of “slight build” and “reticent off the job” he is
a “‘take-charge guy.’” A “colleague” of his suggested “‘He can crack the whip when he
has to.’” 93 However, with the public admiration for Carpenter, it appeared as if the
astronauts could do no wrong. The New York Times stated: “Error By Carpenter Made
Craft Use Too Much Fuel.” 94 Even though Carpenter appeared fallible, he remained in
control of his capsule
The Soviets followed with the next manned spaceflight. On 11 August 1962, they
launched Major Andrian G. Nikolayev aboard Vostok III. Nikolayev orbited the earth
seventeen times in twenty-five hours and eighteen minutes. He broke the previously held
record by Titov. The purpose of the flight was to test man’s “work capacity in the
weightless conditions,” as well as the testing of “communications, control, and landing.”
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The capsule circled the earth every 88.3 minutes while traveling 18,000 miles per hour. It
was reported that Nikolayev ate three square meals a day of “natural food” as opposed to
American astronauts’ “tubed food.” The cosmonaut slept for a total of seven hours. While
he slept the “instruments on board his spaceship was [sic] carried out automatically.” 95
However, The Salt Lake Tribune reported that the television image transmitted during the
mission’s fourth orbit showed a closed eyed Nikolayev. “From time to time,” the paper
argued, “his hands moved to work the controls.” 96 The Soviet news agency, TASS,
underscored the “Iron Endurance” of Nikolayev. 97 Later, it was discovered that the
cosmonaut actually felt ill during the flight. 98 The Times lamented that while it appeared
that Nikolayev would spend the same amount of time in space as the unmanned Soviet
satellite Cosmos IV, seventy-two hours, both American astronauts Glenn and Carpenter
only completed three orbits of the Earth.
The Kremlin delivered a note to the American embassy demanding that the
United States stop any nuclear weapons testing while Nikolayev remained in space.
Moscow also blamed poor Soviet-American relations in Berlin on American aggression
within West Berlin. The infamous note stated the purpose of the Soviet exploration of
space was for “peace purposes.” At the time of the note, the Soviets were also testing
nuclear weapons in the Arctic, however, TASS failed to notify the Soviet people of these
tests. 99 President Kennedy “remained silent” of the Soviet feat. 100 On 12 August 1962,
the Soviets launched cosmonaut Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Popovich aboard Vostok 4 to
orbit the Earth. Both crafts weighed about eight and a half tons, about six tons more than
the American space capsules. 101
The New York Times wrote that Popovich operated his craft “manually.” What
remains interesting is that the American media reported that the cosmonauts, who are
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actually referred to as “astronauts,” were very “busy” during their flights. However, they
are reported as being busy filling out log books, eating, and sleeping. American print
media reports of any actual control of their craft are vague. One report suggested that
“The instrumentation and other equipment of the space ships were said to be functioning
faultlessly.” However, according to TASS, not only did the cosmonaut release himself
from the harness but he also “controlled the ships manually and effected the necessary
measurements, recording the results in their flight logs.” 102 TASS maintained that the
cosmonauts “flew” their craft. 103 Through the porthole of his craft, Nikolayev said he
could see his fellow cosmonaut in orbit. 104
Space journalists’ accounts of the flight remained mixed. Former President
Truman wanted proof of the feat. 105 Kennedy pointed out that while Soviet flights
remained cloaked in secrecy, the American flights were open to the public. Senator
Teague remained confident in the U.S. space program, suggesting ironically, “Our space
program is on solid ground.” 106 Astronaut Carpenter was awestruck by the Soviet feat. 107
While some within American print media hailed the Soviet flight as “Advances Reds
Ahead in Race to Moon,” some papers and TASS incorrectly reported that the
cosmonauts “landed inside their spaceships,” being “cushioned by parachutes” during the
“hazardous descent.” 108 In actuality, the cosmonauts never landed inside of their space
capsules, but rather, they parachuted out of their capsules.
President Kennedy attempted to take back control of the Space Race. At Rice
University on 12 September 1962, like a general encouraging his troops, Kennedy exalted
that the nation needed “knowledge,” “progress,” and “strength.” For this, Kennedy once
again called upon images of America’s past. In 1630, William Bradford enticed his
fellow colonists to overcome “great difficulties” with “answerable courage.” The same
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was needed unless Americans were content to see space “governed by a hostile flag of
conquest” rather than a “banner of freedom and peace.” In space, much like in the
settlement of the United States, “We mean to be part of it—we mean to lead it….We
choose to go to the moon. We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other
things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard.” 109
Space journalists, politicians, and astronauts refused to let reports of cosmonaut
control stifle American control of a spacecraft. Wally Schirra flew next. NASA shot him
into space on 3 October 1962 aboard Sigma 7 (Mercury-Atlas 8). Headlines hailed his
flight as “Proving Pilots’ Space Role.” 110 His flight lasted just over 9 hours, completing
six orbits. Schirra said he turned off the automated sequence ten minutes and thirty
seconds after liftoff and “the capsule was all mine now.” 111 The Chicago Tribune ran the
line that Schirra demonstrated, “precision control of the orbital flight.” Schirra himself
even boldly declared that nobody had “flown a capsule before, much less under pilot
control.” He reminisced on his days as a test pilot as he argued, “my instincts as a test
pilot told me that Sigma 7 would not fail—not unless somebody, including me,
goofed.” 112 Schirra daringly cut off the automatic sequences of the ground stations to
control his retro-fire and bring him down. He insisted that he had “full pilot control.”
Schirra claimed that “The controls worked beautifully.” He continued, “The control
system was so sweet that it responded perfectly with just a few light touches on either
axis. I could point it at anything I wanted to, and I could have parked it on a dime if I had
to. We have to control technique; that’s for sure.” Next, the astronaut experimented with
“powering down” the capsule. Schirra argued that NASA failed by not allowing the
astronaut to let the capsule drift in orbit. In fact, he believed that if he wanted, “I could
have taken over and snapped the capsule back into control at any moment in a matter of
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seconds if I’d had to.” During the flight, Schirra easily realigned himself “by using the
reticle and figuring out the attitude that I was in. In fact, I had no trouble throughout the
flight whenever I wanted to determine or correct the capsule’s attitude.” 113
John Dille’s Life article on Schirra once again presented this image of the
astronaut as free from fear, suggesting that before the flight, Schirra did not have any
butterflies in his stomach. Schirra, the article proposed, hoped to perfect the machine (the
capsule) to make it safer for the astronauts who followed in his footsteps. Therefore, he
approached flying in space as a “professional test pilot.” And yet, paradoxically the
article argued that it was the “marvelously” named Christopher Columbus Kraft Jr.,
director of all manned spaceflights, who “controls the destiny of astronaut flights from
the moment of lift-off to impact in the landing area.” 114 Unlike Schirra’s story of a lone
individual in space controlling his machine, Dille’s article argued that Kraft ultimately
controlled Schirra.
On 15 May 1963, Major Gordon Cooper flew for thirty-four hours aboard Faith 7
(Mercury-Atlas 9). The Life article on the spaceman’s feat, “He Brings it in Right on the
Old Bazoo,” implied that, “In the beginning machinery stole the show.” 115 Newsweek
described Cooper’s 1963 flight: “Once more, the ancient drama of the solitary individual
against the elements was re-enacted.” 116 New York Times headlines hailed “Cooper
Maneuvers to a Bullseye Landing with Manual Control as Automatic Fails.” During his
22 orbits of the earth, on the 19th circuit his automatic system that lined up the capsule to
fire the retro-rockets upon re-entry failed. After the failure, Cooper performed this task of
the automatic controls by himself. Cooper experienced first-hand man’s mastery over
technology. Richard Witkin of the New York Times wrote that “the astronaut guided
himself to safety by manually controlling his capsule when his automatic controls
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failed.” 117 Cooper remembered that after his 21st orbit he was certain that the automatic
power system would not come back on and that “the positioning of the spacecraft for
retro-fire and running the whole rough ride back from space was going to be up to me.”
While he envisioned ground control sweating bullets, Cooper insisted that “All of us in
the Mercury program have felt that pilots are capable of flying the spacecraft through the
complete re-entry sequence.” 118 After 600,000 miles and thirty-four hours “Gordo
Cooper made it—on his own.” Glenn radioed asking for his attitude. “Right on the old
bazoo,” roared Cooper, as he “steered his capsule through the critical re-entry.” 119
Newsweek wrote of Cooper’s calm demeanor, suggesting, “Those who knew him
were not surprised by Cooper’s relaxed manor throughout his mission.” 120 However,
when Cooper’s .05G panel light came on, the pilot did not take over but rather engineers
at Cape Canaveral alerted the astronaut to his next moves. 121 Flight director Kraft ordered
Cooper to turn on his automatic controls. Ground control soon discovered that “Cooper
would have to steer his ship manually.” Not only this, but the capsule’s inverters that
supplied AC electrical support for entry did not work. This meant that Cooper did not
have the aid of the automated systems during re-entry. The article reported, “He would
have to pilot his spacecraft back from orbit by human skill alone—and keep it from
tumbling and burning up.” 122 The operations director for Project Mercury, Walter C.
Williams, summed up the importance of Cooper’s flight when he said, “it demonstrated
more than ever the importance of man in space-flight as a pilot, not as a passenger.” 123
After Cooper’s flight, to further impart the idea of astronaut control, the New York
Times included a drawing of what Cooper’s controls would have looked like and which
ones he would have used during his flight. When compared to the Soviet flights,
astronaut control was vital. In May 1963, Life printed an editorial entitled “World Will
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Be Ruled from the Skies Above” that carried two sides of the debate on the importance of
NASA. While politicians such as J. William Fulbright (D-AR) suggested that the twenty
billion dollars on spaceflight would be better spent on helping the poor, British
astronomer Fred Hoyle referred to the race in space as “stupid.” Life postulated that
unmanned missions into space would be more efficient than manned missions under the
future Gemini and Apollo. However, detractors, such as famed physicist and astronomer,
Sir Bernard Lovell, argued that machinery could not demonstrate the capabilities of man.
In effect, “‘The machines cannot make on-the-spot judgments; neither can it discriminate
and select from alternatives which cannot be anticipated by its designers. The ability to
adapt to the unexpected situation or discovery is a vital factor in exploration.’”[italics in
original] 124
The official NASA historians of Project Mercury wrote that the most important
lesson learned from Mercury “was that man was still invaluable to the machine. Mercury
saw the evolution of the astronaut from little more than a passenger in a fully automatic
system to an integral and fully integrated element in the entire space flight organism.” 125
Astronaut Carpenter remained optimistic of the pilot’s role. In April 1963, before a
Dallas crowd at the AIAA Manned Space Flight meeting, Carpenter stressed that man
would continue to play an important role in the future of spaceflight. “Although we will
be aided and backed by the same flight operations team that has made our Mercury
flights so successful,” Carpenter professed, “pilot decision is going to play a large part in
the spaceflight missions of the future.” 126
As manned spaceflight turned from Project Mercury to Project Gemini, the press,
politicians, and NASA continued with individual control of spaceflight. However, the
Soviet Union constantly ridiculed American machinery and control during public media
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events. On 12 April 1963, Cosmonaut Nikolayev announced during Cosmonautics Day
that after viewing the capsule of American cosmonaut Schirra,
To be frank…I would not like to have been in his place.
You have no idea how cramped and uncomfortable his
capsule looks in comparison with the cabins of our
remarkable cosmic ships…. One looks at this unreliable
American contraption and one is again forced to feel proud
of our country and our people, who have created such
powerful and perfect cosmic ships. 127
Cosmonaut Valery Bykovsky followed Nikolayev, brazenly mocking what was once the
pride of American ingenuity. When an audience member asked Bykovsky if the
American cosmonaut could have “left their couches while in orbit” he teased: “They
would have liked to do so but their cabins were not large enough. They are all strong and
courageous fellows, but they are not to be envied. There is no question of comfort in their
cabins….” During a radio show that same day, Cosmonaut Titov told his audience that he
was once asked who was braver, the American or Soviet cosmonaut. Titov said he and
his fellow cosmonauts replied, “that the Americans were braver because they had to fly in
a rocket that goes one time and blows up another.” He added, “‘If you fly and don’t know
where you are flying, you must be brave.’” 128
During an October 1963 speech in East Germany, Soviet Major General Kamanin
told a crowd that during an interview in the United States, the Soviet cosmonauts were
asked if they would fly into space in an American capsule. He told the audience that the
cosmonauts all answered independently: “‘Why should we change from our miracle
ships, the Vostoks, to such small, primitive, and unreliable capsules?’” 129 Despite foreign
and at times domestic mockery, Americans celebrated the fact that as space machinery
faltered; the American astronaut took over the controls, taming not only the technology,
but also, the environment of space. In this manner, exercising Cold War masculinity in
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manned spaceflight became an essential element to the narrative of the American Space
Race.
Conclusion
The reports from various newspapers, popular magazines, politicians, and NASA
administrators surrounding the six Mercury flights represented the importance of
American control, or Cold War masculinity, within the public image of the astronaut. It
can be argued whether or not the astronauts actually controlled their capsules. However,
in the public discourse surrounding the flights, the purpose of spaceflight was clear.
Human control, and being “first” with it, was clearly important to the domestic and
international image of NASA. Thus, who could fly was of central importance. The flyer
could not be just anyone. He had to be someone who exemplified the best virtues of
American masculinity. In emphasizing the rugged individualism and control of the space
flyer, Americans gendered manned spaceflight as a masculine sphere. Americans
continued the dialogue of control over their space capsules into Project Gemini. As
Americans basked in the glow of the astronaut as a symbol of American superiority,
questions pertaining to the role of women in space thrived in the press. Beginning in
1959, women challenged NASA’s cult of masculinity suggesting that they too were fit for
spaceflight. Women tested not only the boundaries of gender and power, but also, who
could fly.
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CHAPTER V
FLIGHTY WOMEN: PENETRATING THE MASCULINE DIALOGUE OF
SPACEFLIGHT, 1958-1964
In November 1962, appearing before a crowded auditorium at Mississippi State
College, Dr. Wernher von Braun asked why “the Russians were first in space.” He
lamented that Americans had become too complacent with a “life of comfort, ease, and
pleasure.” He asked the crowd, “Had we become too soft in the process?” He implored
the students, both men and women, to embrace new technologies and sciences and
“vigorously” explore space. However, when it came to physically flying a capsule into
space, he told the students that one of the most popular questions he was asked from
reporters was when a woman would go into space. He informed the crowd not to worry.
He and his friend, Bob Gilruth, were “reserving 110 pounds of payload for recreational
equipment.” 1 Von Braun’s joke about women space flyers, his fears of “soft” living, and
his plea to move “vigorously” in space mirrored the public discourse of the Cold War
masculinity crisis. His speech continued the narrative of spaceflight as a masculine
venture.
The following chapter builds upon the previous chapters in asserting that the
public discourse of the print media, politicians, and at times NASA constructed the image
of the astronaut as exhibiting Cold War masculinity in space. Male astronauts vied for
control of space, while NASA relegated women to the role of help mates within the
masculine world of spaceflight. The model of female as support for the male engineers
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and astronauts mimicked—and in my cases was—the role of the wife within the social
structure of the idealized Cold War American family. 2
Western society has typically looked at engineering as a male profession, and the
United States was no different. Ruth Oldenziel argues in Making Technology Masculine:
Men, Women, and Modern Machines in America, 1870-1945 (1999) that machines
became a “trope designed to authenticate male authority in American society.” Since the
beginning of American engineering, Americans created the field as a symbol of white
middle class individual manhood. 3 Margaret Rossiter contends in Women Scientists in
America: Before Affirmative Action, 1940-1972 (1995) that despite the urgency to fill
science and technology jobs, the period of 1940 to 1972 remained a “very dark age for
women in the professions.” Women’s colleges were closing. Colleges and universities
replaced married and older single women with younger PhDs in what Rossiter refers to as
“code language for the masculinization of formerly female dominated areas.” The postWorld War II era could have been a time of great change. Instead, Rossiter suggests, it
was “a time when young male scientists faced enhanced opportunities at every turn, the
young women were supposed to be at home with the children, whether they had them or
not or whether they wanted to be there or not.” 4
The 1964 M.I.T. symposium on Women and the Scientific Professions strengthens
Rossiter’s assumption. Here, Alice S. Rossi claimed that not only society’s assumptions
about men’s and women’s proper roles, but also that the American image of the scientist
and astronaut helped keep women out of these fields. She argued that the image of the
engineer was one of a “rugged outdoor type, highly masculine, smoking an unfiltered
cigarette in a plaid wool shirt amid noise and bustle and dirt.” With an “unfeminine”
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image, women and their parents felt that within the engineering profession, the “very
masculine men would resent the presence of women colleagues.” 5
NASA accommodated the social agenda of Cold War separate spheres for women
by relegating the majority of women into traditionally feminine jobs. This is not to say
that women did not work as scientists or engineers or that NASA viewed women as
unimportant to the organization. Women were very important to NASA. Dr. Nancy
Roman headed NASA’s astronomy program from 1960 until the late 1970s. By 1974,
NASA employed 4,432 women. 310 of these women worked in science and engineering.
Only four served in the highest civil service pay grades. 6 The astronaut’s wives also
played very important roles in the gendered image of manned spaceflight. All but one of
the Mercury through Apollo astronauts was married. As stories of the astronauts filled
print media, so too did stories about their wives. 7 However, even though their numbers
were small, women forced the conversation about gender roles in NASA. Their fight for
spaceflight made Americans confront the masculine image of the astronaut and who
could control a space capsule.
In the early sixties, women’s public response to NASA remained divided. For
instance, between 1959 and 1962, female flyers such as Jackie Cochran, Geraldine
“Jerrie” Cobb, and Janey Hart fought for women to be astronauts; however, they did so in
very different ways. Professor of Linguistics at Case Western Reserve, Marie Lathers,
argues in her “‘No Official Requirement’: Women, History, Time, and the U.S. Space
Program,” (2009) that both Cobb and Hart “argued forcefully that the astronaut
program’s qualifications unfairly excluded women. In contrast, Cochran urged that
NASA hold off on changing its qualifications.” Lathers suggests that these two different
outlooks represented two of the most prevalent views of women’s history. To “place”
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women within history “as it happens” as advocated by Cobb and Hart, or as advocated by
Cochran, wait, and exercise their “gendered virtue of patience” letting the men make
history and have the women follow.
The following chapter also looks at the dialogue within the 1962 Subcommittee
transcripts on the arguments made by the committee, NASA administrator George Low,
astronauts John Glenn and Scott Carpenter, as well as Cobb, Hart, and Cochran.
However, unlike Lathers, who analyzed the historical meanings of words such as
“experience,” “engineering,” “interruption,” “interference,” “qualifications,” and
“requirements;” the chapter places the testimony during the subcommittee hearing within
the context of the Cold War masculinity crisis. Lathers proposes that the possible
“rivalry” between Cobb and Cochran “reveals how individual women who wish to appear
exceptional can sometimes impede women as a group from making a mark on history.” 8
In looking at the public discourse, the chapter contends that NASA considered women
very important to the image of NASA, as long as they stayed within their Cold War
gendered spheres; in other words, outside the realm of Cold War masculinity.
Cochran played into the public dialogue of NASA by suggesting that bringing
women into the program would upset domestic security. She predicted embarrassment for
both females and the country by haphazardly sending a woman into space. Cobb and Hart
wanted equality without playing into their traditional domestic roles as women. In
considering why an American woman could not fly into space in the early 1960s, this
chapter argues that Americans wanted their astronauts to symbolize Cold War
masculinity’s rugged individualism and control. The public narrative surrounding the
early space flights pinpointed American control of the capsules. Within the language of
the Cold War masculinity crisis, femininity meant lack of control. A woman in a capsule
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would have symbolized such. The American media mocked Soviet cosmonauts for their
lack of control. Blasting a woman into space would have contradicted the current public
narrative of American spaceflight. The language of the subcommittee hearings even
suggested the need for pilot control of a space capsule. The domestication of women was
of the utmost importance to the image of spaceflight. Since women belonged in the
domestic sphere, women would have to wait for the domestication of space to fly. In
essence, women would have to wait until spaceflight was safe.
Women have always been part of the narrative of flight. As discussed in previous
chapters, the history of flight is as much about culture as it is about science and
technology. Despite discrimination, women still found avenues into the field. For
instance, in the 1920s, popular culture created a “new woman” image of the female sex.
The “new woman” ventured outside the domesticated realm of the home. On a limited
and usually domesticated scale, American culture accepted women into the disciplines of
science and technology. With limited access, women entered the field of flight. Leslie
Haynesworth and David Toomey of Amelia Earhart’s Daughters (1998) contend of the
flapper image:
And in some ways the aviatrix was the perfect icon of the
‘new’ femininity. She was the flapper and the career
woman rolled into one: a wild adventuress and a serious,
skilled master of a challenging profession. She was
participating in the realization of incredible new
possibilities. She was brave and she was enterprising. And
she did not let traditional notions of what she was
‘supposed’ to do stop her. In short, she was just about
everything Americans wanted their heroes to be. 9
This is not to suggest that women easily entered the male dominated field of
flying. To be accepted, women still played upon their femininity as they made flying
appear glamorous. Women danced atop their planes’ wings in full make-up and costume
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during air shows. Joseph J. Corn argues in The Winged Gospel: America’s Romance with
Aviation, 1900-1950 (1983) that the image of women flyers in the pre-World War II era
created an image of the ease of flying. Corn proposes that most female flyers detested
that to the general public female flyers represented just how easy flying could be.
However, women accepted the image. By playing into female gender roles, women could
enter the male realm of flying. In accepting the feminine flyer image, women
“subordinated the cause of equality for women to the cause of aviation.” 10 Stereotypes of
gender remained as Americans continued to view flying as not feminine, but rather, dirty
and dangerous. 11 Commenting on Amelia Earhart’s July 1937 disappearance, Life
insisted that she had undertaken “the kind of dangerous stunt of which the Federal
Government now strongly disapproves.” 12
Americans might have viewed flight as too dangerous for the female sex, but
women actively carved out their own spaces within flight as stewardesses. Stewardesses
played multiple roles. Aboard commercial flights women acted as nurses, waitresses, and
comforters. Women symbolized control over the cabin, not necessarily control over flight
technology. Their domesticated status symbolized the safety of flight. Women as
stewardesses did not upset power hierarchies in flight technology. The male pilot still
retained control over the technology, and thus, who could fly. Stewardesses demonstrated
that Americans preferred to relegate women to traditional roles of wife and mother
instead of the masculine role of controlling flight. 13
The aviation experience of American women in World War II confirmed the
unwillingness of Americans to send women into dangerous (combat) situations.
Americans detested the idea of women being blown to pieces on the battlefield. However,
historical debates continue about why the United States decided to allow women to fly
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for the military as civilians during the war. Molly Merryman’s Clipped Wings: The Rise
and Fall of the Woman Airforce Service Pilots (WASPSs) of World War II (2001)
attributes the decision to use women as flyers to the relentless insistence of famed female
flyer Cochran and Chief of the Air Corps, General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold. Together
both Cochran and Arnold created the para military organization, the WASPs. 14 Similarly,
in September 1942, celebrated female flyer Nancy Harkness Love founded the Women’s
Auxiliary Flying Squadron (WAFS) or Women’s Auxiliary Ferrying Squadron (WAFS).
In the summer of 1943, the Army joined both Cochran’s and Love’s organizations into
the WASP. 15 Women flying during the war elicited fears of women’s public participation
in the military. In the United States, over 400,000 women served in the military. The
government allowed none to fight in combat. Between 1942 and 1944, over one thousand
WASPs ferried planes from factories to bases throughout the United States, Canada, and
Britain. The WASPs flew every type of aircraft that their male counterparts flew. While
men fought in the skies, the women ferried and tested the planes and trained male soldiers
to fly.
In July 1943, Life magazine featured these “Girl Pilots” on the front cover of their
issue. The article maintained that the “girls” fly with “skill, precision, and zest, their
hearts set on piloting with an unfeminine purpose that might well be a threat to Hitler.”
While the “girls” are very “serious” about their flying, becoming competent in the same
courses as regular Army pilots (besides gunnery and flying formation) the “Girls are very
serious about their chance to fly for the Army at Avenger Field, even when it means
giving up nail polish, beauty parlors, and dates for a regimented 22½ weeks.” While the
article highlighted women participating in atypical feminine jobs during the war, it also
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maintained that women were “to relieve fighting men for combat duty.” 16 Women’s
military participation was clear. They were to remain outside of the male combat zone.
A preponderance of American men, and at times women, hated the thought of
women in the military, let alone women in combat. Some male soldiers even demanded
that their female relatives and friends not join the military. Rumors thwarted the
Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps and the Women’s Army Corps (WAAC/WAC)
recruitment as men viewed female recruits as sexual “extremists.” De’Ann Campbell
proposes in “Women in Combat: The World War II Experience in the United States,
Great Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union,” (1993) that the male disdain for women
in the military, let alone combat, can be best understood as the male view that military
service was “a validation of their own virility and as a certificate of manhood.” Campbell
writes, “What stopped the British, Americans, and Germans from allowing…women to
pull the trigger was their sense of gender roles—a sensibility that had not yet adjusted to
necessity.” 17 However, test piloting was dangerous. Thirty-eight WASPs were killed
while ferrying or testing planes. 18 The military disbanded the WASPs in 1944. It would
not be until 1977 that these women were fully recognized for their military service. 19
Women faced further discrimination in the post-World War II era. Returning from
war, male pilots accepted jobs with commercial airline companies. Women took what
few jobs men did not want. During the war women entered the traditionally male realm of
outside employment and flying. However, the American public viewed their participation
in the war as fulfilling their domestic duties. For the most part, women stayed on the
home front, while their male counterparts left the homeland to fight overseas. Women
still remained in the domestic realm.
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During the war magazines such as Ladies’ Home Journal, Home and Garden,
Colliers, Life, and Atlantic Monthly urged women to find employment for the war effort.
After the war a smaller percentage of women returned to the home than left the home
during the war. Despite a growing number of women working outside the home, popular
magazines, corporations, and pundits advocated for women to return to the home. Social
activist Agnes E. Meyer wrote a scathing article in Atlantic Monthly concerning women
and national security entitled “Women Aren’t Men.” Meyer argued, “Women have many
careers but only one vocation—motherhood….It is for woman as mother, actual or
vicarious, to restore security in our insecure world.” Much like the language surrounding
the masculinity crisis, Meyer’s main concern was the loss of American individualism.
She lamented:
The shattering of the social structure has disastrously
isolated the individual… Many people are tired and
frightened to a point where they can no longer endure their
social isolation and the burden of an individual destiny….
Women must boldly announce that no job is more exacting,
more necessary, or more rewarding than that of housewife
and mother. Then they will feel free to become once more
the moral force of society through the stabilization of the
home. 20
Other magazine articles reflected Meyer’s fears. A 1951 Seventeen Magazine article
entitled “How to Be a Woman,” instructed young girls to be “a partner of man…not his
rival, his enemy, or his plaything.” 21 These were the messages journalists and writers sent
to women regarding their appropriate gender roles. None of these roles included the
dangerous role of flight, let alone spaceflight. D’Ann Campbell argues that “no
permanent or radical transformation took place” in American gender roles after the war. 22
Women returned to the domestic sphere. However, they still found themselves
within public discussions during the early years of spaceflight. In the discourse of
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spaceflight, women’s role as passenger and not flyer appeared evident. In September
1958, the Los Angeles Times argued for traditional female roles for women space
travelers. The paper reported that at a recent meeting of the American Psychological
Association in Washington, psychologists and space scientists quipped that with
“‘feminine companionship’” interplanetary flight might be “less rigorous.” While the
University of Florida’s Dr. Wilse B. Webb suggested that the addition of the female
space traveler would “cure boredom,” the idea was not perfect. For instance, “Suppose
the psychologists goofed and picked a feminine passenger who proved to be
incompatible.” Dr. Webb warned that this would only cause irreparable harm to the pilot.
“Imagine,” advised Dr. Webb, “hurtling tens of millions of miles accompanied by a
nagging back-seat rocket pilot. It would be enough to make the spaceman hit the liquor
lever too hard and make the wrong turn as he approached Saturn.” 23 By the use of the
term passenger, it is assumed that the woman would not be flying the craft. The following
summer, a research firm nominated a married Beverly Hills stewardess, Pamela Jayson,
as the first stewardess aboard a manned spaceflight. The appropriate roles for women
were in the domestic spheres as passengers. 24
The media portrayed male astronauts in the important role of rugged individuals
of the new frontier, and the image of the wives served an equal importance. The astronaut
wives were intelligent, brave, efficient caretakers of the home and children, and above
all, they eagerly awaited their husbands’ return from the dangers of space. The wives’
public role at NASA was wife and mother. Even though the domesticated public image of
NASA remained important, a few men thought NASA would benefit from a more direct
role of women in spaceflight. In 1959, Brigadier General of the Air Research and
Development Command (ARDC), Donald Flickinger, proposed project “Women in
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Space Earliest” (WISE). He worked with Lovelace in the 1950s on the Central
Intelligence Agency’s secret U2 spy plans. Flickinger anticipated both sexes living and
working in space. In 1959, the ARDC assessed female aviator Ruth Nichols to see if she
could pass the astronaut tests. At the same time, in 1959 Look magazine gained
permission to use NASA facilities to put famed flyer Betty Skelton through astronaut
tests. Look conducted the tests for publicity. They were not necessarily interested in
proving a scientific point or removing any barriers to women in spaceflight. While both
Nichols and Skelton went through testing, Jerrie Cobb took her first tests at the Lovelace
Foundation. 25
The ARDC and Lovelace programs hoped to prove that due to women’s smaller
size, they would be more capable of space travel. The programs took place before
Kennedy’s push for a man on the moon, and even before Gagarin and Shepard went into
space. Americans did not have a perfect image of what a space flyer should look like.
However, traditional American gender roles played a large part in the tests administered
by Look and the ARDC. For instance, Look suggested of women in space, “Our first girl
in space will probably be a flat-chested lightweight under 35 years of age and married….
Her first chance in space may be as the scientist-wife of a pilot-engineer.” Weitekamp
suggests that scientists feared that if men and women went into space together, they
would engage in sexual relations. However, a married female astronaut implied
stability. 26 This stability not only implied control, but also the domestication of
spaceflight.
The ARDC held similar views on the jobs of women in space. They considered
using women as scientists, but not as pilots. The Director of the Air Force Aeronautical
Laboratory at Wright Field told the Philadelphia Inquirer in January 1959 that the
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woman’s performance within the isolation chamber overshadowed that of the male
subjects. The men’s performances showed that unlike the women the men “start worrying
about their families and become aggressive and irrational too soon to stand a long and
confining interplanetary trip.” However, the director explained, the drawback to women
alone in space is that “the gregariousness of the sex is well known. Name one famous
woman hermit. Name one who prefers solitaire (except on the ring finger) to a kaffe
klatsch.” The Philadelphia Inquirer continued mocking the dangers of female solitude.
Journalists suggested that “A young unmarried woman…may make a fine test pilot for a
simulated space ship. But wait until the simulation is gone, and with it all chance of
seeing the boy-friend for an indefinite time, and watch the old pioneer spirit evaporate
into space.” 27 The Air Force feared “adverse publicity” and the ARDC cancelled WISE
before it even got started. According to Weitekamp, its cancellation was due to “postwar
beliefs that women should be protected not shot into space.” 28 An article in Look
suggested that “many believe that women’s biggest obstacle to being first is our cultural
bias against exposing them to hazardous situations.” 29
Look and the ARDC were not the only programs open to public debate at the time.
As early as August 1960, the public knew about Lovelace’s testing of women using the
same standards as the Mercury astronauts. At an aeronautical science conference in
Switzerland, Lovelace revealed his testing results. Lovelace referred to his test subjects as
“the First Lady Astronaut Trainees” or FLATs. Life argued that the FLATs proved a
“very important astronautical point: women are as capable as men of enduring the rigors
of space flight.” The same article accentuated Cobb’s aeronautical achievements.
Participating in a “tough masculine trade” as a veteran pilot, Cobb completed over 7,500
hours flying numerous planes from crop dusters to B-17s. After passing the seventy-five
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astronaut tests, Cobb “complained less than the Mercury men had….” Lovelace proposed
that women were better equipped for space travel because they ate and drank less, had a
lower body mass, used less oxygen, and therefore might be able to go into space in lighter
capsules or stay in space longer than men while using the same equipment. Lovelace
suggested that women’s “less exposed reproductive system should also give them a
higher radiation tolerance.” Spaceflight, the article concluded, would be “coeducational”
in the future. 30 In the summer of 1961, James Webb even announced Cobb as a
consultant for NASA. The administration swore her in that summer. 31 In her home state
of Oklahoma, the Daily Oklahoman called Jerrie Cobb a “Space Suffragette.” 32
When the press questioned NASA about the training of Cobb as an astronaut, the
administration denied any connection to the program. The administration professed that it
“has never had a plan to put a woman in space, it doesn’t have one today, and it doesn’t
expect to have any in the foreseeable future.” However, NASA emphasized that “women
someday will ride spacecraft into orbit around the earth or on missions to the moon or
planets.” 33 The usage of the word “ride” suggests that NASA saw women in spaceflight
as passengers and not pilots. Space World’s Donald Cox wrote sarcastically that if NASA
allowed psychiatrists to run the astronaut program, they would bypass the “normal
American male” as space travelers in favor of “schizophrenics, extreme introverts,
Eskimos, aborigines…and even women!” Cox suggested that the “biggest initial obstacle
to an accelerated ‘astranette’ program still to be overcome is the cultural bias of
American men against exposing their women to the hazards of spaceflight.” 34 On the
other hand, science fiction glorified the sex appeal that women might bring to space. In
Doris Wishman and Raymond Phelan’s 1961 sexploitation, “Nude on the Moon,” female
sex goddesses awaited eagerly their discovery by man. In the film, two scientists build a
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rocket and fly to the moon only to discover that the tropical forests and golden nuggets of
the moon are ruled by a colony of topless women. 35
After the media attention surrounding Cobb and Look magazine’s women in space
program, NASA received a barrage of letters from women and concerned citizens
pertaining to the use of women as astronauts. At the same time, NASA instructed that all
management manuals contain an Equal Employment Opportunity for Women statement
as written in the President’s commission on the Status of Women. Within the statement
Kennedy declared, “Women are entitled to equality of opportunity for employment in
Government and in industry. But a mere statement supporting equality of opportunity
must be implemented by affirmative steps to see that doors are really open for training,
selection, advancement, and equal pay.” At the end of the memorandum, the
administrator of NASA, James Webb, wrote “I support fully the President’s efforts. It is
my intention to take positive steps to ensure equal opportunity….” 36 However, equality in
NASA did not necessarily pertain to spaceflight.
In September 1961, Lovelace sent a request to the Pentagon asking for permission
to use the Naval School of Aviation Medicine in Pensacola, Florida. He wished to
continue testing the FLATs to find differences between men and women in spaceflight.
The request read, “Request authority for civilian Miss Jerrie Cobb to fly in Naval aircraft
for the purpose of base-line studies to determine the fundamental differences between
male and female astronauts.” The Chief of Naval Operations replied to the request, “If
you don’t know the differences already, we refuse to put money into the project.” 37
Despite the sarcasm, the deputy chief of naval operations (air), Vice Admiral Robert B.
Pirie, had already been conversing with the powerful Cochran on the matter since the
previous August. Pirie was aware of Lovelace’s plans to use the Pensacola base for jet
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test exercises. He contacted NASA to see if the organization had a specific request to use
the base for training female astronauts. NASA responded that they had not. Without the
backing of federal funds from NASA, according to Weitekamp, Pirie was not about to
use his men and planes for the exercises, especially without reimbursement. 38
Cobb was livid and eagerly wrote letters to NASA and congressional leaders
protesting the cancelation. On 15 March 1962, Vice President Johnson instructed NASA
director James Webb in a memo “I’m sure you agree that sex should not be a reason for
disqualifying a candidate for orbital flight.” Privately, Johnson handwrote a note to Webb
instructing the director: “Let’s stop this now!” As Johnson understood the NASA
qualifications, the candidate had to have piloted a high speed military jet and earned an
engineering degree which gave the astronaut the ability to take over the controls of the
capsule. Johnson ended the letter with “I know we both are grateful for the desire to serve
on the part of these women, and look forward to the time when they can.” 39
In accordance with Johnson’s order, and Cobb’s persistent correspondence,
between 17 and 18 July 1962 a special Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Science and Astronautics convened to investigate alleged discrimination in employment
within NASA. Victor Anfuso (D-NY) chaired the eleven-member special subcommittee.
Two women served on the subcommittee. They were Jessica McCullough Weis (R-NY)
and Corinne Boyd Riley (D-SC). According to Martha Ackmann in The Mercury 13: The
True Story of Thirteen Women and the Dream of Spaceflight (2003) Riley began serving
in Congress three months prior to the subcommittee hearing and had little knowledge of
the space program. 40
In the official report of the subcommittee hearing, the opening remarks by Anfuso
suggested a paradox of women’s role in spaceflight. Anfuso made it clear that the Space
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Race should be open to both men and women, utilizing “all human resources” available.
However, he also highlighted the clear delineation of male and female spheres during the
Cold War in his opening remarks. While introducing flier Janey Hart he referred to her as
Mrs. Philip Hart, wife of Senator Philip A. Hart of Michigan, touting her as not only a
“famed pilot” but an “outstanding wife and mother.” The marital statuses and children of
the expert witnesses, Carpenter and Glenn, are also within the subcommittee hearings.
However, no one pointed out their excellence and ability as fathers. Instead, the
subcommittee simply referred to the men as “Americans of heroic stature, of whom
nothing further need be said.” 41
Cobb spoke first before the subcommittee. According to Weitekamp, Cobb wrote
a note to herself before her testimony that read “Never apologize, no timidity, in
control.” 42 Cobb told the committee that she did not want to enter into a “battle of the
sexes.” Rather, she desired “a place in our Nation’s space future without discrimination.”
Cobb explained that “as citizens of this nation” the women wanted “to be allowed to
participate with seriousness and sincerity in the making of history now, as women have in
the past.” Since her testimony occurred before the flight of cosmonaut Tereshkova, Cobb
carefully constructed her words as to fit within the present dialogue of manned
spaceflight. She used the term “first” to suggest not only the prowess of the United States
in the Space Race, but also to suggest, like those before her, that “Now we who aspire to
bring glory to our Nation by an American woman becoming first in all the world to make
a spaceflight. No nation has yet sent a human female into space.” The United States did
not appear willing to shoot a woman into space due to their cultural roles of man as the
protector and woman as the protected. The testimony at the subcommittee reflected these
parameters. 43
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Hart spoke next. She demanded that NASA should not “be restricted to men only,
like some sort of stag club.” However, for Hart, much like for Cobb, it was not simply
that women should become astronauts to avoid sex discrimination. Hart argued that
women should be admitted into the astronaut corps because they “have a real contribution
to make.” Hart attempted to subdue her passion for women astronauts by playing into
Cold War rhetoric of women needing assistance from men. She suggested: “But happily
for the Nation, there have always been men, men like the members of this committee,
who have helped women succeed in roles that they were previously thought incapable of
handling.” Hart drew upon images of war to make her point. She suggested that using
women as nurses in war hospitals one hundred years ago would have been unthinkable
because women’s “frail and emotional structure.” Hart argued that men proposed that
unattractive women be used in field hospitals because these women possessed “more
strength of character.” Hart continued, “It seems to me a basic error in American thought
that the only time women are allowed to make a full contribution to a better nation is
when there is a manpower shortage….” She asked the committee: “why must we
handicap ourselves with the idea that every woman’s place is in the kitchen despite what
her talents and capabilities might be?” Hart believed women should be given the
opportunity to choose whether being a housewife was enough, or whether or not her
talents would be useful elsewhere. Women, like men, should have control over their own
identity. 44
Hart again suggested that a woman in space benefited both men and women.
Allowing the Lovelace program to continue would “provide valuable data.” Instead of
leaving out women whose talent would only benefit the nation, it would “encourage more
talented young women to enter the specialized fields relating to space engineering…. I
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think it would open to the Nation a great new reservoir of ability and enthusiasm.” Hart
reiterated that she did not want to discourage women from being housewives, she did not
want to be another Susan B. Anthony, nor did she want to “downgrade the feminine role
of wife, mother, and homemaker.” Instead, by playing upon the masculine rhetoric of the
Space Race, she highlighted that using women in space was necessary to the nation’s
national security. She warned: “I just think we would be making a serious mistake if we
assumed that women just have no contribution to make to space exploration.” Her
statements fell upon deaf ears. Taking Hart’s testimony out of context, Representative
Anfuso asked: “Would you go so far, Mrs. Hart, that anything man can do, woman can do
better?” Hart replied, “No, sir, I would not.” 45
After Hart, Cobb continued answering questions. Cobb implored that women
deserved to be proactive actors in space exploration as opposed to passive actors. She
proposed that scientifically women might be better equipped for spaceflight. Cobb
indicated that scientific evidence existed that women weighed less and consumed less
than men, thereby making it cheaper for women to go into space. She also suggested that
women were less prone to heart attacks and radiation “because of the way the good lord
constructed them.” Lovelace argued previously that women were less susceptible to
radiation because their reproductive organs were inside the body. She went on to propose
that women were less susceptible to heat, cold, monotony, loneliness, and pain. 46 When
questioned whether or not she was aware that NASA required women to be jet test pilots,
Cobb answered: “Some of us have worked as test pilots, but it is impossible for a woman
in this country to be a jet test pilot because there are no women pilots in the military
services and the test pilot schools are operated solely by the military services.” 47
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However, Cobb made sure to point out that most of Lovelace’s women had twice
the amount of flying hours as the male astronauts. To this, Representative Joseph E.
Karth (D-MN) asked Cobb: “There is a considerable difference between straight flying—
commercial or private—and test piloting; isn’t there?” Cobb responded that “there is
‘equivalent experience’ in flying that may be even more important in piloting a
spacecraft. Pilots with thousands of hours flying time would not have lived so long
without coping emergencies calling for microsecond reactions.” 48
Cobb believed the jet test piloting requirement to be the biggest flaw of NASA’s
astronaut prerequisites. When asked whether she thought the requirement was essential,
Cobb responded: “I personally do not feel it is essential at all. It is a means to an end, but
it is certainly not the end itself. An astronaut must pilot a spacecraft—not test jet
fighters.” Karth interrupted, again suggesting there was a big difference between “straight
piloting” and “test piloting.” Cobb responded that what was needed to fly in a spacecraft
was “flawless judgment, fast reaction, and the ability to transmit that to proper control of
the craft.” Cobb added that some of the women “have 8,000 to 10,000 [flying] hours—
have flown a million miles in all types of airplanes—this is the hard way to acquire that
experience….” Turning the hearing into a battle of the sexes, Fulton posed to Cobb: “Are
the women just as competent or are they better than the men?”
Cobb skirted the questions, again reiterating that women could not be jet test
pilots in the United States. To this, Fulton asked: “Given the same planes that are
generally available and the same number of hours, how does the safety record of woman
pilots compare with that of the men?” Cobb responded that she was not sure if any study
had ever been conducted. However, safety did not depend upon if you were male or
female. It depended upon whether or not you were a safe pilot. Hart responded that in the
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past seventeen years, each year there is a transcontinental air race of more than one
hundred and one female participants. No fatalities had occurred in the past seventeen
years. Fulton interjected. He advised that The National Safety Council had statistics that
suggested women were safer pilots and automobile drivers. Anfuso asked: “Do you
believe that the recognized hazards in such a feat and the possible worldwide
repercussions to our prestige are worth the risk and expense for us to achieve that
objective of trying to put the first woman in space?” Cobb gave the affirmative: “I very
definitely do—very strongly do.” 49
Representative J. Edward Roush (D-IN) did not appear convinced. He brought the
hearing back to the topic of women as the weaker sex. Space journalists and politicians
acclaimed the astronauts’ emotional control. Roush alleged that Cobb lacked emotional
control. The representative asked:
Miss Cobb, I couldn’t help but overhear a conversation
between you and Mr. Anfuso prior to the hearing and
during that course of the conversation you said….. ‘I am
scared to death.’ How do you reconcile this emotional
statement with the fact that an astronaut must be fearless
and courageous and emotionally stable? 50
Cobb replied: “Going up into space couldn’t be near as frightening as sitting here.” Her
response incited laughter from the panel.
After discussing the cancelation of the Pensacola tests, Fulton asked if the
cancellation was because “the men [NASA] thought the women were too
successful?”Again, this elicited laughter from the subcommittee and the audience of
reporters. When asked if she thought she personally was qualified to go into space, Cobb
answered that while she had passed astronaut testing, she had yet to endure astronaut
training. The panel inquired if she wanted to incorporate women into the existing
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astronaut program, or start a parallel program. Cobb responded that she did not think
there needed to be a separate program, nor did they need to interfere with the present
program. Rather, women should be “inserted” into the existing program when they have
successfully passed all the astronaut tests. 51
The next day, Jackie Cochran spoke with committee. To Cobb and Hart, she
turned on the very women she once helped fund for the FLATs program. Within the first
few moments of her testimony, she proposed that there was not any discrimination within
the astronaut program. Much like Cobb and Hart, Cochran also used the rhetoric of
national security to make her case. She argued:
The manned spaceflights are extremely expensive and also
urgent in the national interests and therefore in selecting
astronauts it was natural and proper to sit [sic] them from
the group of male pilots who had already proven by aircraft
testing and high-speed precision flying that they were
experience [sic], competent, and qualified to meet possible
emergencies in a new environment. 52
Cochran did not think that the sex of a candidate should be the determining factor for
spaceflight. She was more concerned with whether or not the inclusion of women into the
program would “speed up, slow down, make more expensive, or complicate the schedule
of exploratory space flights” of which the country is already engaged. 53 To this end,
Cochran also suggested that there was no need for female astronauts because the country
already had enough well qualified astronauts to undertake the future spaceflights.
Anfuso asked her to expand upon her comment that it would be too expensive to
train women. Cochran replied that she drew her knowledge from her experiences with the
WASPs. However, she could affirm that the WASPs had a high “attrition rate…due to
marriage…. Somewhere in the neighborhood of 40 percent.” Cochran acknowledged that
women flew every type of military aircraft, and with less accidents than the men.
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However, she brought her testimony back to the women and pregnancy suggesting that in
her fourteen years as director of an airline, she could confidently say that the reason
women were not even civilian airline pilots was because it cost around fifty thousand
dollars “to check a pilot out on a 707 or Convair 880. That is expensive if you lose them
through marriage.” She emphasized the importance of gender roles suggesting: “I think
first and foremost no one is successful unless they are first a woman and first a man and
have all of the instincts and desires of the two sexes.” 54
Anfuso asked if women should be trained as test jet pilots. Cochran responded
that it would be too expensive. She alleged that in 1956 it cost $144,000 to train a B-47
pilot. Cochran warned that “to spend that type of money, and take a chance that about the
time we are ready to use that person, she starts a family, then, I am all for it, but I am
against waste, because I don’t think we can afford it.” Anfuso asked if NASA should start
training women as crewmembers. Cochran replied in the affirmative. Not one of the
members on the subcommittee asked, nor did Cochran offer, how much it cost the
government to train a crewmember. 55
Representative Roush pointed out that “most” of the women in Lovelace’s
program were in their thirties, and the astronauts were also in their thirties and early
forties. Roush asked Cochran, “It would seem to me that from this group that the attrition
rate would not be quite so high.” Cochran smartly retorted: “A very good friend of mine,
age 42, just had triplets—so I don’t know.” 56 She argued that women should not become
astronauts because they were “handicapped by extra curricular [sic] complications, such
as motherhood.” 57 Cochran said that training an astronaut was expensive, and that the
money, time, and effort would be wasted if the astronaut gave up the launching pad for
the delivery room. 58 The Lima News article, “House Subcommittee Airs Pregnant
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Astronauts,” sided with Cochran. The author stated that, “women [should] be trained as
space crew members, rather than as pilots.” 59 According to the paper, the women should
not fly.
In her autobiography, Cochran conveyed a different story. She believed that while
NASA was “discriminating” they did not discriminate directly against women. They
discriminated only against those who did not have jet test piloting experience. Cochran
was adamant that she was the only female who possessed such experience. Cochran
suggested that NASA also discriminated against those without engineering degrees and
those who were over the age limit. Cochran wrote, “Women were not eliminated because
they were women, by any means, and I told the investigating committee so.” 60 Her
testimony suggested otherwise.
When Representative James C. Corman (D-CA) asked her if marriage would
“eliminate all women from all professions” Cochran stated no. However, to her, flying
was different. If a woman left for a year to get married or have a baby, “you lose a whole
year, as fast as we move, your [sic] practically have to start over.” While Cochran said
that you “cannot compare that to a normal job,” she advised that jobs as technicians or in
the field of medicine would also be hindered by a woman leaving for a year or so as she
would be way behind in the technology when she returned. Representative Ken Hechler
(D-WV) pointed out that three of the twelve women who passed the Lovelace tests were
married and their marriage did not seem to affect their training. Cochran replied, “No. I
didn’t say it did.” However, she added, “if you initiate a program I say you are going to
lose, if the WASP program is any criteria—that is all I have to go by—a great many
through marriage, who are pretty soon producing their families.” Cochran did not want to
seem anti-woman and added, “I think that I have proved that I am interested in women
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having a chance at this, but I think it should be done, and can’t overstress it, in a very
careful and well-planned fashion across the board.” 61
Representative R. Walter Riehlman (D-NY) asked her what percentage of the
WASPs “washed out.” Cochran replied that even though 20 years had passed since she
was familiar with the numbers, she believed them to be “just a fraction under 40 percent.”
In current military trends, she believed the attrition rate “runs higher today in the armed
services.” She continued to speculate that the attrition rate of the women “paralleled that
of the men.” If this was true, then men and women both dropped out of flying at the same
rate. Why, then, would it be riskier and more costly to have a women’s astronaut corps?
No one asked this of Cochran nor did Cochran suggest any reasons. 62
Representative Fulton pressed Cochran on the issue of women within the military
services. Cochran affirmed that she believed women and men could both be trained in the
future as scientists aboard space flights. When Fulton asked if she believed women
should be accepted into the United States military academies to receive training for the
sciences, she replied, “No, sir.” She acknowledged it was a “new era” than when she
started the WASPs. However, instead of integrating the academies, she proposed that
women join the ROTC or NROTC. As far as when she foresaw the integration of the
academies, Cochran answered, “maybe never…. Don’t clutter up the Air Academy with
women unless we know we want them. We are different.” Fulton brushed over the
statement and asked “I hope you will not take marriage as a disqualification for space.”
Cochran replied, “I would not.” Fulton replied that he certainly hoped not, especially
since presently all the astronauts were married. Fulton asked, “So either marriage or
children would seem to be an asset for space rather than a defect; wouldn’t it?” Cochran
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retorted, “It would not be an asset while you were having the babies. They didn’t have
them, you know.” 63
Fulton asked if Cochran thought that with the future Gemini and Apollo projects
that could contain as many as 2 to 5 person crews, women should be allowed as
“assistants.” Cochran replied, that yes, she was not against women being in the program
or going into space, they could even be “assistant pilots.” Congressman Fulton told her
that her testimony did not suggest she was against women in space. He then continued
with a list of women who contributed to the founding of America: Queen Isabella, Queen
Elizabeth, Pocahontas, Molly Pitcher, Sacajawea, and the women who crossed the west in
covered wagons along with their husbands. Cochran agreed, but again emphasized that
she did not want to see women as astronauts “in a haphazard manner.” Fulton concluded,
“Maybe we men shouldn’t be talking about keeping you out of space. We should be
helping you. Women have come to the fore and taken over and performed a magnificent
job when men failed.” Cochran concluded her testimony by agreeing that “women can fly
as well as men,” however, “we are in a new environment. We are in a new era. Even if
we are second in getting a woman into the new environment, it’s better than to take a
chance on having women fall flat on their faces.” 64
On 18 July, George Low and the NASA astronauts also testified. Low explained
that NASA has chosen the qualification of jet test pilot because “All jet test pilots are
selected and trained to make rapid decisions and take immediate action based upon their
own evaluation of the situation in the presence of high personal risk.” There was also a
“logical reason” explained Low. He told the committee that picking only jet test pilots
limited the applicant pool. It was easier to pick from a small number of candidates.
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However, advised Low, “These qualifications are not static but will be reviewed from
time to time and are subject to modifications as our space flight experience increases.” 65
After Low explained the requirements to become an astronaut, Glenn stepped in
to field questions from the committee. Glenn suggested of the role of the astronaut: “One
of the design criteria we are working on is just where the astronaut is an integral part of
this system, not just a passenger who goes along for the ride, as a biological specimen.
He is an integral working part of it.” Much like media reports of the Mercury flights,
Glenn continued to impart an idea of control of the craft while thwarting any talk of the
feminized term “passenger” in reference to the astronauts. “A lot of the things we had in
the past to protect human life in the early missions, will be given over to the control of
the astronaut,” explained Glenn, “where his function will not be backed up by automatic
systems.... The astronauts’ function is actually then to take over full control….” The need
for astronaut control did not necessarily bode well for the future of women in
spaceflight. 66
When Representative Anfuso asked Glenn if the “psychological adjustment of a
test pilot to hazardous flight” was necessary to become an astronaut, Glenn responded, “It
certainly is the same type of thing.” Low reiterated Glenn’s statements of manual control
of the spaceship. He told the subcommittee, “We all know that in John’s flight, he had
trouble with his automatic control system. He had to assess the difficulties then calmly go
on the manual system and use it, and use it effectively, under trying conditions.” If the
field was so dangerous and mentally taxing as the testimony purports, Representative
Anfuso asked the men why one would want to be a test pilot. Carpenter responded “I
think part of it is curiosity, part of it is a need to do something on your own, something
new.” Glenn answered, “I think we all aspire to the top of the heap in our particular
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professions because it gives us most control over the future.” The testimony of Carpenter
and Glenn infuriated Cobb. 67
The two most important questions the subcommittee asked the two astronauts
concerned the qualifications of jet test piloting and the requirement of an engineering
degree. Representative Jessica A. McCullough Weise (R-NY) stated that even though
Low testified that all jet test piloting was not closed to women, she believed a
“roadblock” existed. Glenn replied regarding this “roadblock,” that “the men go off to
fight the wars and fly the airplanes and come back and help design and build and test
them. The fact that women are not in this field is a fact of our social order.” It was not
NASA’s fault; it was a fact of American gender roles. However, while the NASA
requirements on jet test piloting precluded the women, NASA waived the requirement of
an engineering degree for the men. 68
Fulton asked Glenn: “Colonel Glenn, I understand that the requirement that an
astronaut hold a degree in engineering or in the physical sciences can be waived, and that
in fact this was done for both you and Commander Carpenter. Is that correct?” Glenn
answered: “While I did not have the actual hours at college, I had more than the
equivalency of an engineering degree.” During Glenn’s testimony, Cobb wrote a note and
passed it to Hart. The note read: “Our group, average flying hours, 4500. Male astronauts,
2500. How’s that for jet-test equivalent?” Fulton, chimed in, “On the basis of the
requirements that Mr. Low has stated, obviously Colonel Glenn would have been
eliminated. You wouldn’t have passed, because you don’t have an engineering degree, do
you?” Glenn retorted, “I have one now.” The reasoning behind this was that the main
quality NASA looked for when picking astronauts was pilot training that exemplified the
independent frontiersman, not necessarily the scientist. Without a doubt, by 1962, NASA
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made an exception for the degree requirement for the men, but obviously, NASA made
no exceptions on the training qualifications for female astronaut candidates. After hearing
the testimony from the astronauts Fulton retorted, “We can’t look at these methods of
selection and requirements as rigid,” since NASA accepted both Glenn and Carpenter
who also did not hold an advanced degree. 69
Representative Anfuso asked Carpenter: “Wouldn’t you say…that you are
protecting women by letting men do the daring first and when the trip to the moon, or any
place else, becomes less hazardous, then we would take the other position: is that your
point?” Carpenter said, “No, sir,” NASA wanted the best people for their missions.
Fulton pointed out the gendered sphere that the public image of spaceflight seemed to
keep women in. He said, “It is the same old thing cropping up, where men want to protect
women and keep them out of the field so that it is kept for men.” Inciting laughter from
the audience, Glenn responded, “If we can find any women that demonstrate that they
have better qualifications for going into a program than we have going into that program,
we would welcome them with open arms.” Glenn ended along the same lines as Cochran.
He argued, “Now, to spend many millions of dollars to additionally qualify other people
whom we don’t particularly need, regardless of sex, creed, or color, doesn’t seem right,
when we already have these qualified people.” 70 The responses given by Carpenter,
Glenn, and Low did not satisfy Fulton. Like Cobb, Fulton advocated that NASA outline a
program to include women that did not interfere with the present astronaut program.
In his final words, Anfuso directed the NASA officials to “go back and talk to Mr.
Webb…and come up with some kind of a program so that you can continue to have the
bipartisan support which you have always seen.” 71 On 15 July 1962, Anfuso sent a
telegram to the president urging a woman in space program. 72As for sex discrimination
164

within NASA, the subcommittee found nothing of substance. The subcommittee’s final
report in October 1962 was:
After hearing witnesses, both Government and nonGovernment, including Astronauts Glenn and Carpenter,
the Subcommittee concluded that NASA’s astronaut
selection program was basically sound and properly
directed, that the highest possible standards should continue
to be maintained…. 73
The subcommittee did add the caveat: “some time in the future consideration should be
given to inaugurating a program of research to determine the advantages to be gained by
utilizing women as astronauts.” 74 The Lovelace women were livid. Media reports of the
hearing pinned two femininities against one another, the equality now through arguing
that women have a contribution to make toward spaceflight, and the more traditional
feminist image of Cochran who advocated waiting until the right moment for women to
demand to be part of the new public space of space. In the Chicago Tribune’s “Give Us
Space Role, Women Pilots Urge,” the author Joseph Hearst pins these two feminine
identities against one another. He commented that “Two women pilots today urged that
women be given an opportunity to become astronauts, but a third urged a go-slow
approach.” 75
Almost a year after the subcommittee hearings, the Soviets blasted Tereshkova
into space. American media reports from New York to El Paso suggested that the people
of the Soviet Union embraced their female space traveler. Various American newspaper
and magazine reports highlighted her femininity. For instance, a 17 June 1963 United
Press International article, entitled “First Cosmonette Darling of Reds,” set Tereshkova
apart from her masculine comrades. The article stated that she [Tereshkova] had a
“weakness for spiked heels…. Has beautiful light brown hair, blue eyes, and an oval face
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with dimples.” The article also mentioned her possible engagement to the only bachelor
cosmonaut, Andian Nikolayev. But most importantly, the paper paid particular attention
to her feminine fashion sense. For instance, “she wore a blue woolen suit described as
‘very fashionable’ and white shoes with spiked heels….” 76
The same edition of the paper also contained an article entitled “Two Russian
Capsules Whirl around Earth.” As with the other article, the feminine attributes of
Tereshkova were obvious. “Tereshkova…insisted on wearing make-up on her historic
mission….” The article claimed that she became the heroine of women all over the world.
Even Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev boasted after her orbit, “Now you see what
women are capable of…. I am very proud and feel fatherly pride that it is our girl, a girl
from the land of the Soviets that is the first in space….” 77A 1963 article in Life entitled
“She Orbits over the Sex Barrier,” noted that twenty-six year old Tereshkova did not
even have the flight experience of the thirteen American women who had passed
Lovelace’s physical tests. The article explained, “By American standards her selection
might seem a fantastic gamble.” However, this was not the case for Russian space
capsules because they were equipped with automatic systems and back up equipment in
case of an emergency. In her joint flight with Lt. Colonel Valery Bykovsky in Vostok 5,
Tereshkova logged forty-eight orbits around the Earth. She completed more orbits in
space than all the American astronauts put together. The article claimed that NASA’s
“outstanding lack of enthusiasm” meant that an American woman had never been
seriously considered as an astronaut. 78 The article also highlighted both American and
Soviet gender roles. For instance, in the spread on Tereshkova, the magazine did not
show her flying, but rather, in a salon getting primped for her flight.
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The gender stereotyping did not end with Tereshkova’s new hairdo. The 5 July
1963 edition of Life included photographs of Khrushchev standing with the cosmonauts.
Under the photograph was the caption: “Khrushchev Waves a Hand—Five Space Aces
and a Cosmic Queen.” The caption suggested that Tereshkova could not be labeled with
the masculine title of “ace” but rather, more appropriate for her sex, a “queen.” 79 In
reporting Tereshkova’s flight, even the New York Times concentrated on her physical
features. For instance, a 17 June 1963 article by Seymour Topping called the twenty-six
year old Tereshkova a “heavy-set parachutist.” 80 However, another article that appeared
in the same edition by an unknown author entitled “First Woman in Space Valentina
Vladimirovna Tereshkova” refers to the cosmonaut as a “pleasant-looking, gray eyed,
athletic young woman with wavy, dark blond hair.” 81 Despite the reporting of the
physical features of Tereshkova, most articles commented that her flight elicited
tremendous pride in Soviet culture.
Henry Tanner’s article on 17 June 1963 maintained that “Muscovites Glow Over
Space Feat.” People crowded into the streets of Moscow, congratulating each other on
Tereshkova’s success, which not only gave the Soviets the lead over the U.S. in the Space
Race, but also signaled the egalitarianism of Soviet culture. Tanner reported that a
woman on the streets cried out, “Now it has actually happened.” In the background of the
Lenin Mausoleum, a group of smiling teens carried signs in gray, blue, and red
watercolors. The students painted clouds, rockets, and space ships on the signs and
chanted, “To the Moon.” The students picked up a teenage girl with blond hair and
hoisted her into the air. In the entrance of the Saint Basil Cathedral a young blond man
with an accordion sang an improvised “ode to the spacewoman.” Soldiers in the crowds
posed for pictures with their girlfriends and random young women, and police officers
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joked and laughed with the people. 82 To the print media, in Moscow it was clearly a day
of celebration. Soviet technology surpassed that of American technology. They Soviets
also believed Tereshkova’s flight demonstrated the equality of the sexes in the Soviet
Union. The Soviet press was not shy to point out, “Tereshkova alone remained in space
longer than all the American cosmonauts taken together.” 83 In the winter of 1962,
President Kennedy acknowledged that “The only area in which Russia excels is in the use
of her women.” 84 Some Americans, however, were not laughing.
According to the New York Times, Tereshkova’s feat tied the U.S.-Soviet space
achievements to an even 6-6. 85 In June 1963, writer, philanthropist, former Republican
representative of Connecticut and ambassador to Italy, Clare Booth Luce, wrote, “But
Some People Simply Never Get the Message.” The Life article chastised politicians and
NASA officials for suggesting that Tereshkova’s flight was a publicity stunt. She quoted
astronaut Glenn as stating, “‘so far we felt the qualifications we were looking for…were
best taken care of by men.’” Luce quoted New York Times reporter, Harold M. Schmeck
Jr. as trying to lighten the mood by suggesting:
If space exploration continues to grow…women are
considered likely to play a part in it over the long
range…but there appears to be no hard evidence that
female physiology or psychology would confer any special
advantages on a woman space traveler. 86
Luce did not believe that any of these men came to the right answer of why the
Russians sent Tereshkova into space. She wrote that Americans’ preoccupation with
“sexiness” led these popular men to assume that her flight was a stunt because, in the
United States, sex sells. However, Luce suggested that communist ideology presented the
right answer. She wrote that since the revolution in 1917, Soviet Russia “has tried to
practice the inherent equality of men and women.” Luce used “statistics” from the Soviet
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Union in an attempt to show how women had progressed. In 1917, Russia had six
hundred women engineers, but by 1961, there were 379,000, approximately thirty-one
percent of all engineers. Fifty-three percent of the professionals in the Soviet Union in
1961 were women. Seventy-four percent of their medical field was female. In 1962, the
Soviets had 332,400 female physicians, while the American Medical Association
reported only 14,000 in the United States. Luce applauded the Soviet Union’s utilization
of women in the professions for both their “brain power” and their physical strength in
jobs such as cement mixing, driving buses, sweeping streets, pitching hay, and of course,
cosmonaut. 87
Luce considered the astronauts to be the most popular hero of a nation. Americans
adored and respected the astronaut because he possessed “high technical skills and even
higher virtues of intelligence, endurance, resourcefulness, discipline, courage, and the
capacity to make life-and-death decisions.” Not only did he possess these superhuman
attributes but, as Kennedy would have advocated, “he [the astronaut] is the symbol of the
way of life of his nation.” In entrusting a twenty-six year old girl with a cosmonaut
mission, “the Soviet Union has given its women unmistakable proof that it believes them
to possess these same virtues.” Luce believed that Tereshkova was “symbolic of the
emancipation of the Communist woman. Her flight symbolizes to Russian women that
they actively share (not passively bask, like American women) in the glory of conquering
space.” Luce’s belief that Tereshkova’s flight represented the equality of the sexes in the
Soviet Union was grossly misguided; however she echoed the arguments that the
astronauts represented the epitome of American masculinity. Within this symbol, women
were not necessary. This myth of the male astronaut helped create NASA as a masculine
sphere. Tereshkova’s flight caused men and women to dance in the streets of Moscow. In
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the United States the thought of sending Jerrie Cobb into space became a battle between
the sexes. 88
In February 1964, NASA training officer, industrial psychologist Robert Voas,
gave a speech to the New York City YMCA on the topic of women in space. He noted
that in 1964 NASA employed five-hundred-and-eighty women at the Manned Spacecraft
Center in Houston, Texas. These women worked as nurses, physiologists, “calculators,”
who plotted orbital trajectories by hand, and artists who painted the space capsules. Two
women even worked as senior NASA astronomy scientists. However, Webb ordered
Voas to quell the frustration over possible sex discrimination in NASA. Voas stated that
he was “rather unimpressed with the technical importance of putting women into space.”
He insisted that women’s ability to withstand isolation better than men no longer
mattered, because men had discovered just how exciting space travel was. Voas then
joked that if a woman were to fly into space, she would have to leave her purse behind to
lower the weight. He mocked that overweight women should be sent into space so they
could go on a diet. He told the crowd at the YMCA that there was no benefit in sending a
woman, only risks from launching someone unqualified. He ended his speech by saying,
“I think we all look forward to the time when women will be part of our space flight team
for when this time arrives, it will mean that man will really have found a home in space—
for the woman is the personification of the home.” What Voas was really saying was that
when the masculine men had made the “battlefield” of space safe, women could fully
participate in the space program. Like earlier reports of women’s role in spaceflight,
Voas’s speech championed women in the domesticated realm of American life. 89
Not only did the U.S. administration clearly not want to risk the lives of women in
this war for space, but the very doctors who administered the tests on the women at the
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Lovelace Foundation turned against them. While the successful launch of Shepherd into
space rendered women’s lower weight and smaller size irrelevant, doctors suggested that
they found scientific “evidence” for the exclusion of women in space. According to
Weitekamp, the only “scientific” article that appeared on the subject was in the February
1964 edition of the American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology. Two Lovelace
foundation doctors, Johnnie R. Betson Jr. and Robert R. Secrest, wrote a four-page article
entitled “Prospective Women Astronauts Selection Program: Rationale and Comments.”
The article argued that women’s menstrual cycles compromised their ability to go to
space. Further tests would have to be conducted during “the entire menstrual cycle.”
Their reasoning for this was that, “mental illness is higher, crime rate increases, and there
are more attempted and successful suicides just prior to and during the menstrual flow.”
The doctors finally concluded, “Menstruation may complicate the use of the female
astronaut in an environment of time tables and rigid schedules needed for a perfectly
manned space voyage.” 90 There is no evidence suggesting the doctors’ motivations.
However, Weitekamp speculates that in 1964 the two doctors “worried that women’s
physiology would not prove reliable enough for programmed space launches.” 91
Women’s menstrual cycles and physiology represented a complete lack of control.
Women were prone to hysteria. The inability of women to control their emotions or
bodies impeded women’s ability to fly into space. Men exerted masculinity through their
control over women’s sexuality.
The Soviet Union continued to press the dialogue of women as both flyers and
space travelers. In August of 1964, American newspapers speculated that the Soviets
would orbit another female cosmonaut. The American press reported that the candidate
was famed Soviet Air Force military test pilot, and wife of cosmonaut Pavel Popovich,
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Marina Popovich. In 12 August 1962, Popovich commanded Vostok 4. In August 1964,
the Moscow UPI and Soviet government newspaper Izvestia leaked the possible names of
the cosmonauts for the first Voskhod flight. The press speculated that the flight was
scheduled for the following October. 92 According to Soviet space historian, Asif A.
Siddiqi, Marina was supposed to be the first female cosmonaut in space, but at the last
minute, Tereshkova was chosen in her place. 93 The idea that not only would a husband
and wife cosmonaut team fly into space, but also a female military test pilot, attracted
front page headlines within the American press. On 11 August, Elyria, Ohio displayed a
picture of Marina, “holder of a Soviet aircraft speed record,” whose husband informed
the press that his wife “is now familiarizing herself with a ‘considerably more powerful’
machine.” 94 News outlets carrying the story emphasized that Marina had recently
completed a new Soviet flying record, but they failed to portray her as an individual.
Instead, papers emphasized Marina’s marriage to Popovich. 95
By 15 October, American newspapers commented that unfortunately for this
“slim, long-haired Russian girl,” Marina, this would be a second time that “history” was
“passing her by.” The paper reported that three men would make the first Voskhod flight.
Apparently, “it is looking less and less like a woman’s world, even in space.” The article
did not stop there, even suggesting that Tereshkova did not go into space for her “talent”
but rather because “the Russians sought the prestige of having the Eve as well as the
Adam—Yuri Gagarin—of space.” The paper reported the Soviet press as suggesting that
at a future date they may send another female space traveler into space, but they would
do so because she had “talent” not solely because she was a woman. 96
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Conclusion
The United States left the dangerous duty of blasting into space to the male jet test
pilots. The mission of the American Space Race was clear. The race was not only a way
to depict American superiority in technology, but within the public discourse, the race
also symbolized the importance of American masculinity. American astronauts
performed masculinity through control of the space capsule. Women performed
femininity by awaiting the astronauts’ return. American spaceflight demanded traditional
Cold War familial roles of man as the warrior in space while the woman was left home.
Within the public sphere, Cold War masculinity of rugged individualism and control was
not for women.
As NASA transitioned into Gemini space remained a masculine sphere. Space
journalists, politicians, and astronauts continued to place the utmost importance on
astronaut Cold War masculinity. However, NASA refashioned the image of the space
flyer when it inducted “scientist-astronauts” into the astronaut fraternity. Scientists and
engineers as space flyers raised questions concerning the role of the American astronaut
and his control over his capsule. Fears of the scientist-astronaut not only changing the
masculine image of space, but also challenging American “firsts” of astronaut control
permeated the institution through much of Gemini. Meanwhile, space journalists
continued publicizing its “firsts” of astronaut control of space.
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CHAPTER VI
“REFRESHINGLY HUMAN AND WINNING”: CONTROL AND PROJECT GEMINI,
1965-1966 1
Space journalists and politicians presented the astronauts as the best jet test pilots
in the country. However, the professional organization for test pilots, the Society of
Experimental Test Pilots (SETP), questioned the astronauts’ control over the capsule. The
SETP was not convinced that the astronauts did any real flying. The organization
believed that the astronaut did not land the craft. The capsule did not even have a window
for the astronaut to see where he was “flying.” The SETP argued that there were too
many automated systems that the astronaut depended on during his flight. In 1962, the
astronauts pled their case to the SETP. They argued that as pilots they controlled their
spacecraft. Gus Grissom spoke passionately before the organization, paradoxically
claiming that the astronauts were actually passengers in the Mercury capsule. He
declared, “‘Until now, man has been a self-experimenting guinea pig.’” Distinguishing
between projects Mercury and Gemini, Grissom insisted: “‘The most important
difference is the amount of control the pilot exercises over all functions…. Gemini is the
first true pilot’s spacecraft.’” The astronaut would no longer be the “spam in a can” that
the jet test pilots mocked him to be. Grissom asserted that in Gemini, “‘the test pilot will
have stepped into his proper role—the explorer of space.’” 2
The following chapter continues to trace the Cold War masculinity within the
public image of the astronaut. The narrative of the Gemini astronaut continued along the
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lines of American “firsts” through astronaut, or pilot, control of the space capsule.
However, the astronaut image of the rugged individualist pilot began to change. Scholars
have documented the shift in the image of the astronaut from that of the jet test pilot to
that of the scientist and engineer. However, none have completed a gender analysis of the
transition. This chapter asks how the shift from jet test pilot astronaut to scientistastronaut changed the masculine image of the astronaut.
The chapter argues that the introduction of the scientist-astronaut transformed the
narrative of NASA from courageous feats of lone wolf astronauts to space as a scientific
undertaking. The chapter adds to the historiography by suggesting that the image of the
scientist-astronaut symbolized the Cold War masculinity crisis within the astronaut
image. NASA’s introduction of the hyphenated scientist-astronaut commenced the
domestication and routinization of spaceflight. Domestication meant NASA accepted into
the astronaut fraternity men of science who did not need to hold previous flight
experience, let alone jet test piloting experience. The lowering of the physical
requirements to become astronauts took the hypermasculinity out of the public image.
This new astronaut image suggested that spaceflight was no longer dangerous. It was
routine.
The pilot astronaut image also confronted newer technology in the Gemini
capsule. Computers helped the pilot with calculations, flying, and landing. As
commercial aviation shifted focus from the pilot to the passenger, so too did the discourse
of spaceflight. The pilot astronaut feared losing his individualism and control over the
capsule. Thus, the pilot astronaut image not only represented a superior American
masculinity, but at the same time he symbolized the Cold War masculinity crisis. While
the image of who could fly shifted, the importance of “firsts” continued.
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Unlike the solo flights of Mercury, in Gemini astronauts flew in teams of two. On
7 December 1961, NASA approved the project. Between 1965 and 1966, NASA flew ten
manned Gemini missions. The first two missions, Gemini 1 and Gemini 2, were
unmanned spaceflights. On 23 March 1965, the program’s first manned flight
commenced with Gemini 3 (The Molly Brown) and ended on 15 November 1966 with
Gemini 12. Like Mercury, the prime contractor for Gemini was McDonnell Aircraft. The
associate administrator of manned spaceflight, Dr. George Muller, served as the director
for Gemini. Despite print media reports of astronaut control during Project Mercury,
NASA historians agree that Gemini’s purpose was to be the ship to prove man’s ability to
actually fly a spacecraft. 3 Gemini differed from Mercury in that designers hoped that
further technological achievements for Gemini meant giving the capsule the ability to
have “more human control.” To land the capsule as if it was an airplane or jet, engineers
and astronauts hoped to build a paraglider onto the capsule. However, NASA scratched
the plan after experiencing both economic and technical difficulties. Even though the
pilots could maneuver the capsule during re-entry, like Mercury, they would have to land
in the water. 4
Before NASA launched the first manned Gemini missions, from October 12 to 14
October the Soviet Union sent a team of three men into orbit aboard Voskhod 1 (Sunrise).
Aboard the capsule were pilot and flight commander Colonel Vladimir M. Komarow and
two non-military pilots, the engineer scientist Konstantin Feoktisv, and medical doctor
Boris Borisovich Yegorov. 5 Voskhod 1 represented the ability of non-pilots to go into
space, but in a subordinated role. The Soviets envisioned the engineer and doctor as
passengers, not pilots. 6 Interestingly enough, on 19 October 1964, only a week after the
Soviet’s launched Voskhod 1, NASA began recruiting scientist-astronauts.
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The following spring, once again “Gloom descended over the Cape [Kennedy].
The sound of disappointment ranged from profanity to polite and frustrated Pollyanity,”
wrote the writers of Time. 7 The Soviets had struck again. On 18 March 1965, Cosmonaut
and Soviet fighter pilot, Alexei Leonov, performed the first extra-vehicular activity (EVA
or spacewalk) aboard Voskhod 2. Leonov “walked” in space and Pavel Belyayev piloted
the capsule. Leonov’s proximity to Voskhod 2 was about fifteen feet when he was outside
of the craft. In approximately twelve minutes, he completed four somersaults, a head
stand, and filmed his surroundings. 8 To make matters more embarrassing for American
technology, engineers estimated that the rocket carrying the Soviets contained about 1.43
million pounds of thrust, about three times that of Gemini’s Titan rocket. The capsule
reached 307 miles of altitude, the highest of any previous Soviet or American capsule.
Unlike previous Soviet capsules that demanded the cosmonaut parachute out of the craft
after the return from space, the Voskhod’s capsule came equipped with a solid-fuel
braking rocket that allowed the Soviets to land the craft. 9 Similarly to the American
automated systems, Life reported of the faulty Soviet automatic control system. Belyayev
was forced to manually land his craft. However, he did overshoot his mark by hundreds
of miles. 10
The UPI reported that international scientists believed that with the scientific
information taken from the EVA, the accomplishment “put the Soviet Union even more
months ahead of the United States in the race for a manned moon landing.” 11 TASS
reported that “the target before us now is the moon, and we hope to reach it in no distant
future.” 12
However, Americans were skeptical of the walk. Time doubted that Leonov
controlled his EVA. The magazine speculated that Leonov’s somersaults were actually
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unintentional. While the Soviet press insisted that Leonov “inspected the outside of
Voskhod II and did useful work,” Newsweek maintained that Leonov failed to “work”
outside the capsule. The popular print magazine reported that the video footage of
Leonov’s flight “did not show all these actions [Leonov’s inspection of the capsule], but
work is not easy to do in weightless space….Any work Leonov did was probably slight,
and he may have inspected the ship by simply pushing off into space and swinging
around a little.” 13
NASA chief, James Webb, attempted to calm any fears that Americans and the
world may have had regarding the feat. Even though the Soviet’s were first with the
EVA, Webb maintained that since the American flights were “not based primarily on
propaganda” the American program was superior to the Soviets. 14 George Low insisted
that NASA’s manned spaceflight program was already operating at its maximum
capacity. Of the Soviet feat, George P. Miller (D-CA), chairman of the House Space
Committee, remarked that the Soviets did not do anything the United States was not
expecting. Nevertheless, since the Soviets had “gotten ahead of us,” it was time for
Americans to “tighten our belts and get going.” 15 Miller’s fears were not alone. Space
pundits and Congressmen believed that with the Soviet’s EVA, the Americans might
need another year to “match the Russians feat.” 16
The American print media still viewed the Soviet achievements as “propaganda”
stunts. NASA spaceflights were not for prestige, they were serious business. The
Americans continued to perform their own firsts openly to the world, while the Soviets
conducted their space performances in secret. On 23 March 1965, NASA launched Gus
Grissom and John Young aboard Gemini 3. Newsweek proclaimed that the astronauts
controlled the craft “like jet pilots.” 17 The Lawrence Daily Journal-World reported of the
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flight, “Grissom and Young scored a world ‘first’ by actually maneuvering their Molly
Brown through three orbital changes.” 18 The Coshocton Tribune in Ohio stated that
Gemini 3 completed a “first” as officials reported “it was the first-spaceship to be steered
in flight by either U.S. or Russian pilots.” 19 Similarly, the Albuquerque Journal ran an
AP article acclaiming that Grissom and Young “made spaceflight history Tuesday by
skillfully maneuvering their ship…” 20 In the 2 April 1965 issue of Life, the magazine
proclaimed, “For the first time, rather than being nearly helpless riders aboard an
intractable projectile, the Astronauts really controlled their craft.” The article suggested
that Grissom did not reorient the craft once, but rather three times. Grissom’s movements
included reducing the oval shaped orbit into a near precise circle, changing the vehicle’s
yaw around the earth into a new course, and finally lowering the orbit of the craft. 21
Grissom argued “No Astronaut from anywhere had ever performed these maneuvers.” 22
A correspondent for the Los Angeles Times reported that Grissom and Young
performed a space first by “maneuvering their capsule through three orbit changes before
landing safely.” 23 The men were more interested in flying than in the scientific
experiments they performed. Grissom explained, “as test pilots John and I were not quite
as fascinated by sea urchins and sandwiches as we were by the chance to carry out some
real ‘firsts’ in space flight [sic].” 24 In the Washington Post, journalist Charles Stafford
heralded the dawn of a new era of spaceflight. Paradoxically, Stafford claimed that the
Mercury astronauts did not fly their capsules. He proclaimed that Gemini was the “first
true flying machine to enter the space race.” 25 An editorial also appearing in the Post
claimed that while “The Russians have shown that homo sapiens can ‘walk’ in space;
Astronauts Virgil Grissom and John Young have confirmed mankind’s ability to ‘fly’ in
space.” 26
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Not only did journalists proclaim that the Gemini pilots had control of their ship,
but they also had the ability to steer the capsule even during the landing. Historian David
Mindell considers the ability to land, “worthy of a pilot’s dignity.” 27 After his flight,
Grissom declared that the automated computer told him and Young that they would land
just short of their mark, the aircraft carrier, the USS Intrepid. Therefore, Grissom took
over the controls and flew his own capsule. He remarked that the craft maneuvered
almost like an “airplane,” and that he alone “was able to reduce the error considerably.” 28
The news that the pilots retained control over the capsule continued to be important
within the public discourse. Even veteran New York Times space journalists, John W.
Finney, wrote that the difference between Mercury and Gemini was that the Gemini
capsule would be “under the control of the astronauts rather than automatic instruments.
In effect, the astronauts will be flying the capsule.” 29
However, with Gemini, the astronaut image experienced a shift from the
autonomous pioneer to a two man team. When President Johnson called to congratulate
both Grissom and Young, he said that the feat, “was an impressive testament to the team
work of our fine talents…who have worked together so successful on Project Mercury
and now on this important first step of Project Gemini.” 30 The lone wolf rugged
individualistic astronaut in space was slowly becoming a team member. The public
discourse of the astronaut image was shifting. For instance, in a statement before the
Committee on Science and Astronautics in the House of Representatives, Dr. Dryden,
said that when the Wright brothers created the first powered flight, “For a number of
years following that flight it was possible for any individual to learn and know all there
was to know about aeronautics and airplane design….” However, in the Space Race, with
the highly technical knowledge of spacecraft “No member of the team has complete
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knowledge of the final product in all its detail. It has been estimated that over 45,000
scientists and engineers are directly engaged in our greatest space undertakings….”
Dryden’s speech suggested that the astronaut was moving farther and farther away from
rugged individual control. Dryden argued, “The building of modern airplanes, boosters,
and spacecraft require[d] a highly developed concept of team activity and functional
coordination. The team itself must include more kinds of specialists with knowledge of
more scientific fields.” 31
On 3 June 1965, the Americans performed their own spacewalk. After Gemini 4’s
fourth orbit, Lt. Col. Edward “Ed” Higgins White Jr. left the capsule. For twenty minutes,
White walked in space at a speed of 17,500 mph. He reported to Mission Control, “‘This
is fun.’” 32 His distance from people on earth was a mere one hundred and twenty miles.
The article in Life entitled “The Glorious Walk in the Cosmos” claimed that White’s walk
was not a “mere stunt” but rather “a deliberate and methodical test of the techniques
which future astronauts may have to use in docking maneuvers and making
extraterrestrial emergency repairs.” 33 White was attached to the “mother ship” by an
“umbilical cord.” The capsule’s command pilot, Major James Alton McDivitt, helped
White back into the craft. The press had reported cosmonaut Leonov’s spacewalk as
“slowly somersaulting and floating as though in a vast midnight swimming pool,”
connected to the capsule only by a cord. Conversely, the print media reported that White
controlled his direction during his spacewalk. 34 Journalists described that White
maneuvered himself to various sides of the craft with his “jet gun.” 35 The Chicago Daily
News stated “In some respects, notably his use of a ‘space gun’ for individual propulsion,
he surpassed the Russian achievement….” 36
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The West Coast followed suit by printing similar praise of the feat. The
Oregonian maintained: “With astronaut Edward White’s successful space walk and the
Gemini spacecraft zipping along smoothly…the belief that the United States lags behind
the Soviet Union in the space race should be pretty well shattered….” However, the
writers contemplated, “Maybe the chief difference between the U.S. and Russian space
programs all along has not been technological superiority, but just a matter of
boldness.” 37 The writers at Time continued the narrative of astronaut control. They
concluded that when compared to Leonov, White “had much more maneuverability; all
Leonov did was somersault around at the end of a tether, getting dizzy, while White
moved around pretty much at will.” Time congratulated the new “second generation”
astronauts. The magazine underscored the flying ability of the pilots. The authors referred
to McDivitt as a “superb pilot and a first-class engineer,” and White as a “daring flyer,
[and] a fine athlete.” 38 Newsweek went so far as to proclaim that White’s walk was “the
most dazzling human achievement yet in the space age.” Both Newsweek and Time
compared White’s maneuverability with his “rocket gun” to the famed fictional character
“Buck Rogers.” 39
The Western world commended the individual control exercised by White as a
symbol of democratic prowess over the communist system. Stockholm’s Svenska
Dagbladet rejoiced that the American feat proved what an open system can do compared
to the Soviet closed society. The Swedish paper wrote, “‘The fact that the U.S. dares to
expose even its shortcomings, dares to give advance notice, dares to speak the whole
truth, is a sign of strength and confidence. But above all, it is so refreshingly human and
winning.’” Within the headlines in Latin America, Buenos Aires conservative La Nacion,
and their independent Clarin, both “declared flatly that White’s performance had clearly
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surpassed the similar feat of the Soviet Cosmonaut Leonov.” 40 London picked up on this
example of American astronaut control as well. The Daily Express reported that while
Russia performed the first spacewalk, Major White walked in space with his own means
of propulsion. 41
The New York Times remarked that unlike Cosmonaut Leonov, Astronaut White,
did not suffer from “disorientation.” After White and McDivitt secured themselves back
onto the capsule’s couch, they completed sixty-two orbits of the earth in three and a half
days. Gemini 4’s re-entry system broke down forcing McDivitt to manually fire the retro
rockets and land the craft. 42 They landed fifty-six miles short of their recovery vessel
stationed in the Atlantic, the carrier the USS Wasp. Despite the much anticipated first
American spacewalk, the mission did have one setback. The astronauts and Mission
Control hoped that Gemini 4 would be able to test a rendezvous with a rocket booster in
space. Unfortunately, a large amount of Gemini’s fuel burned up too fast during
maneuvering, and with low fuel levels, the astronauts were unable to attempt such a
feat. 43
In sharing their stories with Life, the public discourse of astronaut control was
familiar. However, their own stories remain paradoxical. The astronauts admitted that in
spaceflight the astronaut was not always in control. The complexity of spaceflight also
demanded computerized systems. McDivitt wrote that he was not scared or fearful for his
“personal safety” but rather that if something did not go as planned “all that work [was]
for nothing.” McDivitt was not shy to point out when it came to rocket booster’s “You
don’t have any control over the booster at launch; you’re really at its mercy.” 44 The
astronauts emphasized the need for traits other than piloting ability, especially when it
came to performing a rendezvous with a space booster. The astronauts thought they could
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use their skills as pilots, “keen eyes, stable hands, and cool heads,” to rendezvous with
the booster. The astronauts discovered that their piloting skills were not enough.
Computers and equations were necessary to dock with a booster. The astronauts needed
the minds of engineers and mathematicians. To aid the astronauts in space, IBM created a
powerful new computer with 4,096 words of 39-bit memory. The computer calculated
trajectories, attitude, velocity, and the astronaut responded. Mindell argues, “Heroic
action now involved not only controlling the spacecraft but also loading code into a
digital machine.” 45
On 19 August 1965, NASA’s testing of the black and white Martin Titan II rocket
that would take Gemini 5 into the heavens failed on the Cape Canaveral launch pad.
Engineers and technicians repaired the rocket. Two days later, during the actual launch,
as a French reporter shouted into his radiotelephone “‘L’orange! L’orange!’” the rocket
launched perfectly into the New Frontier at a speed of 17,605 miles per hour, making
Gemini 5 the fastest American capsule. The 21 August to 29 August 1965 Gemini 5
mission of command pilot Gordon Cooper, and pilot Charles “Pete” Conrad Jr., had two
goals. First, test to see if an astronaut could work eight days in space, and second, test
space equipment for possible linkage of ships in space. However, it did not go unnoticed
in the press that Cooper and Conrad, “Were out to break the 119-hour and 6 minute flight
record of Soviet Lieut. Col. Valery F. Bykovsky, who flew for 5 days in a Vostok capsule
in 1963.” 46
Once in space, Gemini 5 was not without its setbacks. A faulty electrical system
and a defective heater circuit threatened to discontinue the flight. Both Mission
Controllers and astronauts were needed to fix the problem. The plan could not go off as
expected if it were not for the astronauts in the capsule turning off electrical devices to
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conserve power. Mission Control debated what to do next. Flight Director Chris Kraft
stated to the press, “I don’t see any reason for not going eight days at the moment.”
While under orders from Kraft to continue, the astronauts aboard the capsule were
suffering from a lack of sleep. The astronauts’ doctors demanded that the men get some
rest. Commander Conrad growled, “I try to, but you guys keep giving us something to
do.” 47 After the flight, TASS accused the American government of ordering NASA to
“‘beat the Soviet Union’ at any price with regard to duration of the orbital flight.” TASS
claimed American scientists were “compelled to carry out a crash program….” The
Mission Control officer in charge of Gemini 5, John Hodges, replied to these charges,
“‘That’s not true.’” He continued, “‘I don’t believe we are doing that, I know very well
we weren’t told to.’” 48
Life magazine followed the flight by dedicating the front cover and inside article
to the anatomy of the capsule. The magazine photographed the cockpit’s many control
systems. A few roles of the astronaut appear paradoxical in the spread. The article shows
the control stick of which the astronauts use to control the attitude, pitch, roll, and yaw of
the capsule. However, even with the images of astronaut control, the article referred to
the flyers once again as “riders” of the craft, making them passive participants in the
flight. 49
The fascination with the astronauts’ use of the cockpit’s controls continued to
attract media attention. A 23 August New York Times article called the dynamic duo “The
Loquacious Astronaut and the Taciturn One.” In describing his personality, Conrad said
that before the launch he designed instrument panels for Gemini, Apollo, and the LEM
(Lunar Excursion Module). While designing and building the panels, Conrad explained
that he had to learn the art of “diplomacy.” From this the astronaut concluded, “Being
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pilots and individualists, astronauts are notorious for not agreeing on what they like to see
on the instrument panel.” The article claimed that the reason Cooper flew the last
Mercury flight was because he was such a “maverick” that it “irritated space officials and
may have caused them to hold back his flight.’” 50
In Pete Conrad’s article on his Gemini 5 flight, he remembered that as a child he
had an interest in weightlessness. He knew that he always wanted to be a test pilot and
that all other careers were out of the question. He admitted that as he signed up for the
astronaut corps, from a “pilot’s point of view,” he doubted if he would feel the
excitement of a conventional aircraft. His August 1965 flight proved him wrong. Conrad
missed the “constant changes of G-forces” of conventional test piloting in space
However, Conrad argued that the pilot still has the “fantastic awareness of speed and
altitude.” He continued:
Every one of my colleagues who has flown has
demonstrated the value of a pilot in a spacecraft, and I look
forward to some of the presently automatic functions
becoming pilot functions. I hope one day to see Astronauts
(sic) ignite and control the lift-off of their boosters just as
they do jet takeoffs.
Conrad even went so far as to refer to himself and Copper as present day pioneers. The
official NASA Gemini 5 patch depicted a covered wagon. Conrad explained that while he
was sleeping, “Gordo took a pen and drew a covered wagon on the dashboard next to the
main chute switch.” 51
The flight was not without its dramatics. On 26 August the media reported that
the Soviet Defense Ministry accused the United States of using Gemini 5 for spying. The
astronauts had taken photos of Cuba. The Soviets believed the astronauts were
photographing weapons held within the country. The astronauts disagreed. They said that
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the photos were merely “scenic shots.” 52 Despite the public conflict with the Soviets over
the use of space for spying, the flight proved successful.
The astronauts completed rendezvous maneuvers that would one day be necessary
to go to the moon. The objective of the mission was to test the space equipment for linkups in space. Conrad and Cooper were pleased that during the flight they performed the
first rendezvous with an invisible rocket. The astronauts came within 15 nautical miles of
the phantom rocket, the Agena. The success of the task took the skill of the pilot astronaut
using the computer and radar to “shift and set the capsule.” But the skill of the pilot to
maneuver the capsule was not the sole reason for the success. Doctors worried that the
astronauts might suffer from a lack of sleep. Allowing ground control to take over the
capsule and plot the coordinates of the Agena while Cooper and Conrad slept added to
the mission’s achievement. As astronauts spent more and more time in space, cooperative
team work took over the rugged individual astronaut of the Mercury program. 53 The
onboard computer also greatly aided the American space victory. As spaceflight
progressed the astronaut became less of an individualist in space. The astronauts
struggled for control from the automated systems. They needed to justify their piloting
ability in the presence of sophisticated space technology. They successfully proved that
they were a necessary component to spaceflight.
During re-entry, Cooper missed the landing site. Conrad explained that even
though they had manual control during re-entry, there was an error on the computer’s
reading of their position. The computer, not the astronauts, was at fault for missing the
target, the USS Lake Champlain. 54 However, Astronaut Cooper’s article suggested a
different idea of who held control over the flight. He described himself and Conrad
sitting in the capsule with their hands clasped in front of them “waiting for the experts on
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the ground to figure out the problem.” While their fuel cell oxygen heater read at 60, the
minimum operational pressure should have been at 220, ground control asked Cooper and
Conrad if they wanted to go on. Life wrote that within seconds the astronauts told
Mission Control that they wished to continue with the mission. Kraft told the astronauts
to lower the capsule down to 10.8 amps. On making the decision to keep going, Cooper
wrote, “It all went to prove once again that both machines and men can be badly
underestimated, and maybe we shouldn’t give up too soon on either.” 55
Gemini 6a and Gemini 7 performed the fourth and fifth manned spaceflight for
Project Gemini. Between 4 December and 18 December 1965, Command Pilot Frank
Frederick Borman Jr., and Pilot James “Jim” A. Lovell Jr., flew Gemini 7. The mission
was to rendezvous with Gemini 6a. Leaving the launch pad on 15 December 1965,
Gemini 6a carried both Command Pilot Wally Schirra and Pilot Thomas Stafford. The
two capsules met up in space within inches of each other. The New York Times presented
a case not necessarily of the individual controlling the capsule but rather of human and
machine cooperation in space. The machines calculated the trajectories, the distance to
the landing zone, and even fired retro-rockets. However, the capsule would not have
worked without the astronauts’ ability to “guide” it through space and even prevent the
capsule from “tumbling” by incorrectly firing its thruster rockets. 56 Schirra preferred to
illustrate that he was in control of the capsule. He said:
Using what I called my ‘eyeball ranging system,’ I did an
in-plane fly around of Gemini 7, like a crew chief
inspecting an aircraft…I was amazed at my ability to
maneuver, controlling attitude with my right hand and
translating in every direction by igniting the big thrusters
with my left hand mechanism. 57
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The astronauts of Gemini 8, Command Pilot Neil Alden Armstrong, and Pilot
David “Dave” Randolph Scott, further presented this image of the astronauts controlling
the capsule. The mission of Gemini 8 was to become the world’s first space vehicle to
dock with another space vehicle. On 16 March 1966, NASA launched Gemini 8 to dock
with a target vehicle [rocket] that had been in orbit for the past five months. The target
vehicle was once again the Agena. Life magazine, Armstrong, and Scott, depicted the
flight as man’s triumph over the machine. The astronauts reported that “Neil made the
closing maneuvers and Dave handled the computer calculations which told us the exact
amount and direction of thrust needed.” 58
When Gemini 8 docked with the Agena, both vehicles spun around like a child’s
toy top. Reports suggested that the astronauts remained calm during the unrehearsed
spinning. Life argued that even at the mission’s scariest moments, Armstrong’s voice
remained “laconic.” Armstrong’s control of the situation never wavered. However, the
piece suggested a lack of individual control of the pilots as Life argued that it was not the
pilots in control, but rather, “NASA’s worldwide network of control.” 59
Reporters also emphasized the engineers. Time depicted the scene at Houston as
“controllers huddled over their console” trying to pinpoint the trouble. But it was the
astronaut who ultimately prevailed. Armstrong regained control by activating the
thrusters that were used to stabilize the capsule during re-entry. He was a pilot in control
of his capsule. Armstrong radioed back to Houston, “We are regaining control of the
spacecraft slowly.” 60 After stabilizing the craft, Armstrong “executed re-entry with such
precision that frogmen (rescue swimmers) reached the vehicle within minutes….” 61
Armstrong stated that as a “test pilot” he was trained in “identifying problems and getting
the answers. We never once doubted we would find an answer.” 62
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NASA launched new Gemini missions every two months. Journalists continued to
emphasize astronaut control over the imperfect technology. Command Pilot Thomas
Patten Stafford and Pilot Eugene “Gene” Andrew Cernan experienced firsthand the faulty
technology as they waited atop their Titan 2 for NASA controllers to blast Gemini 9a for
a 4 day mission in space. 63 The third try worked. On 3 June 1966, Gemini 9a launched
from Cape Canaveral. Unfortunately, as the astronauts attempted a docking maneuver in
space, the “protective shroud” of the 11-foot docking target, once again the Agena,
malfunctioned, leaving the Agena looking like an “angry alligator.” Despite the faulty
technology of the Agena, the control of the astronauts persisted. The rocket’s guidance
system may have piloted the rocket into space, but Stafford “fired the thrusters for a
minute to make the first adjustment in the craft’s orbit….” As the capsule reached the
target vehicle, Stafford, “sat in the left seat steering.”After two orbits, the astronauts were
able to “steer their craft to their rendezvous with the target vehicle.” Despite the
“alligator jaws” of the docking vehicle, the astronauts still wanted to attempt a
rendezvous. Much to their chagrin, Flight Director Gene Kranz “ordered the astronauts to
‘leave it alone’” until engineers could make sure docking was safe. 64 The UPI hailed the
feat, perhaps incorrectly suggesting that the astronauts had “mastered” the rendezvous
procedure. 65
The astronauts failed to attempt a docking, but they performed an EVA. At first,
Mission Control ordered the men to delay the walk in space. The reason given for the
delay was “to conserve the energy of both men and machine.” Essentially, as the
Washington Post claimed, the astronauts concluded that they were too “fatigued” to go
on. Ronald Thompson of the Associated Press called the astronauts “weary,” “sleepyeyed,” and “tired.” 66 After around 10 hours of rest, Cernan was able to leave the capsule
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for his walk in space. Fogging inside his helmet forced the “cool-nerved” astronaut to cut
his walk seventeen minutes short. Cernan was unable to fully test the “oxygen supply and
propulsion rockets of a new backpack that would have made him, in effect, his own
spacecraft.” Articles in both the New York Times and the Washington Post referred to
Stafford as “steering Gemini to a slightly lower orbit” and “pilots maneuver craft into
orbit for reentry.” The Washington Post pointed out that Cernan called off his walk,
telling Mission Control, “‘I can’t see in front of my eyeballs…. No-go for the AMU
[astronaut maneuvering unit].’” Despite the faulty space helmet, print media lauded that
Cernan’s walk was far longer than any of the world’s previous EVAs. 67 Cernan returned
to the capsule, and the “astronauts steered their spacecraft” to its landing in the Atlantic
Ocean. The Salt Lake Tribune wrote that the astronauts completed a “Near Perfect
Landing.” 68 Once again, another American “Troubled Flight Ends in Success” as man
took over the machine. President Johnson praised the astronauts’ “coolness and courage
under pressure.” 69
Less than two months after Gemini 9a, on 18 July 1966 NASA launched
Command Pilot John Young and Pilot Michael Collins aboard Gemini 10. They landed a
few days later on 21 July. Papers hailed the countdown as the “smoothest” and “cleanest”
of any spaceflight. Project Gemini was making space travel appear routine. The point of
the mission, again, was for Gemini to perform a successful docking with an unmanned
satellite, Agena. Approximately 100 minutes before the liftoff of Gemini 10, NASA
blasted the Agena into space. The mission broke the former altitude record held by the
Soviets’ Voskhod 2 at 307 miles. The link-up between Gemini 10 and the Agena reached
an altitude of 474 miles. 70
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As spaceflight seemed more and more routine, so too did the script of control. The
Billings Gazette ran an article that proposed “Young controlled the Gemini.” 71 Space
journalist John Noble Wilford’s columns on the control of American space feats
continued in the New York Times. For instance, as Collins opened up the capsule’s hatch
to take photographs of space, Commander Young “was inside at the controls.” 72
Journalists took advantage of Collins’s EVA to again emphasize astronaut control
in space. Wilford writes that Collins “maneuvered himself to a nearby Agena rocket
vehicle that had been in orbit since last March.” After Collins’s walk in space and
retrieval of a micrometeorite detection box from the rocket, “Young steered the
spacecraft into a new orbit to be ready for splashdown….” Collins accomplished two
firsts. He was the only astronaut to walk into space, return to the capsule, and then walk
back out into space again, thus braving space twice during the same mission. While doing
so, he was the only world astronaut to “work” with another space vehicle. 73 Print Media
reported that like the EVA of astronaut White, Collins was able to maneuver himself with
a special hand-held gun. Collins’s gun allowed him to move “free of the Gemini 10
spacecraft at the end of a fifty foot tether.” The tether carried communication and oxygen
lines, as well as nitrogen for Collins’s maneuvering ability. When Collins released the
trigger of the gun, “bursts of nitrogen” propelled the astronaut forward and backward.
The article mentions White’s “maneuvering unit” and also compares both White’s and
Collins’s ability to control their movements in space unlike that of the world’s first EVA
completed by cosmonaut Leonov. 74
NASA cut Collins’s walk short. To avoid fogging of the helmet’s face plate, the
astronauts carried an “anti-fogging detergent.” While Collins snapped pictures of space,
his eyes burned. Sitting in the capsule, Young experienced the same sensation. Both men
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believed the burning to be a result of the fumes of the anti-fogging spray. When asked by
Mission Control why he did not mention the burning, choking fumes, Young said, “‘I
didn’t say anything about it because I figured I’d just be a sissy.’” Forty-minutes in to his
historic walk, Young ordered Collins: “‘Mike, come on back in the house.’” NASA
offered no concrete evidence for the eye inflammation, but proposed that the irritation
was because of lithium hydroxide. The same chemical also hindered the Gemini 4
mission. 75
The faulty technology did not deter the enthusiasm of the print media. It only
made the story of astronaut control that much more exciting. Journalists eagerly wrote
about Collins’s background, depicting him as a rugged individual. The New York Times
described Collins as “physically bold and socially reticent.” His “Associates” referred to
him as a “doer not a talker.” In fact, Collins’s lack of communication irked Mission
Control. The Washington Post referred to Collins as “‘a very quiet boy—very selfpossessed, and ‘imperturbable,’” certainly not the “‘romantic or cavalier type that you
would expect to be an astronaut.’” Beneath his quiet exterior, former classmates
remembered Collins as “‘quick and aggressive in athletics and less aggressive in his
studies.’” Collins’s controlled temperament as a child prepared him for spaceflight.
Reporters continued to emphasize the importance of emotional control as a necessity for
spaceflight. The Atlanta Constitution professed that the astronauts remained remarkably
“calm” during their scary landing in which the capsule heated up to “3,000 degrees,
blackening it on all sides.” 76
The New York Times’ official box score of the United States-Soviet Space Race
suggested that the U.S. commanded the lead. In July 1966, the Americans had tripled
their amount of time in space as compared to the Soviets. 77 The paper claimed that the
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U.S. had seven successful rendezvous in space, while the Soviets completed zero. The
paper reported that the Americans had eight maneuverable capsules while the Soviets still
had not successfully maneuvered a capsule in space. 78 Maneuverable capsules were
important to the Americans. It meant Americans were doers. They were not feminized
passive actors in spaceflight. The piloted capsules insinuated that the Americans had
control as rugged pioneers in the New Frontier of space. Through this control the
astronauts exhibited masculinity. Furthermore, the United States had two space linkups
while the Soviets had none. According to Time, the Americans attempted feats the
“Russians have not yet begun to try.” The perfection of the American flights, according
to Time, made spaceflight appear “almost routine.” 79 The Americans had left the Soviets
in the dust.
Flying from 12 September to 15 September 1966, Gemini 11, piloted by
Command Pilot Conrad and Pilot Richard Francis Gordon Jr., smashed the previous
altitude record as they soared to a new altitude of 850 miles. 80 The two man team
completed the world’s first ever successful rendezvous during a spacecraft’s first orbit. 81
While the United States continued to tout its space “firsts,” these firsts in the narrative of
spaceflight completed another interesting shift. As Gemini 11 splashed into the Atlantic,
the New York Times and associated press underscored not the pilot control but rather,
computer control. Wilford wrote that the “Gemini 11 astronauts let their computer take
over today to steer them automatically to a safe and accurate splashdown…” This was not
the first landing with the aid of a computer. The astronauts had previously relied on
computers for “guidance data” but the astronauts have always “fired the braking and
maneuvering rockets themselves.” 82 The Wisconsin State Journal hailed the technology
celebrating that “Gemini 11 guided its proud pilots to a breathtaking bull’s eye
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landing….” 83 The Des Moines Register echoed the sentiment in Wisconsin with “Gemini
Lands By Computer.” 84 Aiken county South Carolina reveled in the “batch” of new
“space records” that Gemini accomplished, especially its “automated Atlantic
landing….” 85 The Syracuse Post-Standard reported that “Glinting in the tropical sun,
their spaceship automatically guided the thrilled spacemen to a breathtaking, bull’s-eye
landing….” 86
The enthusiasm for computer control did not end. With Gemini 12, reporters once
again celebrated that the astronauts allowed the computer to land the capsule. The New
York Times stated that “For their return to earth, the Gemini 12 pilots let an onboard
computer the size of a hat box take over both the guidance and firing of the maneuvering
rockets. Gemini 12 made the first [sic] such automatic controlled landing….” 87 But again,
it was the astronauts who allowed the automated system to land the craft. The
Washington Post continued to emphasize astronaut control. After the launch and re-entry
of Gemini 12, the Post recounted the step by step benefits of the Gemini missions. The
Post looked back at the Gemini program and praised the maneuvering ability of
astronauts Grissom, Young, Schirra, and Stafford. The paper proclaimed one major detail
of the American feats as compared to those of the Soviets. The Post argued that there is
no “indication that the cosmonauts can actually maneuver their craft.” 88
Despite the continued script of astronaut control, Gemini 12’s mission left famed
Life NASA reporter Loudon Wainwright underwhelmed. In fact, the space reporter
missed the splashdown entirely, absently mindedly forgetting when the astronauts would
be returning to earth. It was not that Wainwright was falling short of his exemplary
reporting. “Truthfully,” Wainwright writes, Americans were suffering from “total
ignorance” of the spaceflights. In his article “All systems are ho-hum,” Wainwright asked
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a group of six people information on the flight’s landing. No one in the group had any
idea when the astronauts were expected to land, if they did land, and if the landing was
successful. 89
Wainwright reminisced on the Mercury astronauts. He remembered how “Each
flight was packed with drama and suspense—fuel running low, automatic controls not
working, flaming re-entries, temporarily lost pilots, last minute rescues” followed by
parades, crowds, presidential welcomes, and Congressional hearings. The hysteria was so
great that five years ago during John Glenn’s New York parade; the crowd broke through
the barricades and crushed the fender of Glenn’s car. Wainwright suggested that in
Gemini the technology was more sophisticated and pilot control greater. However,
Wainwright wrote that even though Jim Lovell has “85 times more hours in space than
John Glenn” the average American was more likely to recognize Glenn than Lovell.
Wainwright proposed that there were too many astronauts. NASA has 50 astronauts
whereas Lindbergh was “the long eagle.” If Lindbergh had flown as a two man team “a
second man in that cockpit would have lessened his glory.” Wainwright hypothesized
that “the companionable sense of security felt by the unlonely [sic] Gemini astronauts is
undoubtedly communicated to the bystanders on the ground.” But overall, the
“professionalism” and “soundness” of the equipment ruined the “exhilaration” of the
early flights. In other words, Americans were no longer “half expecting the whole thing
to blow up.” The astronauts were no longer rugged individuals controlling faulty
machinery in space. 90
Scott Carpenter told Wainwright that the lackluster public attention to the flights
did not bother NASA. The pilots still performed their job. But he added, “The fact that
people have gotten blasé may even have added to the efficiency.” Carpenter prophetically
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suggested that even in the future, trips to the moon will “seem a bit ho-hum.” Still, “one
day,” Carpenter imagined, “Grandmothers will be making the flight…and will be
impatient when they don’t get their baggage on time.” 91
Life magazine, the only media outlet with the rights to the astronaut’s stories,
dedicated only two pages to the last Gemini flight. They implied that the playful picture
taken by Command Pilot Lovell of Pilot Edwin Eugene “Buzz” Aldrin in the open
hatchway suggested just how routine spaceflight had become. The flight was so smooth
that “Where previous space-walkers had encountered some scary difficulties, Aldrin had
none.” With this feat, the “public was almost in danger of becoming blasé to its success.”
On the bright side, the success of Gemini,
has established beyond doubt man’s capacity for
controlling space. No longer is he a ‘captive’ of a
womblike capsule but its master, able to maneuver it, to
hook up with another vehicle and harness that vehicle’s
power, or to step out in space and act as a celestial
mechanic with undue sweat, as Aldrin proved so well. 92
The article deemed it hard to imagine that just a short twenty months ago “the astronauts
were essentially passengers rather than pilots.” 93
The highly sophisticated efficient Gemini capsules strengthened America’s lead
in the Space Race. Nevertheless, it did so during the beginning of a major shift in the
image of who retained individual control of the craft. The astronaut, the symbol of Cold
War masculinity during a time of a masculinity crisis, was changing. On 21 November
1966, after a tour of Southeast Asia, President Johnson congratulated America’s efforts,
specifically praising the efforts of the individuals involved to come together in such a
highly technical and dangerous project. He said:
Today’s flight was the culmination of a great team effort,
stretching back to 1961, and directly involving more than
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25,000 people in the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the Department of Defense, and other
Government agencies; in the universities and other research
centers; and in American industry.
The image of spaceflight, the rugged individual astronaut, was at odds with spaceflight as
a team effort. The astronaut as a symbol of rugged individualism and control wavered as
spaceflight continued to become more complex. As the United States continued into
Apollo, Johnson recognized the dangers involved. He predicted that “The Apollo
program which follows is much more complicated. …The months ahead will not be easy,
as we reach toward the moon.” 94 In the press, the need for teamwork, scientist-astronauts,
and computers helped change the astronaut image from a rugged individual to a symbol
of the average American man striving for individuality and control apart from the group.
Joseph D. Atkinson Jr. and Jay M. Shafritz recount in The Real Stuff that in July
1962, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Space Science Board met at the State
University of Iowa to conclude an overview for NASA of the role space science was
playing in manned space flight. 95 The research group concluded that there should be a
scientist-astronaut, an institute should be created to train him, and that he should be
included in the first moon landing. 96 In the summer of 1963, the NAS sponsored the
Space Science Summer Study. The group met to investigate the role of man in space
science exploration. On 6 January 1963, the group of scientists compiled a report entitled
Review of Space Research. They sent the report to Webb. The men concluded that space
exploration was scientific and urged NASA to include “trained scientist-observers…in
future American space missions.” The scientists recommended that immediate steps be
taken by NASA to include a “scientist-astronaut” on the Apollo lunar mission, if not as
early as Gemini. The scientists suggested that those with backgrounds in meteorology,
geology, astronomy, and biology be selected for space missions. The report concluded
205

with the urging that scientists be utilized in four areas at NASA: Scientist-Astronauts,
scientist-passengers, astronaut-observers, and ground scientists. 97 This new astronaut
raised questions about the rugged individualist pilot image that space journalists,
politicians, and even astronauts depicted.
It was clear that NASA did not want a scientist-astronaut for various reasons.
Atkinson Jr. and Shafritz argue that with the “novelty and possible danger in the
missions, NASA believed that only astronauts with extensive test-pilot training and
experience could safely fly the spacecraft.” The scientist-astronaut image deviated from
the jet test pilot image of the astronaut, thus complicating the idea that the astronaut
maintained control over his craft. Those within NASA considered space travel too
dangerous for the scientists, consequently feminizing the scientists as they had done to
the FLATs. However, according to Atkinson Jr. and Shafritz, because of the significant
political influence of the scientists, the scientists and engineers won the battle for the
recruitment of scientist-astronauts. 98
William A. Lee, Director of Systems Studies at NASA Headquarters, wrote to Dr.
Joseph E. Shea, Deputy Director of Systems Engineering, suggesting that in recruiting
scientist-astronauts “we would have to relax our present stringent requirements for jet test
pilot experience; thereby gaining training experience with non-test pilots.” 99 The
“relaxing” of the requirements for the scientist-astronauts insinuated a lowering of the
astronaut’s masculine standards. The astronaut was facing his own crisis of masculinity.
The control of the capsule once displayed by the astronaut pilot shifted. The rugged
individual astronaut was becoming less and less alone and more of a team player within
manned spaceflight. The image of who can fly was becoming less stringent, commencing
the domestication of spaceflight.
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NASA commenced recruiting scientist-astronauts. The NASA news release
stated: “A vast scientific frontier is being opened to direct scientific exploration by man.
Observations made by scientist-astronauts will provide new information on the solar
system and on man’s ability to perform effectively in prolonged space flight.” The
applicants did not have to have piloting experience, but it was preferred. If selected,
NASA trained the scientist-astronaut to fly a T-38.Therefore, the applicants needed to be
able to pass the Class I Military Flight Status Physical. This demanded uncorrected 20/20
vision. The image of the scientist with thick black glasses did not fit the new image of the
scientist-astronaut. The scientist-astronauts had to have a degree in the natural sciences,
medicine, engineering, or its equivalent by time of selection. However, the advertisement
preferred the candidate have a doctorate degree. 100
By the application deadline of 31 December 1964, NASA received over 1,351
applicants. In February 1965, NASA and NAS officials narrowed down the pool to four
hundred applicants. Four of them were women. NASA continued to lower the
requirements of the men with the right stuff. Engineers and scientists believed that the
rigors of spaceflight had become less physically demanding. They discontinued the stress
tests that the first three groups of astronauts endured. Unlike the military astronaut
candidates, medical testing on the scientists found that some of the candidates possessed
varicose veins, inguinal hernias, nasal polyps, and myopia. 101 The fact that they had more
medical abnormalities implied a physically weaker man than the jet test pilot astronauts.
This presented a democratization of space technology, however only in regard to
masculinity. None of the women who applied to be scientist-astronauts even made the
short list of potential candidates. 102
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On 29 June 1965, NASA introduced the first ever scientist-astronauts. They
included: Owen Kay Garriott, Ph.D. (electrical engineer); Edward George Gibson, Ph.D.
(physicist); Duane Edgar Graveline, M.D. (flight surgeon); Joseph Peter Kerwin, M.D.
(flight surgeon); Frank Curtis Michael, Ph.D. (space sciences); and Harrison Hagan
“Jack” Schmitt, Ph.D. (geologist). At the time of their service, all were civilians except
for Kerwin. He was in the Navy. 103 Of these men, all had flying experience but one.
However, their flying experience differed greatly. Kerwin and Michael had jet experience
and did not have to take the qualification course. The others went through with the Air
Force Undergraduate Pilot Training Program. As a flight surgeon for the Air Force,
Graveline flew both single and dual seat T-birds. However, NASA believed Graveline
would not be able to transition into the T-38 without further training. Gibson, Garriott,
and Schmitt went through Air Force jet test piloting school together. Before NASA,
Gibson held a private pilot’s license. Garriott flew small tail-dragger airplanes; basically
those with conventional undercarriages consisting of two wheels forward of the center of
gravity and a tiny third wheel beneath the tail. These were the types of planes that Cessna
advertised to average Americans in the 1940s and 1950s. The astronauts, especially
Shepard and Slayton, mocked their lack of flying skill. Jack Schmitt held absolutely no
piloting experience. 104 Even if these men had flown as a pilot in mechanical engine
planes, to the astronauts, the scientist-astronauts had never experienced any real flying.
The men might not have needed to be pilots, but they needed to have healthy
familial relationships. NASA promptly asked for Graveline’s resignation after his wife
filed for divorce in July 1965. Carole Jane Graveline accused her husband of having
“‘violent and ungovernable outbursts of temper.’”According to court documents, Mrs.
Graveline feared her husband so much she believed that if not for a restraining order, she
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“‘will suffer physical bodily injury and may even lose her life.’” While Graveline was
“surprised” by such harsh wording, the New York Times reported that the scientistastronaut was informed by a lawyer “that it was common wordage in Texas divorce
actions.” According to the Times, Dr. Graveline “would not contest the divorce.” 105 The
press reported that as of 18 August 1965, Graveline resigned from NASA. 106 Roger
Launius suggests that since 1959, NASA had taken painstaking feats to keep any
indiscretions of the astronauts away from the press. 107 Chief astronaut Deke Slayton
suggested in his autobiography Deke! US Manned Space: From Mercury to the Shuttle
(1994), “The program didn’t need a scandal. A messy divorce meant a quick ticket back
to wherever you came from—not because we were trying to enforce morality, which was
impossible, anyway, but because it would detract from the job.” 108 NASA needed men
who had emotional control. In the press, Graveline depicted the opposite. NASA also did
not want to project the image of a broken family. Familial importance continued at the
center of the NASA public image.
While some papers ran brief stories on Graveline’s unfortunate exit, newspapers
were quick to pick up on the lack of piloting experience of the new scientist-astronauts.
The Tucson Daily Citizen declared that despite the fact that two of the chosen were
qualified jet pilots, of the other scientist-astronauts, “three of the scientists had never
flown jets and two had not flown at all.” NASA put each scientist-astronaut through a
year-long training program to fly the T-38. While busy with their training, recruit Gibson
lamented, “we feel too isolated from the other astronauts and from the space program,
especially the scientific aspect of it.” One of the scientist-astronauts referred to their
training as “on-the-job training,” not necessarily inspiring the confidence of one entrusted
with the cult of masculinity’s national security endeavor in space. Michael even told
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reporters that he once applied for astronaut training but was rejected because he did not
possess “1,000 hours in jet flying time.” Michael described the scientist-astronaut’s job as
“…trained observers. We won’t necessarily have specific things to do, but will look
around, get some appreciation of what we see and decide on the spot what we should
do.” 109
The scientist-astronauts attempted to demonstrate that they would have control of
the capsule. Not necessarily by actually piloting, but by conducting experiments. They
too wanted to show that they could not be replaced by automation. The Independent from
Long Beach, California ran the headline “Six Scientist-Astronauts Declare: Instruments
Leave Space Gaps Only Man Can Fill.” When interviewed at the Manned Spacecraft
Center near Houston, the scientist-astronauts suggested their role was “to fill the gaps left
by instruments.” Michael suggested that “Without human involvement instruments limit
you in scope. Gibson reiterated his new teammate’s assessment replying, “You need
much theoretical background so you can make on the spot decisions instruments can’t
make.” Chairman of the Academy’s Selection Board, Dr. Harry Hess, backed up the new
astronauts with “Man can differentiate between a thousand possibilities while instruments
cannot.” 110
By the end of the training of the “scientific-six,” NASA faced paradoxical
messages in regard to its future plans and funding. On the one hand, NASA envisioned
the next fifteen years of Apollo flights, lunar landings, and space stations. At the same
time, NASA feared cutbacks as rumors of budget cuts and loss of interest grew. In the
midst of American disinterest in space, NASA envisioned multiple Apollo landings and
an onslaught in the need for scientists in space. In May 1966, despite the opposition of
Slayton, NASA picked another 19 pilots. On 26 September, NASA called for a second
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group of scientist-astronauts. Much to the chagrin of the jet test pilot astronauts, NASA
further eased the physical requirements to become an astronaut.
Geologist Donald Beattie writes in Taking Science to the Moon: Lunar
Experiments and the Apollo Program (2000) that NASA disqualified him from the first
selection of scientist-astronauts because he was one inch over the height limit and nine
months over the age limit. He hoped for a chance with the second selection of astronauts.
He writes:
The Academy had been somewhat disappointed by the
number of applications received from the first
selection…and thus the selection criteria were a little more
relaxed the second time. The age and height limits had not
been changed, but this time the press release stated that
‘exceptions to any of the…requirements will be allowed in
outstanding cases. 111
Dr. Beattie thought that this time he could be considered as an “outstanding case.” With
the growing number of astronauts and scientist-astronauts it seemed as if everyone could
qualify for the right stuff. In the NASA press release, Gene Shoemaker, chair of the NAS
committee, wrote of the new role of scientist-astronaut: “While such missions call for
daring and courage of a rare kind, for the scientist they will also represent a unique
adventure of the mind, requiring maturity and judgment of a higher order.” 112 The public
image of the masculinity of the astronaut had changed from a physical, tough,
masculinity to one that prided brains over brawn.
On 4 August 1967, NASA announced eleven new scientist-astronauts. Three were
astronomers, two physicists, once chemist, one geophysicist, and one electrical engineer.
One was an MD/physicist and two were MD-Ph.D. physiologists. None of the men had
flying experience. All eleven of them would have to spend fifty-three weeks in the Air
Force’s jet pilot course. After they finished their jet piloting course, survival schools, and
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space academic studies, the scientists received their first active assignment in the summer
of 1969. 113 With the arrival of this sixth class, NASA had 57 astronauts. Slayton told
them that if they had any fantasies that they would be flying on the shrinking Apollo
program, they should leave. No one did. 114
Conclusion
Regardless of the first page headlines that declared astronaut control of the
Mercury capsules, newspapers, politicians, NASA, and even astronauts paradoxically
asserted that Gemini was the first craft to be piloted by an astronaut. This demonstrates
the importance of astronaut control moving into Gemini. However, the acceptance of the
first scientist-astronauts into the astronaut corps forever shifted the public astronaut
image. Gemini proved that scientists without any previous jet training could become
astronauts. The scientist-astronauts suggested that the astronaut did not need to have
rugged individualism and control. Spaceflight was becoming so routine that even NASA
was entrusting scientist-astronauts to fly. The once superior masculine image of the
astronaut was being tested. As the pilot astronaut struggled for control over his capsule,
he too faced his own Cold War masculinity crisis.
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CHAPTER VII
“IT’S HIP TO BE SQUARE”: APOLLO, TEAMWORK, AND THE END OF THE
RUGGED INDIVIDUAL ASTRONAUT, 1967-1972 1
It was only supposed to be a test. But for the families of command pilot, Gus
Grissom, senior pilot, Ed White, and rookie astronaut pilot, Roger B. Chaffee, 27 January
1967 was a nightmare. At approximately 6:31 p.m., after spending five hours atop a nonfueled Saturn B rocket at Kennedy Space Center, an astronaut’s voice radioed to the
Saturn blockhouse in a “casual tone[s], Fire…I smell fire.” A couple of moments later
White cried out, “Fire in the cockpit.” A “hysterical” voiced shouted, “There’s a bad fire
in the spacecraft!” Eleven seconds of silenced passed and the “shrill voice” of Chaffee
cried out again, “We’ve got a bad fire! Let’s get out! We’re burning up! We’re on fire!”
As flames engulfed the capsule, all the listeners could hear were cries of excruciating
pain. The only escape route, the hatch door, was sealed shut. Veteran space reporter, John
Noble Wilford, described the men’s last moments as “scrambling, clawing, and pounding
to open the sealed hatch…. There was no automatic release button.” There was no way
out. As they sat defenseless, the astronauts burned in the fire. Due to a combination of
scorching heat, malfunctioning gas masks, toxic smoke, and fears of an explosion, the
ground crew was helpless to save them. The only way for the astronauts to open the hatch
was to use the ratchet that was secured directly above the astronauts’ heads. Using the
tool, it would have taken the spacemen ninety seconds to open the hatch. While
inspecting the capsule after the fire, technicians found that the skin of the astronauts’
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finger tips had melted onto the hatch door. 2 The Apollo 1 astronauts were the first
American astronauts to die aboard a spacecraft. 3
The astronauts were powerless to escape their inevitable fate. All three perished
from smoke inhalation, and their bodies burned in the fire. Accounts of the accident
flooded the media. The U.S. mourned their deaths, and the world grieved with them. 4
One American magazine reported that these astronauts may have had “square and almost
sissy names of Virgil and Edward and Roger” but these men were the symbol of
American strength and prowess. 5 They were athletes, eagle scouts, family men, and jet
fighters all. They were the symbol of American masculinity. However, the fire also
represented a loss of control over technology for the rugged individual astronauts and the
scientists, engineers, and technicians. The loss of Apollo 1 displayed American
impotency in technology, bureaucratic management, and above all, teamwork.
Through the image of the astronauts projects Mercury and Gemini represented
American Cold War masculinity. This chapter argues that Project Apollo encountered a
refashioning in the discourse of spaceflight from one of rugged individual control
exercised by the astronauts, to the astronauts engaging in teamwork with Mission
Controllers and scientist-astronauts. Journalists and politicians embraced the team effort
of the Apollo missions. The Mission Controllers became more prevalent in the
spaceflight discourse. These men represented the team spirit of the organization, perhaps
even that of William Whyte Jr.’s organization men. The men differed from the astronauts,
not only in that the media viewed them as team players, but much like the hyphenated
scientist-astronauts, the men appeared physically different.
Papers and magazines failed to depict the Mission Controllers as physically
rugged. Some were, such as Rocco Anthony Petrone, but most were not. The men all
224

looked very similar. But so too did the astronauts. However, the press did not depict
Mission Controllers as mavericks or individualists. Roger Launius describes the public
image of the men at Mission Control as “‘Geeks’….with their short-sleeved white shirts,
narrow black ties, slide rules hung on their belts like sidearms, and their pocket protectors
complete with compass and ruler and myriad pens and mechanical pencils.” 6 They were
part of the bureaucracy and the organization of NASA. They were part of the Cold War
team player atmosphere. They conformed in dress. They created automated machines.
They were part of why Americans thought there was a masculinity crisis. They were the
feared organization men and the astronaut image was becoming one of them. The
astronaut image struggled for individual control over his capsule much like average
Americans struggled for individuality and control during the Cold War masculinity crisis.
In 1961 President Kennedy declared that the main goal of NASA was to land a
man on the moon and develop his ability to work in a lunar atmosphere. 7 For this venture
NASA designed the Apollo capsule for three man teams, with each astronaut aboard
responsible for an individual task. To complete the mission organization was paramount
at Mission Control. Print media stressed the team atmosphere of the space missions.
NASA organized the engineers within the control room, as one newspaper commented,
like a “football squad.” As had been done during Mercury and Gemini, Mission Control
divided each engineer into a team based upon the engineer’s specialty. A “captain” led
each team while the “head coach,” in Apollo’s case the director of flight operations,
worked as the overseer of the team. 8 Mission Control gave the individual teams color
coded names. These teams worked together in a windowless room in building 30 at
Johnson Space Center. Within the room the teams stared up at a large screen at the front
that updated them on data calculated from computers housed in the room below Mission
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Control. What differed between these teams and the ones in Mercury and Gemini is that
they were more complex, continually catching the interest of the print media. The images
of Mission Controllers became as important to spaceflight as the image of the astronauts.
In October 1968 NASA finally felt comfortable enough to launch men back into
space. Apollo 7 flew from 11 October to 22 October 1968. NASA chose space veteran
Wally Schirra as the capsule’s mission commander. Life described Schirra’s personality
as exuding “authority” and “a competence which inspires people” to the point where
“Nothing but his hair ever gets ruffled.” 9 NASA picked Donn F. Eisele as the command
module pilot and R. Walter Cunningham as the lunar module pilot aboard the mission. In
Apollo the astronauts were again part of a team, with each astronaut having his own
individual responsibility aboard. However, like with the last two Gemini missions, the
print media highlighted the control the astronauts shared with their onboard computer.
Some major magazines and newspapers even questioned who held control; the astronaut
or the computer. The astronauts insisted they had control. For instance, Schirra
commented on Eisele’s navigational ability: “he could make that guidance and control
system perform and sing to us” so well in fact that he “sang into the most precise landing
that any spacecraft has ever achieved.” 10
However, Eisele’s statements insisted a shared control between the astronauts,
Mission Control, and computers. He referred to the tasks during the trip as “getting
beautiful information from the ground giving us our position” and “feeding the data into
the on-board computer which keeps its own knowledge of where you are and where the
target is.” Even with teamwork between man and machine, reporters continued to
highlight the role of man’s individualism as Eisele mastered the computer. At a particular
moment during the mission, the astronaut quit trusting his computer, and instead, relied
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upon his own estimation of the how far Apollo 7 was to its landing zone. According to
astronaut reports, a couple of times the computer went “crazy” and Eisele said to himself,
“Oh man there goes the computer” again. 11
During Apollo 7 the New York Times reported tension between astronauts and
Mission Control over who held control of the flight. At times Mission Control changed
the flight plan on the astronauts as they flew in space. According to the Times, Schirra
finally lambasted building 30, roaring over the radio, “I have had it up here today….and
from now on I am going to be an on-board flight director for these updates. We are not
going to accept any new games like doing some crazy tests we’ve never heard of before.”
According to John Noble Wilford, Schirra’s choice words for Mission Control were the
“stormiest fits of temper ever displayed by an orbiting astronaut.” He wrote that
“stunned, ground controllers could manage only a soft ‘Roger’ in reply….” Schirra
demanded to know “‘the idiot’s name who thought up this test…. and talk to him
personally when I get back down.’” 12
On 22 October 1968 Apollo 7 splashed-down in the Atlantic Ocean. Apollo
Program Director, Lieutenant General Samuel C. Phillips of the Air Force, hailed the feat
as a “Perfect Mission.” With news of the successful pick up of the astronauts by the USS
Essex, the dozens of men inside the control center under 31-year old flight director Glynn
S. Lunney “lit the traditional post-flight cigars. Smiling Apollo officials milled among the
control consoles offering congratulations to the controllers.” The New York Times article
interpreted the perfection of the flight as the perfection of the automated systems. For the
most part, engineers designed these systems, not the astronauts. The automatic guidance
controls “triggered the ignition of the 20,500 pound-thrust service module engine” or
what the engineers called the “‘de-boost’ to ‘de-orbit’” to slow the craft down. As the
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craft slowed down, more automated controls took over. The “explosive devices” fired
“automatically…to separate the service module from the command module.” The capsule
automatically re-entered the atmosphere through the automatic firing of “small rockets on
the service module.” Even the capsule aligned itself for descent automatically by the
automatic firing of the thrusters of the command module. 13 The words “automatically”
and “automated” appeared over and over. Any mention of astronaut maneuvers to slow
down the craft was limited.
After the flight, product advertisements highlighted the image of team players
over that of rugged individuals. For instance, IBM declared that the Apollo 7 mission was
a “tribute to the courage and skill of Astronauts Schirra, Eisele, and Cunningham, and the
dedication of the entire NASA team.” The team included, “20,000 companies and more
than 300,000 Americans who have created the gigantic Apollo/Saturn rockets.” IBM
hailed itself as the “prime contractor for the instrument Unit, a ring of complex
instruments which guides and controls the massive Apollo/Saturn” from liftoff, to the
moon, and back to earth. Their excellent communications and guidance systems were
“essential…. Just ask the men who sat on top.” 14
Advertisements used the space missions to focus on teamwork. At the same time,
control of spaceflight confronted the routinization of spaceflight. Major newspapers and
magazines suggested a routinization of spaceflight during the next Apollo mission. From
21 December to 27 December 1968, Apollo 8 took to the skies. The crew consisted of
mission commander, Frank Boreman, command module pilot, Jim Lovell, and lunar
module pilot, William Alison Anders. Apollo 8 became the first capsule to be launched
by a Saturn V rocket and the first capsule to leave the Earth’s orbit. During the mission,
the astronauts became the first humans to see the “far side of the moon.” It took them
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three days to travel from the earth’s orbit to the moon’s orbit. The astronauts orbited the
moon ten times in twenty hours. On Christmas Eve the major television stations of ABC,
CBS, and NBC broadcasted the astronaut’s reading of the first ten verses from the Book
of Genesis. 15
Life interviewed the families of the astronauts, but this time the response from
their children was less than enthusiastic. They seemed unimpressed that their father’s had
become the first men to leave Earth’s orbit. For instance, Frank Boreman’s eldest boy,
Edwin, “got up reluctantly” to watch his father’s launch and “went back to bed.” Jim
Lovell’s wife had to “shout” at their son Jay to even get him into the house to listen to his
father’s live telecast. Jay “watched moodily,” “couldn’t recognize his father’s voice,” and
“was disgusted” to learn that the spaceship had slowed down to only 24,000 miles per
hour. 16
William Anders’s children proved just as unenthusiastic about watching their
father on television. They “kept switching to the cartoons” when their mother took her
eyes off of them. Dora Jane Hamblin argued in her Life article that the children’s
ambivalence toward their fathers’ flight in space lay in the idea that “They have been
brought up in the climate surrounding a very special occupation, and it remains for the
rest of us, the outsiders, to be struck dumb by what dad did.” 17
But not only were the children bored. A New York Times columnist wrote that the
American public viewed the space feats as “somewhat routine.” An article even ran the
headline, “New-Breed Astronauts: Scientists, Not Daredevils; New-Breed Apollo
Astronauts: Scientists, but Not Daredevils.” Homer Bigart’s article insisted that unlike
the courageous daredevil astronauts of the past, Apollo astronauts were not out for
performing an “historic act” but rather, cared more for an “obsessive curiosity about
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space travel.” 18 To the Times, routinization had taken the danger out of spaceflight. Even
Mission Controllers referred to flying in space as safe. Before the Wings Club at the
Biltmore Hotel, Director of Manned Space Flight Safety, Jerome Lederer, claimed that
the astronauts would be safer aboard their capsule than any of the crewman aboard one of
Columbus’s ships. 19
Even as spaceflight appeared routine, American media outlets continued touting
the Cold War masculinity of the astronauts. The New York Times described Colonel
Boreman as a “take-charge man,” and “a sneaky non-conformist.” Boreman and his
fellow astronauts “kept a firm rein on their emotions.” 20 Boreman wrote of his flight, “I
was flying the spacecraft manually, firing our attitude-control thrusters….” 21 William
Anders called the 240,000 mile trip to the moon and back “a bit of a drag.” However, he
appreciated his pioneer status. He wrote that he always believed the American people had
a sense of “frontier” in their veins. “The Appalachian Trail, the wide Missouri,
Antarctica…they were there, and men came to conquer them. Now space is our frontier,
and there I was in the lead wagon.” 22
Since Apollo 8 left the Earth’s orbit, reentry proved more difficult than during
other spaceflights. Previous flights only orbited the earth. Therefore, all the astronaut had
to do was fire the capsule’s retrorockets to slow the craft down. The capsule would be
going too slow to continue in orbit and drop back into the atmosphere. However, because
Apollo 8 was returning from another orbit, they would be going much faster, about 7,000
miles an hour faster than normal. If they hit the earth’s orbit too hard, they would bounce
off it like a rock. The capsule needed to keep its roll at a 180 degree angle to stop the ship
from bouncing out of the earth’s orbit. To not bounce the capsule, the astronauts need to
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rely on the “automatic pilot.” The computer also controlled the roll’s angle. Boreman said
of his reliance on the computer:
I was watching it closely because if it failed to function I
would have to fire our engines manually to make it roll. It
performed perfectly. This wonderful machine, this
spacecraft, which had taken us all these miles, saved its
most sophisticated performance for the final eight minutes
of our flight. 23
Underscoring the cooperation between astronauts and Mission Controllers, Lovell
claimed that in actually getting from the earth to the moon “the ground would have
primary responsibilities.” 24 Upon Apollo 8’s arrival home, the Atlanta Constitution
lauded the computer aboard the ship as “flawless,” and claimed that the flight was not
only a testament to man’s dreams, spirit, and inventiveness, but also to the “integrity of
his machines.” 25 Eau Claire, Wisconsin repeated the Constitution’s sentiments,
exclaiming of the flight, the “computer takes charge.” 26
Once again, the ground crew also took center stage. For Apollo 8, NASA divided
the duties of controlling the craft. The astronauts’ onboard automated systems controlled
the navigation from the moon to the earth. Space journalists wrote furiously about these
new systems and their designers. The New York Times wrote a piece on Rocco Anthony
Petrone, the director of launching operations at the Kennedy Space Center. Petrone, a
West point graduate and former football player, not only protected the astronauts by
performing “defensive measures” but also stood in the control room “overseeing a team
of 350 essential people….” One of his co-workers described Petrone’s job as, “‘a
conductor of a gigantic complex orchestra…. Everything must harmonize—all the men,
machines, and minutia—without mishap…. Petrone is the unsung hero….’”Another close
friend reported that Petrone failed to see exploring space as an adventure, but rather a
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“‘search for perfection…. The beauty of the teamwork, the precision of the men and
instruments….’” 27
The media also emphasized the reactions of the controllers at Houston’s Manned
Spaceflight Center. One controller described the scene as: “I’ve seen locker rallies in
locker rooms after championship games, happy politicians after elections but never—
none of them do justice to the spirit pervading this room.” 28 The music from John
Glenn’s documentary “Eyes on the Stars” and the smoke of cigars filled the room. A
close associate of acting NASA Director Thomas O. Paine called Apollo 8’s flight “a
triumph of the squares—meaning the guys with crewcuts and slide rules who read the
Bible and get things done.” 29 These depictions of ground control highlighted not the
rugged individualism and control of the astronaut, but a different masculine image. The
Mission Controllers represented the corporate team player.
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists furthered this shift in control from the
rugged individual control of the astronauts to the team work of the men at Mission
Control. The journal’s editor, Eugene Rabinowitch, wrote of the Apollo 8 astronauts:
“their flight was monitored by instruments of incredible sensitivity and guided by
computers of lightning speed…. The one decision of their own was to join the program.”
The Bulletin depicted the flight as “a triumph of enormous teamwork, of scientific
discovery, technical skills and organization—served by a daring and disciplined crew….”
The authors continued to applaud the team effort behind spaceflight underscoring the
control of the engineers and scientists:
Certainly, most, if not all, of the critical maneuvers—the
separation of the command and service modules from the
carrier rocket, the acceleration to leave the earth’s orbit, the
deceleration needed to enter the lunar orbit, the renewed
acceleration employed to leave the moon and the final entry
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into the atmosphere—were performed with the aid of
computerized, semi-robot guidance and control system
programmed to do its job in advance. Its performance was
continually supervised by the crew, able to resort to manual
operation if the automatic controls had failed. 30
The Bulletin boldly implied that the “true authors” of Apollo 8’s flight were not the
astronauts alone but the scientists and engineers who built the rockets, computers, radios,
cameras, heat shields, fuel cell batteries, and the other mechanized pieces of equipment
used during the mission. 31
Space journalist Walter Sullivan speculated that in the new age of spaceflight
instruments were necessary that go beyond the scope of the human mind. “For while the
explorers who first ventured across the seas, tramped the Polar ice and pioneered in plane
flight, were able to navigate on their own, this is not possible in space.” In space
navigation, the astronaut faced “complex” calculations that “depend on a computer.” The
computer changed the way men explored. The technology of television also transformed
the relationship of people to their explorer. For example, with Captain Robert F. Scott’s
ill-fated trip to the South Pole, the public did not hear from the explorer until the explorer
came back from their journey, or as in Scott’s case, their bodies were discovered
complete with journals describing the journey. In the case of space exploration and
Apollo 8, people heard the explorer detail his travels while he performed them. Sullivan
referred to this type of exploration as “one in which the whole world participates….”
Spaceflight’s audience shared power in interpreting and remembering the exploration,
whereas beforehand, the control in its interpretation was left largely to the explorer. 32
Even in the memory of spaceflight exploration was shifting from an individual effort to
teamwork.
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After the mission, for the first and the last time in the history of Time magazine,
an astronaut made “man of the year.” Not only did Time give this title to an astronaut, but
the magazine gave the very first “men of the year” title to all three Apollo 8 astronauts.
While the three men, Anders, Borman, and Lovell received the top honor, Time
remembered the men behind the trio, the many, many men. The issue proclaimed:
The mission’s fantastic precision could never have been
achieved without the creativity and dedication of the
greatest task force ever assembled for a peaceful purpose:
300,000 engineers, technicians, and workers. 20,000
contractors backed by $33 billion spent on the nation’s
space effort in the past decade. 33
However, Time reiterated, “In the end, though, it was three lonely men who risked their
lives and made the voyage.” To the magazine, the astronauts became a “gift” in a
particularly rough year. War, the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr., and Robert F.
Kennedy, and declining U.S. prestige, the “nation’s own self-confidence sank to a nadir
at which it became a familiar litany that American society was afflicted with some
profound malaise of spirit and will.” 34 Journalist, at times, viewed teamwork in space as
an example for Americans and the world to follow.
American spaceflight appeared paradoxical. On one hand the astronaut as a
rugged individual in control was an important symbol of American masculinity. At the
same time, American journalists prided themselves in the team effort of spaceflight. As
the American astronaut faced a crisis over whether he was an individual or a team player,
the Soviets became more interested in the technical aspects of unmanned spaceflight.
Shortly after the historic flight of Apollo 8, one of the Soviet Union’s top space scientists
and the father of Sputnik, Professor Leonid Sedov, told reporters that the Soviet Union
did not plan to send a man to the moon or even into orbit in the near future. Instead, he
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said that unmanned flights into regions of space deeper than the moon appealed more to
Soviet scientists. 35 Who could fly seemed less and less important to the Soviets.
The Americans continued with manned flights. The 3 March to 13 March 1969
flight of Apollo 9 completed 151 revolutions of the Earth. The media described the flight
as “smooth” and “accurate.” The less than stellar amount of print media coverage of
Apollo 9 suggested that despite Nixon’s comment that the flight was “10 days that thrilled
the world” Apollo 9’s “perfection flight” did not excite the American public, but rather,
seemed routine. However, the routinization of the flight led to speculation for a summer
moon landing. 36
During the mission the astronauts completed the first transfer of an American
astronaut from one orbiting spaceship into another orbiting ship. This took place from the
command ship into the lunar module. Previously, on 16 January 1969, the Soviets
accomplished this same feat between Soyuz 4 and Soyuz 5. To counter this Soviet
achievement the United States also succeeded in its first link-up of two manned
spaceships and its first spaceship flown in space that could not re-enter the atmosphere
[the lunar module]. However, the Americans did complete their own “first” in world
history. They had three spacemen simultaneously exposed to the dangers of space.
Astronaut Russell L. Schweickart performed a spacewalk, Colonel David R. Scott “poked
his head out of the command ship door,” all while Colonel James A. McDivitt sat in the
lunar module with the door open to the elements of space. The Soviets on the other hand
only had two men simultaneously exposed to the elements. 37 Finally, Schweickart
performed the first spacewalk where an astronaut was free from life support lines.
Instead, he used a back-pack full of oxygen for life support. If one literally weighed
together the command module, the protective shield, the lunar module, and Saturn 5’s
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upper stage, Apollo 9 became the heaviest satellite to orbit earth at 140 tons. The flight
cost 340 million dollars, the most of any previous spaceflights. 38
Mercury and Gemini missions almost always had an automated system fail. Space
journalists did not emphasize this to the same degree in the Apollo missions. The
discourse surrounding the flights continued to impress the genius of the computer, and
thus, as opposed to the dangers of spaceflight, journalists focused on the teamwork
between Mission Control and the astronauts. Space reporter Wilford wrote of this
cooperation during the Apollo 9’s flight:
As soon as Colonel Scott found the exact point in the
sextant (telescope) cross-hairs, he pressed a button, feeding
the information to the onboard guidance computer…..
From this, the computer calculated the spacecraft’s orbital
position and velocity and, if necessary, could order rocket
firings to correct the space craft’s position. 39
Teamwork with ground control for successful flights continued. Journalists even
emphasized the control of Mission Controllers. The Times reported that during the
mission “ground controllers are confident they can accurately handle all systems on the
orbiting spaceship” while the astronauts to sleep. Originally, NASA believed that the
astronauts would sleep in different shifts, giving astronauts more control over the capsule.
However, since most of the astronauts’ jobs onboard required all three simultaneously,
this proved difficult. As one astronaut said “We say ‘mission control you’ve got it’ and
we close our eyes.” 40 The rugged individual astronauts were sharing their control with the
engineers on the ground.
Space journalist William K. Stevens even went so far as to report, “Although
Apollo astronauts are among the busiest of men once they venture into space, in a sense
they are just along for the ride.” The space journalist insisted that “The real work of
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‘flying’ the spacecraft is done by an ingenious electronic guidance system that is
coordinated and controlled by an on-board computer about the size of a suitcase.” The
computing system, designed by M.I.T. and built by General Motors, and the computer,
built by Raytheon Company, operated as the heart of the capsule, checking the speed,
position, and future course of the ship. The rugged individualism and control was gone.
The astronauts entered information into the computer through their DSKY keyboard on
the control panel, checked it, and held the final say in what to do with its out-put, “but,”
Stevens argued, “for the most part they sit back, figuratively, and let it do its job.” 41
Space reporter Wilford even detailed the fallibility of the astronauts. For instance,
during an 8 March 1969 firing of the main rocket to propel the capsule back into a lower
orbit the astronauts noticed a “sloshing” of propellants when the rocket was to fire. Due
to gravity, the liquids within the tank sometimes remained suspended. To make the
liquids settle into the outlet pipes, the capsule needed to be at a tilting position, especially
during the firing of the main rocket. If the liquids were suspended during the rocket
launch, an explosion might take place. Luckily for the astronauts, the computer failed to
launch the main rocket while the liquids were suspended. The ground controllers
suspected that the “astronauts fed incorrect instructions into the auto pilot for the
maneuver. Spotting the error, the auto pilot never ordered the maneuvering thrusters to
fire.” Ground control instructed the astronauts to orbit the earth again and re-fire the main
rocket. With the new information from ground control, the astronauts gave the computer
new coordinates and the computer promptly fired the rocket. Colonel McDivitt radioed to
Houston, “Thank you from the bottom of our computer.” 42
Apollo 9’s flight brought in even more reports of “The Men Behind the Men in
Space.” On10 March 1969, the New York Times interviewed Apollo Mission Director,
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George Hampton Hage. The reporter touted him as a “member of the nation’s new elite
corps of technical managers.” In the interview, Hage, a “muscular six-footer,” spoke of
the romance of the moon but beamed about the other accomplishments of the mission
such as its “rigid manufacturing standards” which is responsible for the higher quality of
American products of the “20,000 organizations that have built the equipment needed to
get to the moon with their 400,000 workers.” 43 The astronauts were lost in a sea of
workers.
When President Nixon congratulated the three astronauts on the perfect launch he
also applauded, “The genius of the American scientific and technological community
which created and designed the Saturn 5 and the command ship and the lunar module,
once again stirs the imagination and gratitude of the world.” 44 The Washington Post
reported Nixon as praising, “the three of you [the astronauts] and the great team which
enabled you to complete your successful mission….” 45 It was clear, the astronauts were
not lone wolves, they were team players and even, perhaps, organization men.
Shortly after Apollo 9, NASA launched Apollo 10 on 18 May to 26 May 1969
with Commander Thomas Stafford, Command Module Pilot John Young, and Lunar
Module Pilot Gene Cernan. They were all experienced astronauts spending a total of
eight days within the earth’s orbit. The mission was a “dry-run” for Apollo 11. The
Apollo 10’s lunar module did not land on the moon, but it did come within eight nautical
miles of the moon’s surface. While these astronauts may have set a Guinness World
Record for fastest manned vehicle at 24,791 miles an hour, their flight was largely
overshadowed by the build-up to Apollo 11. 46
The manned moon landing gave print media a reprieve from the tumultuous Viet
Nam War. On the surface it appeared that the moon landing strengthened the vitality of
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the United States. President Nixon exalted the landing as the “‘greatest moment of our
time.’” 47 The launch of Apollo 11 appeared to be another example of the transitioning
dialogue of spaceflight from one focused on the individual mastery and control of the
astronauts to one that represented teamwork. However, it should be noted that while team
work was necessary, the rugged individualism and control of the astronauts was still a
priority. The New York Times asserted that the men that so many Americans idolized
were “not scientists seeking fundamental truth – although astronauts on future flights will
be – but supremely self-confident pilots, who like action; and highly disciplined
engineers whose natural habitat is the sometimes bewildering technology of the
electronic age.” The paper hailed the men who would be first to step foot onto the surface
of the moon as “expressions of the dominant values of the broad American middle class,
but each represents a different current in that mainstream of society.” 48
The men NASA picked to go to the moon represented the same rugged masculine
qualities as the astronauts before them. Neil Armstrong, the son of an auditor, and a
“good church going lady,” grew up in Ohio. Like the astronauts in the first group, he
earned his way through college; in Armstrong’s case, with a Naval scholarship to Purdue
University. Upon commission into the Navy, he flew Panther jets off the deck of the USS
Essex. He completed seventy-eight combat missions, earning himself three Air Medals.
After being shot down, he spent a day behind enemy lines before being rescued. After the
service he worked for Edwards Air Force Base and NASA as a civilian jet test pilot
flying the experimental X-15. Interestingly enough, Armstrong did not only consider
himself a pilot, but also, an engineer, “using airplanes merely as tools, the way an
astronomer uses a telescope as a tool.” While describing the demeanor of Armstrong, Life
referred to his moments of silence in conversations not as “icy” but as “controlled.” He
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denied any “courage” or “fear” of going to the moon. His wife Janet continued the
dialogue of control as she described her husband as not “one to rush into anything.” 49
Life writers created a pioneer image of the Armstrong family. Life described the
first house that Neil and Janet built 5,000 feet up into the mountains outside Edwards Air
Force Base. The family mastered their surroundings in a household of little modern
conveniences as Armstrong frequently fished for their dinner. To continue this pioneer
image, the article pointed out that as a young Eagle Scout, Armstrong was never a fan of
team sports. Reinforcing a rugged individual image, Hamblin suggested that Armstrong
preferred solitude within the sport of flying gliders. 50 The New York Times continued
with a dialogue of control suggesting that although Armstrong did drink [alcohol] he
never appeared “visibly affected.” 51
Unlike most of the astronauts, Edwin Eugene “Buzz” Aldrin, the son of an aviator
and oil man, grew up with an upper middle class childhood in Montclair, New Jersey. He
was a particularly no nonsense child who dreamed of flying for the service academies.
After graduating number one in his class at West Point, Aldrin went to Korea. Aldrin
flew sixty-six fighter missions. After the war he became an Air Force instructor, and then
married Joan Archer. He received a Ph.D. from M.I.T. in Aeronautical Engineering. Life
described Aldrin as not only having the best scientific mind of any of the astronauts, but
also as having the ability to correct a computer, thus, insinuating an element of control
over technology. 52 The media also reported on his manly physique. The New York Times
stated that beneath Aldrin’s “suave urbanity” and “stylish clothing” hid a “well
conditioned body whose individual muscles are under disciplined control, an asset that
has made Colonel Aldrin probably the most accomplished of the six Americans to ‘walk’
in space.” 53
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Michael Collins held a similar background to Aldrin. His father was a military
attaché to the US Embassy in Italy, and Collins was born in Rome. After moving around
throughout his childhood, Collins went to West Point and then entered the Air Force.
Like the other astronauts, he too flew as a jet test pilot at Edwards. Collins said one of the
reasons he yearned to become a fighter pilot was because they are “independent, they say
what they mean, they prove who they are by what they do.” Like the men before him the
article described Collins as fearless. Collins was not scared to go to the moon because
“Things that you understand fully are not really frightening.” 54
On 16 July, Apollo 11 launched into space. Journalists stressed the individual
control of the astronauts. Richard Witkin of the New York Times reported that even
though the computer fired the engine and pitch-up maneuver and the keyboard controlled
the attitude, during the flight, Armstrong switched to manual control to find a safe place
to land the Lunar Module (LM), nicknamed, Eagle. 55 The Charlotte Observer concurred,
writing that “Armstrong had to seize control of the spaceship from a computer that would
have dropped them” into a dangerously large crater. 56 To the Observer, “In the end, man
was on his own. The wondrous machine he’d built to land him safely on the moon just
wasn’t as versatile as man himself.” 57
The Birmingham News ran the headline “To Houston, Crew, LM Moon Landing
‘Hairy.’” The article by Richard Lewis (CS-T) highlighted the individual control of
Armstrong. Armstrong switched to manual control as the automatic guidance system of
the LM sought to miss the landing site and send Armstrong and Aldrin into an enormous
crater. NASA director, Thomas O. Paine, lauded the “cagy piloting” of Armstrong as he
landed the Eagle safely. 58 Jack Nelson of the Los Angeles Times quoted Paine as
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suggesting that the United States had been lucky with their past unmanned moon landings
because without a “pilot” the LM might not have made a successful landing.
Mission Controllers had anxiety about the extremely precarious situation in space.
The astronauts’ hearts raced, but they “kept their voices under ‘tight control.’” 59 Mission
Control touted “The men and equipment that are Apollo 11 have performed to perfection.
Perfection is not too strong a word.” 60 Headlines likened the training of the men to a
“unit.” 61 Praising the Mission Controllers, the Lost Angeles Times reported that the men
back in Houston “‘play[ed] it cool.’” 62 British historian Arnold Toynbee was quick to
point out that the heroic feat of the astronauts would not have been possible without the
“skill, toil, devotion, loyalty, and competitiveness of the hundreds of thousands of
scientists and technicians who have made the astronaut’s feat possible.” 63 The astronauts
were not alone.
Involved in the launch were not only NASA centers and astronauts. To see the
launch, 267 Congressmen flew to Cape Canaveral. NASA allowed each Congressman to
bring one member of the immediate family. NASA paid the bill. 64 During the flight the
astronauts carried silicon discs inscribed with the names of men such as presidents
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. Along with the name Barry Goldwater, 49
other names of members of the House and 28 Senators, including Vice President Spiro T.
Agnew were also taken into space. The disc included miniaturized messages of 72 heads
of state. Engraved were Pope Paul VI’s citation of the eighth Psalm and even the
president of Senegal, Leopold Sedar Senghor’s, “This is a message from black militants,”
which praised human will over technology. 65
The print media coverage of the moon landing spanned the globe. Half a billion
people watched the landing. 66 “Crowds screamed joyously in Trafalgar Square, people
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danced in Chile, a Russian yelled ‘Hooray,’” wrote the associated press in London. The
associated press declared that with the great feat of the American moon landing, “Almost
everyone on Earth was somehow touched.” 67 During the turbulent times of civil rights
and Viet Nam, former president Johnson boasted that the landing proved that Americans
“can do anything that needs to be done.” 68 To celebrate the launching of Apollo 11,
Nixon declared a day of national participation. Nixon ordered nonessential government
employees, governors, mayors, heads of school systems, and private employers to close
down for the day. 69 The president proclaimed that the feat of landing on the moon was
not to be enjoyed by NASA alone, but rather that all Americans should take pride in the
accomplishment. 70
And they did. Outside a Zenith store, New Yorkers waited in anticipation for the
landing. 71 As the New York Yankees played the Washington Senators, “the words
‘They’re on the Moon’ flashed on the scoreboard” at Yankee Stadium. After the landing,
the umpires stopped the game and the 15,000 fans fell silent with prayer followed by the
singing of “‘America the Beautiful.’” At Disneyland park goers flocked to the “‘Flight to
the Moon’ Ride.” 72 Upon the astronauts return cities throughout the United States, such
as New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, planned enormous parades. 73
The city of Birmingham, Alabama turned into a ghost town as residents were
home watching the landing and praying for the safety of the astronauts. 74 The residents of
Huntsville, Alabama deserted the streets to stay inside and watch the landing footage.
One child commented that the streets were quieter “‘than during the Alabama-Tennessee
game.’” After the landing, Huntsvillians rejoiced with pride in their eclectic city for
helping land astronauts on the moon. 75 British astronomer Sir Bernard Lovell celebrated
the American “superiority” over the Soviets in space, exclaiming that the Soviets could
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“‘no longer regard themselves as masters.’” 76 Among the accolades for the astronauts and
teamwork in space, Americans continued to debate pilot control over space technology.
John Glenn rejoiced but reminded Americans that the astronaut did not embody
rugged individualism, but rather that he was part of a vast network of control. Glenn
remarked that the explorers of yesteryear such as Edmund Hilary and Charles Lindbergh
“were independent agents. They had only to apply their own ingenuity and round up the
necessary backing before taking off on their own to satisfy their urges to learn,
accomplish, and conquer.” However, to Glenn, as it was to most of the media,
advertisers, NASA employees, and the general American public, the astronauts were a
different type of explorer, stretching the myth of the independent flier as much as the
historiography of the west stretched the myth of the autonomous frontiersman. Glenn
wrote, “astronauts are part of a complex, interdependent system from which they cannot
separate themselves, and the very existence of which rests on the say-so of the public.” 77
Some reporters even suggested that it was not the skill of the pilot that led to the
safe LM lading. Journalists maintained that a “Change of 2 Numbers on Apollo
Computer” shifted the craft to a new landing location 247 miles farther North and East to
land closer to Johnson Island. 78 Louisville’s Courier-Journal ran a similar article by
Richard Witkin that proclaimed “Eagle’s Descent to the Moon Mostly in Computer’s
Hands.” Witkin described that the astronauts pushed the buttons “Program 63” followed
by the “Pro” [Proceed] key that enabled the computer to fire the engines. The computer
performed all the flying until Armstrong was forced to manually take over the controls to
land the LM on the surface of the moon. 79
Praise for Apollo’s man and machine teamwork continued. However, some
journalists feared that Americans were losing control both domestically and
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internationally. Suville R. Davis of The Christian Science Monitor warned that “the good
name of the United States will still have to be proved. It is not enough to have its flag
propped up in the Sea of Tranquility, where it can no more feel or know the gales of
Earth….” When the enthusiasm for the astronauts died down, space headlines would once
again be replaced by American war and civil rights protestors clashing with police. While
the world “regards [Americans] as doers,” in the end, warned Davis, the world will not
judge the United States on its ability to land a man on the moon, but rather, on its
“civilization.” “The country that ‘cannot afford to be second best in space’” wrote Davis,
“ may make more friends by its frank acknowledgement, at last, that it could not achieve
military victory within South Vietnam.” 80
Putting its domestic and international problems aside to go to the moon would not
solve America’s current problems. David Bowie’s “Space Oddity” lyrics aptly described
the loss of control of the astronaut and American Cold War masculinity: “Here I am,
floatin’ ‘round my tin can far above the world, Planet earth is blue and there is nothing I
can do.” The astronaut is looking at the domestic and international conflicts 1960s, but
even though the astronaut is the hero, he is helpless whether out in space or on the
ground. The song continues: “Ground control to major Tom, your circuits dead, there’s
something wrong, Can you hear me major Tom?.... Here I am sitting in my tin can far
above the Moon, Planet Earth is blue and there’s nothing I can do.” 81 The astronauts, like
American men, were losing Cold War masculinity.
An editorial appearing in Louisville’s Courier-Journal wrote of this “Human
Paradox” of the moon landing. “The Central Meaning of the moon landing is
inescapable,” exclaimed respected journalist Flora Lewis. It was one of both “hope” and
“fear.” If man could reach the moon, asked Lewis, why can man not cure “hunger,”
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“greed,” “warfare,” or “cruelty?” Taking the moon landing as a symbol of hope, Lewis
remained optimistic, anticipating that “the day man touches the virginal moon must
surely be the day man starts to purify himself, breaking free from hate and horror as the
astronauts broke free from the very earth.” 82 Another editorial asked, “How far can we go
to satisfy scientific curiosity without making the earth a living—or dying—hell?” 83 War,
American poverty, and race riots competed for front page headlines with NASA. The
astronaut as a symbol of rugged individualism and control could not cure America’s
problems. Instead of representing control, he was representing a complete lack of control.
The astronaut image was facing a masculinity crisis.
The U.S. commander in Viet Nam, General Creighton Abrams, did not take time
out from running the war to listen to the moon landing. However, the press suggested that
“‘everybody else’” in Viet Nam was listening to the footage on Armed Forces Radio. 84
Contradicting the report, journalist Keyes Beech interviewed volunteers and soldiers at
the USO in Saigon who reported that the pool game at the base never stopped during the
landing, and “There was no rush” for the free hamburgers and coke offered by an
American businessman. Some soldiers were in disbelief. They thought the landing was
“science fiction.” However, “a good many asked what it had to do with the war. The
answer, as they saw it, was nothing.” Specialist William D. Hutchison of North Dakota
commented, “‘You might think that a country that can put a man on the moon could end a
crummy war like this.’” 85
Not only the Viet Nam War, but also civil rights became a contested topic as
Americans landed on the moon. As the astronauts readied for space, the poor watched at
the Cape. While Thomas O. Paine lauded the feat as “an example of what this country
can do,” Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) president, Reverend Ralph
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D. Abernathy, watched along with 150 poor and three mules. The spectacle created a
metaphor for the loss of Cold War masculinity, not only control in the form of black
demonstrations but also in control over their own earth, to feed the hungry and eliminate
poverty. Abernathy congratulated NASA on such an achievement but wished for
Americans to learn to live together “down here on earth.” As the world watched,
Abernathy pointed out America’s shortcomings. Paine maintained that NASA was for
“all Americans.” He implored Abernathy to “hitch your wagons to our rockets.” 86 Paine
said he too wished for an end to poverty and racial injustice, telling Abernathy, “if it were
possible for us not to push that button tomorrow and solve the problems you are talking
about, we would not push that button.” 87
New York Times staff writer Bernard Weintraub called the launch of Apollo 11 a
microcosm of the United States. He said that on one side of the launch you had the
businessmen, politicians, and generals in the bleachers, and on the other side, you had the
poor gathering outside of their Cape Canaveral shacks, angry, hopeless, and shaken, but
at the same time “yearning to break through, possibly even smash through, this very
power.” In between the two groups stood the middle class, made up of engineers,
teachers, farmers, and housewives, “whose pride in the country, and themselves, was
pure.” 88A cartoon adorned the inside pages of Baltimore’s Afro-American with the
headline “Our Prayers Go With You.” The cartoon depicted a white astronaut waving to a
crowd of onlookers as he entered the space capsule. In the picture, spectators held up
cards reading “Remember the Poor” and “Please Share More with the Poor.” 89
The Times reported that most African-Americans “couldn’t have cared less” about
the Apollo 11 flight. In fact, 50,000 African-Americans gathered in Harlem on the day on
the moon landing to celebrate a cultural soul music festival. Upon hearing the news of the
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Eagle’s landing, the crowd booed. Bars patronized by African-Americans in Chicago’s
Michigan Avenue reported that as the astronauts landed the patrons watched baseball.
The newspaper quoted one patron as saying, “‘There ain’t no brothers in the program
where they can get into some of that big money.’” 90
Operations Director of Pride Inc. blasted the flight telling workers to “keep on
working” as he castigated NASA and the U.S. government with: “Why should blacks
rejoice when two white Americans land on the moon when white America’s money and
technology have not even reached” the poor black populations. 91 Journalist J. Anthony
Lukas wrote that while white men were landing on the moon, some Americans have yet
to “Discover America.” To Lukas, many Americans, especially African-Americans, still
lived in abject poverty. One man he interviewed in James, Mississippi only made twentythree dollars a week working on a white man’s plantation. Lukas speculated that “Even
relatively well-off Negroes frequently feel their hold on prosperity is precarious.” 92 The
Chicago Defender reported that even though for one instant the Eagle landing on the
moon united all Americans it could also be considered a “cultural lag.” 93An attorney for
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP) legal
defense and education fund commented:
It proves that white America will do whatever it is
committed to doing…. If America fails to end
discrimination, hunger, and malnutrition then we must
conclude that America is not committed to ending
discrimination, hunger, and malnutrition. Walking on the
moon proves that we do what we want to do as a nation. 94
Newsweek reported that a young San Francisco journalist lamented that the trip to the
moon did not include a minority. He wrote, “If one of the Americans setting foot on the
lunar surface had been a Negro I feel that the $24 billion might have been justifiable.” To
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the journalist, if NASA had launched an African American it “would have demonstrated
to ourselves and to the world not only that we have the best technicians, but also we
know how to live with each other.” 95
The Washington Post’s William Greider described the protests that occurred
outside Houston’s Mission Control on the day of the landing. He wrote that “outside the
white buildings of the Manned Spacecraft Center campus, Sunday visitors strolled along
the walkways with dreamlike disregard.” White families enjoyed a leisurely afternoon.
However, in the background appeared a different image of American life in the 1960s.
“An assemblage of about 40 black children and their mothers, welfare recipients from
Houston, gathered on the grass terrace beside the LEM [model] to demonstrate.” As they
protested, building 30 waited for Armstrong and Aldrin to land. Upon planting the
American flag, Armstrong reported as scripted: “‘That’s one small step for [a] man, one
giant leap for mankind.’” The controllers exploded with excitement, “pounding on
desks,…arms waved and technicians jumped out of their seats.” Outside a black man
with a shirt reading “AFRO” led the group of black children in song. The demonstrators
followed suit singing, “‘He’s got the lunar module in His hands. He’s got the astronauts
in His hands.” Someone who appeared to be organizing the demonstration passed out
signs that read: “‘Good Luck from the hungry children of Houston’” or “41 cents a day is
not enough.” 96
As the demonstration persisted, most of the white tourists continued to walk the
campus grounds hoping to catch a glimpse of the engineers. According to Greider, the
white tourist either “gawked at” or “ignored” the protestors. One of the news men ran out
of a building toward the demonstrators exclaiming, “‘Do you people realize that two men
just landed on the moon?’” An employee for NASA’s contractor AV Corporation, John
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Harrison, pulled some money from his wallet, waved dollar bills in the demonstrators
faces, and hollered, “‘Are you people hungry? Here’s a dollar!’”A black woman cried
back, “‘Take us out tomorrow to one of those big cafeterias where we can’t go.’” The
man roared back: “‘Why don’t you go out and work and get yourself some food?’”
Greider asked Harrison his thoughts on the protestors. Harrison fired back that he was
“‘damn mad’” that the “welfare rights organization” ruined the moon landing for him. 97
Just days before the moon landing, Newsweek attacked NASA as lacking any real
“over-all goal.” The magazine compared the Apollo program to a “metaphor for all of
contemporary technological speed—that is, in the textbook definition, of velocity without
direction.” The magazine added, “For, if spaceflight stirs nothing more than flag-waving
in the xenophobes and only a moldering sense of injustice in the dissidents, then there are
others who are still moved by the promises of what the new age can be….” 98America was
torn between two worlds. The astronaut was somewhere in the middle. He was a symbol
of a new man, a symbol of hope, the rugged individualist Cold War pioneer. And yet, it
appeared as if he had no control at all. He could not fly a capsule on his own. He
symbolized a superior America, and yet he could not solve American problems. The
astronaut image faced an identity crisis.
Within the public discourse, the astronaut image was losing his control to the
Mission Controllers. Space journalists, politicians, and NASA administrators continued
with the trope of spaceflight as a symbol of teamwork between both astronauts and
Mission Controllers. The teams at Mission Control during Apollo 11 were as follows: 37year old Clifford E. Charlesworth headed up the green team; 35-year old former jet test
pilot Gene Kranz headed up the white team; the black team was led by the youngest
mission control flight director to date, 32-year-old Lunney, and finally, Milt Windler, 37,
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headed-up the maroon team. The White team, nicknamed “white flight,” was in charge of
bringing the astronauts to the lunar surface. The black team’s responsibility lay in the
liftoff from the moon, and the maroon team was in charge of both the moonwalk and the
mission back to earth. The green team was responsible for everything else during the
mission.
Like all the spaceflights before, the only one person allowed to speak with the
astronauts during the actual mission, was Capcom. The man at Capcom “relays the flight
director’s instructions to space—but always as recommendations. The astronauts like to
think that they are the ones flying the mission, not the ground controllers.” The Capcom
communicator for the mission was astronaut Charles “Charlie” Moss Duke Jr. Continuing
this pyramid structure were about “150 experts” assembled in a small room in Mission
Control analyzing computer data and waiting for any problem that may befall their
special area. If one arose, it was their job to fix it. 99 Further down the pyramid were
representatives from the manufacturing companies that made the spaceship and lunar
module who were ready to step in with their expertise. The astronaut was one man in this
huge organization.
The media fixation on the scientists and engineers continued. The Washington
Post argued that during the spaceflight, “Four Men in the Background Played Key Apollo
11 Roles.” The article was referring to NASA Director Thomas O. Paine, director of the
Manned Spaceflight Center in Houston, Robert Gilruth, associate administrator of
manned spaceflight, George Mueller, and Apollo mission director, George H. Hage. 100
Newsweek proclaimed Mission Control as “A place where 13,000 men can feel like they
are Columbus.” 101 Victor Cohn of the Washington Post argued “Christopher Columbus
Kraft: ‘He Gives the Orders!’” “‘The guy on the ground,’ he once said, ‘ultimately
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controls the mission….there is no question about that in my mind or the astronauts’
minds. They are going to do what that guy says.’”
To demonstrate the amount of control that Kraft exercised over the astronauts,
Cohn looked back at the incident of Scott Carpenter’s flight when Carpenter ended up
burning too much fuel “‘trying to ‘fly’ his spacecraft himself rather than relying on
automatic systems. Carpenter never flew again.” It was Kraft who gave astronaut Gordo
Cooper the complex numbers and orders to make a manual retrofire and re-entry after
Cooper’s automatic-recovery power supply failed. 102 Project Apollo director Sam Phillips
wrote in the New York Times of the group dichotomy at NASA: “The NASA System: A
Meshing of Many Parts, People and Ideas.” To Phillips, NASA had created a web of
workers, management, hardware, software, technical workers, contractors and
subcontractors. 103 Together, all of these groups came together to exemplify the
organization, and even perhaps, the organization man. Print media hailed the organization
of NASA so much that some suggested “Apollo Teamwork is Needed on Earth.” 104
James Clayton of the Washington Post suggested that Apollo taught important
lessons of camaraderie, management and teamwork. Engineers, doctors, electronics
specialists and propulsion men had to work together and “Pulling all this together was the
computer and communications network.” 105 The New York Times followed suit with an
article by Chris Kraft entitled “Computers and Controllers” in which he singled out the
computer as the most necessary piece of equipment aboard any American space flight. 106
Not once in Kraft’s article did he acknowledge the necessity of the astronaut over the
technology aboard. However, while Kraft did not highlight pilot control in his article, his
fellow NASA administrator and manager of the Apollo spacecraft program, George Low,
argued that “In Developing Space Hardware, Human Judgment Still Counts Most.” 107
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But again, Low’s argument centered on the mind of not just the astronauts, but also the
men building the technology.
IBM made sure that the people of Earth did not forget that millions of minds went
into the Apollo 11 flight. In their 24 July advertisement in the Washington Post, IBM
saluted the astronauts “who took historic first steps in our space program. And the people
of NASA who guided them And [sic] the 20,000 companies in the Apollo program who
helped.” 108 Westinghouse “salute[ed]the fantastic astronauts and NASA team that made
Apollo 11 possible. 109 The New York Times hailed the “Intricate Communications
Systems” that converted “speech, pictures, and data, into electronic signals” hurling them
into space as electronic waves. The waves “are converted back into speech, pictures, and
data so that the world can hear the astronauts and so that the computers can analyze what
is happening to the astronauts and their craft.” 110 A General Electric advertisement
suggested that “Hundreds of smaller steps led to man’s giant step on the moon. And
thousands of General Electric people were there along the way.” 111
Not only did a shift occur in that print media failed to present the astronauts as the
only men in control of the craft, but the dialogue of the goal of space, to control and
master space, was refashioned again as the headlines ran “Moon Walk Yields Data for
Science.” 112 From 14 November to 24 November 1969, the crew aboard Apollo 12,
Commander Pete Conrad, Command Module Pilot Richard Gordon, and rookie Lunar
Module Pilot Alan L. Bean, ventured back to the moon. 113 A New York Times editorial by
Earl Ubell, science editor for WCBS news-New York, suggested controversially that
Apollo 12 was the spacecraft to prove what Apollo 11, Gemini, and Mercury failed to
prove; that man with machines have a “role beyond piloting, beyond generating glory and
poetry.” 114
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By the time of the launch of Apollo 13, the excitement over the launch garnered
the same support as most of the other Apollo flights. However, there were obstacles. An
astronaut needed to be replaced only days before the mission. NASA believed that during
training exercises astronaut Thomas Kenneth “Ken” Mattingly II was exposed to the
German measles. Doctors felt it best to replace him rather than risk having an astronaut
with measles in space. NASA replaced Mattingly with astronaut John Leonard “Jack”
Swigert Jr., the first bachelor astronaut. The media referred to Swigert as a “rambunctious
bachelor.” His sister told reporters, “‘You know how a sailor has a girl in every port?…
Well, Jack has a girl in every airport, from coast to coast.’” 115 Swigert had swagger.
On 11 April 1970, NASA launched Apollo 13. Three days later, Apollo 13
experienced a “power failure.” 116 On 14 April, as Apollo 13 approach the lunar orbit of
the moon, its oxygen tank exploded resulting in an oxygen leak. The explosion also
caused the command module to lose its electrical power. NASA ordered the astronauts
out of their command module and into the moon landing module to serve as a lifeboat.
The astronauts kept the hatch door between the module and the capsule open. One
astronaut stayed in the command module to monitor the systems. Mission Control then
instructed the astronauts to use the rockets of the landing module to propel themselves
back into the atmosphere and into the Pacific Ocean. 117
The press reported the situation and those involved as calm, cool, and collected.
Deputy Director of Manned Spaceflight, Kraft, reported that the astronauts had simulated
such mission abort procedures before and were well informed of the necessary actions to
perform. Papers reported that this was “the first serious cliff-hanging development in any
of the nation’s five flights to the vicinity of the moon.” 118 Americans anxiously awaited
the fate of the astronauts. However, the image Americans gazed upon was quite different
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than before. Unlike with Apollo 11, they saw three heroic astronauts, helplessly floating
in space, while the men in control reported to them from Houston. The media painted a
picture of the men at Mission Control (both figuratively and literally on screen). They
were “At the console in the big room, men in shirtsleeves” looking over sheets of paper
and instrument panels. As the New York Times proclaimed, the crew lay “crippled” and
the flight director Lunney was “making the decisions.” 119Astronaut turned Mission
Controller, Deke Slayton, said “We’ve got things well under control.” 120
The craft’s water shortage limited the astronauts’ use of their navigation systems
and the astronauts coasted home without any “sense of direction.” 121 While reflecting on
the 1995 movie Apollo 13, Launius described the scene in building 30 as an “interesting
transference of masculine power from the astronauts” to the Mission Controllers. 122
Aboard the capsule the astronauts represented a lack of rugged individualism and control.
The astronauts image symbolized the Cold War masculinity crisis.
The news of the stranded astronauts shocked the world. One American girl in
New York City said, “‘It all seemed fairly routine. I wasn’t all that excited when they
walked on the moon…. now, of course, I want them back.’” Before the launch, Milan’s
newspaper IL Girono reported that the American space feats were: “Too Perfect; the
Public is Getting Bored.” After the flight, confusion over America’s exceptional image of
technical prowess led a Japanese business man to ask “‘How could it happen?’” 123
Countries around the world including Britain, West Germany, Spain, Italy, South Africa,
Brazil, and the Soviet Union offered aid to the astronauts in the form of ships and
planes. 124
On 17 April 1970, Apollo 13 returned to the earth’s atmosphere in a “perfect”
landing in the Pacific Ocean. Such a perfect landing required “intricate maneuvering,”
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which was not conducted by the jet test pilot astronauts alone, but rather required both the
improvisation of Mission Control and the execution of the astronauts. 125 Mission Control
and the astronauts both worked out the necessary steps to detach the lunar and command
modules. The necessary separation saved the fuel from exploding during reentry. The
USS Iwo Jima picked up the astronauts as they landed in the Pacific. Mission controllers
erupted into cheers, lighting cigars and downing champagne. 126 After the safe return of
the astronauts, the media and Director Paine hailed the feat as a “triumph of
teamwork.” 127 Mission control “Hails Aquarius Performance.” Low stated that never
before had a mission required “as much from the men flying the machines as this one
has.” 128 Which men he is referring to is unclear.
The New York Times’s Joseph Lelyveld summarized the uniqueness of the
astronauts not for their “courage or the perils they faced,” but rather that it was their
“training and technical expertise” that made them part of a “unique fraternity.” He
suggested that transforming Apollo 13’s mission from one of scientific and technical
importance, to one that focused on simple needs such as air, oxygen, and lifeboat,
transformed the astronauts into Odysseus facing the Cyclops and longing to return to
Penelope.
Of course we knew that their return would be impossible
without the computers and simulators and expert
technologists arrayed in their orderly rows. But in the final
14 minutes of flight, when the tiny capsule hurled back into
the earth’s atmosphere at last we found ourselves talking of
“recovery” and “acquisition”—simple, supremely nontechnical concepts,…. 129
For their courage, President Nixon awarded the Medal of Freedom, America’s highest
civilian honor, to the three astronauts in Hawaii. However, before he did so he stopped by
Houston and awarded the Medal of Freedom to the Apollo 13 ground crew. Director of
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Flight Operations at the Manned Space Center, Sigurd A. Sjoberg, accepted the award on
behalf of mission control. Nixon declared the date a national day of prayer and
thanksgiving. 130
The United States had kept its promise. NASA landed a man on the moon before
the end of the decade. The United States conducted its Space Race openly, fulfilling its
word to create a balance in the duality of space technology: technology for military
purposes, but most importantly, technology for peace. Peace through strength prevailed.
Space technology shifted once again. This new purpose of space technology came to the
forefront of the space narrative, causing a manifestation of the image of spaceflight that
carried itself into the shuttle era. New space technology proved useful for space science.
Some feared a scientist-astronaut would not be called into space. Even though Apollo
17’s crew had yet to be decided, as of May 1971, there were no scientist-astronauts listed
as any of the crewmembers for Apollo 15 or Apollo 16. Only scientist-astronaut Jack
Schmitt was listed as one of the back-up crew for Apollo 15.
Scientists felt betrayed. In the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, scientists wrote a
scathing opinion piece entitled “Requiem for the Scientists-Astronauts.” The article
maintained the importance of space science to the missions and thus, the necessity of the
scientists to the crew. Claiming that Gordon Cooper perceived crew selection to be part
of “politics,” the article defended the ability of the scientist-astronauts to pilot the space
capsules and lunar modules. Suggesting that the jet pilot image was deemed necessary by
NASA for the space flyer image, the article purported that when it came to space
technology, “The Apollo command module is controlled primarily by an on-board
computer, and space craft activities, both routine and emergency are generally supervised
and directed by ground control.” 131
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A week after the 7 August 1971 landing of Apollo 15, NASA announced that it
would in fact send up a scientist-astronaut, Harrison “Jack” Schmitt, in Apollo 17 as the
crew’s lunar module pilot. The Arizona Republic suggested that NASA reluctantly
“bowed to scientific pressures.” The scientist-astronauts no longer wanted to be treated as
“window dressing.” NASA kept Commander Eugene Cernan and Command Modular
Pilot Ronald Evans as Schmitt’s fellow crew members. With Schmitt’s appointment, the
“pilot-oriented” group made “concessions.” Much to Cernan’s dismay, NASA scraped
astronaut Joseph H. Engle from the crew. The original three crewmembers had been
training together for months. 132
The announcement elated the scientific community, especially scientist-astronaut
champion, Wernher von Braun. Von Braun reflected upon the achievements of the
Apollo program before the last launch to the moon. To von Braun, the importance of
Apollo was not only that Americans successfully landed men on the moon. The landing
highlighted the importance of manned spaceflight as opposed to unmanned spaceflight.
Since the beginning, Americans championed the need for manned spaceflight. Von Braun
argued, “Each Apollo mission, including the ill-fated Apollo 13, confirmed and expanded
the role of man in space. What little doubt remains about the wisdom of the NASA
manned space program will be resolved in the upcoming Skylab space station….” Not
only did Apollo demonstrate the importance of man in space over robots in space, but
von Braun also defended his original vision of a space flyer, that of the scientist. To the
German scientist, Apollo proved not only the suitability of the pilots in space, but also the
necessity of his fellow scientists on future flights. 133 As von Braun excitedly awaited the
first astronaut-scientist flight, other pundits had fascinating insights into this new image
of the spacefarer. Earl Ubell professed:
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Apollo 15 probably marks the end of the supremacy of the
racing car drivers in space—the men who spring beyond
our atmosphere for national prestige, for flexing
engineering muscle, for adventure or just for getting there.
With this flight, scientists have finally won parity with, if
not ascendency over, engineers and publicists. 134
Apollo 17 received little network media attention. The commercial television
stations only sporadically interrupted programs on Apollo updates. Cable appeared to be
a better medium for spaceflights but even there few viewers tuned in. 135 While lackluster
coverage appeared onscreen, newspapers, especially the New York Times, continued with
their barrage of coverage. Journalists asked what Americans had learned from Apollo.
While assuaging critics of the 26 billion dollar price tag on space exploration, historian at
the Smithsonian Institute, Dr. Daniel J. Boorstin, proposed that NASA acted more as a
cultural representative in space. Much like Dryden argued in 1962, Boorstin proposed
that “The great thing about space exploration is that we don’t know what its payoff will
be. This symbolizes the American civilization. The people who settled America had no
idea what the payoff would be. They settled it before they explored it.” 136 Times sports
writer, Nelson Bryant, wrote passionately of the qualities of the astronaut:
They are the most daring, dedicated and disciplined hunterexplorers mankind has ever known, willing and even eager
riders of machines in the infancy of their development,
performing tasks with their bodies and minds beyond the
reach of technology. 137
Bryant described the astronauts as not only rugged but paradoxically he wrote that they
were surprisingly “human and fragile.” 138
Despite questions over the benefits of federal money spent on space exploration
and the routinization of space, Americans flocked to Cape Kennedy for the last Apollo
mission. About half a million spectators arrived. They saw the teamwork of humans and
machines as 30 seconds before the scheduled liftoff the “computer signal halted
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countdown.” The liquid oxygen in the third and top stage did not pressurize
automatically. Man triumphed over the computer. Worried that the launch might not
occur as scheduled, Mission Control feverously checked the problem. They decided to
switch to manual and pressurized the liquid oxygen. The New York Times hailed the feat
as “Experts Tricked the Computer.” 139 Two and a half hours later, on 7 December 1972,
the countdown was back on and Apollo 17 blasted into space. 140
When NASA launched Apollo 17 into space the mission became not only
symbolic as being the last Apollo manned lunar flight, but it also became the first manned
space mission with a scientist-astronaut crewmember. 141 Journalists saw scientistastronaut Jack Schmitt as different. Not only had Dr. Schmitt learned to fly “after being
named an astronaut,” but unlike the previous astronauts, he was not going into space for
“adventure” but rather “science.” According to the New York Times, many astronauts
believed a lunar landing would be too difficult for anyone who was not a career pilot.
However, through his training, Schmitt proved that “a geologist could learn to fly
spacecraft as competently as a test pilot.” 142 The scientists were in. A different masculine
image apart from that of the lone wolf jet test pilot had entered the astronaut corps and
the discourse of American manned spaceflight. Schmitt’s flight commenced the
domestication of spaceflight and the end of the rugged individual astronaut.
Conclusion
Journalists, politicians, and NASA praised the teamwork of the new scientistastronauts, astronauts, and building 30. As Flight Director Gene Kranz looked around
Mission Control, a sense of satisfaction swept over him. He wanted the one thing that
every manned flight since Mercury had. He wanted a mission patch. He wanted one
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specifically for Mission Control. Talking with patch designer Bob McCall, Kranz
“emotionally” remembered:
We fought and won the race in space and listened to the
cries of the Apollo 1 crew. With great resolve and personal
anger, we picked up the pieces, pounded them together, and
went on the attack again. We were the ones in the trenches
of space and with only the tools of leadership, trust, and
teamwork, we contained the risks and made the conquest of
space possible. 143
While they may not have won the initial debate over who would fly into space,
the “squares” carved out a new identity for themselves as scientist-astronauts. The
scientists had entered the closed community of the astronaut, but as a hyphenated
member of the corps. Slowly spaceflight, like commercial flight, was becoming routine.
With the routinization of spaceflight came passengers. Passengers meant that women
could fly. Women symbolized the domestication of spaceflight. The question of who
could fly was broadening. The introduction of the scientist-astronauts, sophisticated
technology, and teamwork with Mission Control led the pilot astronaut to question his
control over the capsule. As the astronaut moved farther away from the rugged individual
controlling his capsule, he became closer to the organization man. The astronaut no
longer symbolized a superior American Cold War masculinity. Instead he symbolized the
Cold War masculinity crisis.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION: TO INFINITY AND BEYOND 1
On 21 November 1962, President Kennedy met with his science advisor Jerome
Weisner, NASA administrators James Webb, Hugh Dryden, Robert C. Seamans Jr., and
the director of the Office of Management and Budget, David E. Bell. They discussed the
top priority of the space program and the upcoming NASA budget. Kennedy restated that
“the whole thrust” of the program should be the manned lunar landing. In the “race” for
the moon, landing a man on the moon first was important for both domestic and
international “political reasons.” Kennedy told his advisors that he did not care for space
science. Webb interrupted. He reminded the president that scientifically they knew
nothing about the environment of the moon. Kennedy seemed confused and irritated by
Webb. Kennedy knew these “other things” were “desirable but they can wait.” Weisner
exclaimed, “We don’t know a damn thing about the surface of the moon and we’re
making the wildest guesses about how we’re going to land on the moon.” Without
scientific studies of the moon’s surface, the landing would be risky. Seamans added that
he did not think it reasonable to “emasculate” space science if the administration
encountered “budget problems.” 2
Kennedy reiterated that the manned lunar landing was tied to beating the
Russians. Webb asked the president, “Why can’t it be tied to preeminence in space?”
Kennedy responded, “we’ve been telling everybody we’re preeminent in space for five
years and nobody believes us….” Kennedy asserted that he “was not that interested in
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space” unless NASA could land a man on the moon. Landing a man on the moon was the
only justification for the multibillion dollar budget and their “pell-mell” style of planning.
Kennedy wanted to showcase the ability of the astronaut to fly to the moon. The race for
space was not only about technology, thrust, and rocket boosters, but it was also about
culture. 3 The image of spaceflight was important. Space symbolized a reinvigorated
United States. The central importance of the race relied on the ability of the astronaut to
land on the moon. As the dissertation has argued, an early narrative of NASA existed in
the American public discourse that emphasized the space flyer image, and the question of
who could fly into space. The masculine image of the jet test pilot astronaut became part
of the gendering of space in early American spaceflight.
Joseph Corn’s The Winged Gospel offers a narrative of aviation history apart from
the plane as a military tool. Looking at how aviation technology influenced American
culture, Corn proposes that aviation technology became an instrument of “social reform.”
Writing on the Wright brothers’ first successful airplane design, Corn suggests, “The
pilot of an airplane seemingly possessed the freedom and control of a bird. At the
controls of the new invention he not only rose into the heavens but mastered them,
moving at will in three dimensions.” Corn contends that aviation technology can be
viewed as “an instrument of reform, regeneration, and salvation; a substitute for politics,
revolution or even religion.” 4
Mastering the sky brought hope for a better future. Americans viewed the
conquest of space in the same manner. In the public discourse the astronaut represented
Americans regaining control over the fictional organization man. Americans equated the
pilot image to true rugged individualism. The astronaut was a new pioneer who flew
alone left to his own wits to survive and master both technology and the atmosphere. The
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astronaut mastered space technology and demonstrated masculinity through pilot control
of a space craft.
Corn suggests that the need for man to control the airplane began with the Wright
Brothers. The danger and excitement of flying quickly changed the pilot image from
refined white middle class bicycle mechanics to that of a hot-shot dare-devil. The rugged
individual pilot controlled the technology into the new frontier of the sky. In World War
II the public image of the flyer shifted from the autonomous stuntman to that of a heroic
team player. The World War II flyer did not risk his life for sport, but rather, to save his
country. The image of flying shifted again after the war. The Cold War era’s
commercialization of flight routinized and domesticated flying. The flyer became not the
pilot but the passenger. Flying in the Cold War era no longer symbolized strength and
bold exploits of individuals in control. Flying evolved into well earned leisure.
Passengers looked not for daring or adventure but for comfortable travel. Sophisticated
technology and the leisure of flight suggested that flying was easy for the whole family.
Passengers, leisure, and automation took the moxie, rugged individualism, and control
out of flying. 5
Cold War pilots confronted conformity, automation, commercialization, leisure
and bureaucracy in flight. Flying became a metaphor for the masculinity crisis of the
1950s. As writers feared the downfall of white masculine control over society, the pilot
feared the loss of control over his own plane. To regain the moxie that flying once had,
pilots continued to push the edge of the envelope to regain individual control. Flyers
wanted to go higher and faster than commercial jet liners. However, to reach faster
speeds and higher altitudes the pilot was forced to rely on more automation and less on
his physical strength and rugged individualism to control the machine. Just as
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intellectuals feared that the white male was losing individuality in society, the pilot feared
the same. The discourse surrounding the astronaut image attempted to thwart the
discussion of the pilot’s reliance on technology. The astronaut image brought hope for a
future in which man was in control.
President Eisenhower wanted jet-test pilots as astronauts for their discipline. Jettest pilots implied astronaut control over the space capsule. Americans clamored over the
possibility of pilot control. Print media accounts, politicians, and astronauts attempted to
regain the rugged individualism and control that the pilot, and average American men,
once represented. They created a public discourse in which the lone wolf astronaut flew
in space. Through his control over the space capsule, the astronaut embodied a superior
American masculinity. The astronaut image of rugged individualism and control
represented an ideal Cold War masculinity. At the same time, Americans mocked the role
of the cosmonaut as that of a passenger in space. The Cold War masculinity exercised by
the American pilot astronaut demonstrated that the United States was not simply
following the Soviets into space. Instead, with astronaut control the Americans conducted
the Space Race on their own terms.
The astronauts controlled space through their control over the capsule. The focus
on astronaut control in the public discourse created a cult of masculinity in space.
However, Americans forced NASA to confront the role of women within spaceflight. The
image of astronaut control over the capsule dominated the discussion. Women could not
fly a space capsule because they did not have jet test piloting experience. If NASA
launched a woman into space, the public might question the control of the pilot over the
capsule. If a woman could do it, could not anyone? Women represented passengers, not
pilots. Female control of a capsule would have feminized spaceflight and thus the
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masculine sphere of space. 6 Walter McDougal argued that the flight of Tereshkova
proved to the Soviets that anyone could fly into space. 7 But the Americans were different.
They did not follow the Soviets. They did not rely on automation. Americans did not rely
on machines. They relied on the pilot to control space. The pilot was the public image of
spaceflight, not the passenger. After Tereshkova’s flight, the American print media,
politicians, and astronauts continued to accentuate male astronaut control of spaceflight,
thus continuing the masculinization of both spaceflight and the astronaut image.
Space journalists, politicians, and astronauts paradoxically claimed Gemini to be
the first true space capsule controlled by an astronaut. While the Soviet Union performed
the first EVA, the Americans maintained that they performed the first spacewalk under
astronaut control. As the early NASA dialogue continued with astronaut control of the
capsule, in the background, engineers and scientists were slowly becoming part of the
greater dialogue of control over spaceflight. The introduction of scientists and engineers
into the astronaut corps changed the public image of astronaut Cold War masculinity. The
new scientist-astronaut did not symbolize physical control over the capsule, but rather,
intellectual authority. Their lack of piloting experience questioned the need for pilots in
space capsules. Spaceflight was becoming so routine, some believed, that even the
squares could fly a capsule.
Scientist-astronauts were not the only new men entering the discourse of
spaceflight. As spaceflight became more complex, space journalists highlighted the
engineers and scientists at Mission Control. Their masculine image also differed from the
rugged individualist astronaut. These men work in teams. They conformed in dress. They
were part of the corporation, the bureaucracy. They appeared to be the Cold War
masculinity crisis’s enemy. They were the organization man.
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By the end of Gemini, the Americans surpassed the Soviets in manned spaceflight
technology. American spaceflights performed so well that journalists wrote that like
commercial flight, spaceflight was becoming routine. Apollo 1 and Apollo 13 questioned
the routinization of spaceflight, and at times, who controlled the capsule. The Apollo 1
fire revealed a lack of control by astronauts, engineers, scientists, and technicians. The
Apollo 11 moon landing symbolized both team work and American preeminence in
space. Apollo 13 demonstrated the control of not the astronauts but the scientists and
engineers. The flight of the first scientist-astronaut aboard Apollo 17 represented the
routnization and safety of spaceflight. The capsule did not need a rugged individual jet
test pilot at the controls. The pilot astronaut was moving farther away from Cold War
masculinity. He relied on computers, Mission Control, scientist-astronauts, and team
work. He was becoming part of the organization, part of the bureaucracy. He did not
represent a superior American masculinity. He was becoming a symbol of the Cold War
masculinity crisis. Through the public discourse, Americans viewed space like a
conquered frontier. Passengers would soon be able to fly. The Cold War pioneer
astronaut struggled to find his proper role in the routninization of spaceflight.
The domestication of spaceflight commenced. In the fall of 1972, NASA Center
directors met at the Peaks of Otter Lodge, just north of Roanoke, Virginia, to discuss the
future of spaceflight. NASA administrator James C. Fletcher suggested that a “plan be
developed for our next selection of astronauts, with full consideration being given to
minority groups and women.” 8 On 26 September 1972, Dale Meyers, Associate
Administrator for Manned Space Flight, sent a memorandum to Manned Spaceflight
Center (MSC) Director Kraft requesting that a plan to integrate minorities into the
astronaut corps be submitted to him by 1 February 1973. 9
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The commissioning of the new space shuttles was important to opening up
spaceflight for minorities. After Apollo 17 NASA busied itself with designing its first
space shuttles. In 1972, the flight of the scientist-astronaut and the commission of the first
passenger space shuttles marked the end of the rugged individual astronaut and the
continuation of the Cold War masculinity crisis at NASA. Scientific adventures, it
seemed, replaced death defying feats in space. The race was over. The United States won.
The astronauts and Mission Controllers had conquered space. Passengers could now fly,
forever changing the image of spaceflight.
Budget cuts followed the end of the race. NASA clamored for a cost conscious
reusable craft that would routinize spaceflight. In 1972, President Richard M. Nixon
accepted the plans and funding for the future space shuttles Enterprise and Columbia.
Challenger, Discovery, and Atlantis followed in 1979. NASA did not commission
Endeavor until 1987. The United States also invested in space science. Between 1973 and
1979, Skylab circled the earth. On 15 July 1975, NASA launched the first Apollo-Soyuz
mission from Cape Canaveral. Flying for the Americans was Commander Tom Stafford
and Command Module Pilot Vance D. Brand. Flying into space had become so safe that
despite his irregular heartbeat, NASA launched Deke Slayton as the docking module
pilot. The Soviets sent up Commander Alexi Leonov and Flight Engineer Valeri
Kubasov. The Soviet Union and the United States appeared to have made “detente” in
space. Cold War masculinity of rugged individualism and control appeared to have lost
its purpose in space.
In the fall of 1973, as NASA reports shifted from tales of Apollo to the future of
the space shuttle, once again, Americans refashioned the image of the astronaut. The
Second Wave of Feminism helped shape this image. Weitekamp argues in Right Stuff,
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Wrong Sex that not only did prevailing Cold War gender roles for men and women
prevent women from flying, but also, the struggle for a cohesive civil rights movement
during the early stages of the Space Race failed to successfully champion a woman
astronaut. Weitekamp’s conclusions are correct. Americans were unsuccessful in
convincing the public, politicians, and even NASA of any advantages to flying women
into space. 10 However, in the 1970s, Americans, including those at NASA, presented an
organized effort to integrate spaceflight.
NASA’s future plans for spaceflight were shared with the public. As early as 21
July 1969, news reports were already circulating about Wernher Von Braun and Maxime
Faget’s future reusable space shuttle. The Washington Post reported that if approved by
Congress, the $6 billion dollar shuttle program would serve as a “taxi service” for the $3
billion dollar proposed orbiting space laboratory. Von Braun and Faget also hoped that
the shuttle would be able to carry passengers to the moon and back. The paper reported,
“Up to now, the stress and expense of space flights have restricted them to astronauts—a
carefully selected and highly motivated crew of young physically fit and rigorously
trained men.” 11 On 16 August 1972, NASA issued a press release entitled “Bathroom
Commode Design for Space Shuttle Passengers” that detailed a system that could be used
“for men and women Shuttle passengers.” 12 By 17 September 1973, NASA informed the
public that they were studying women’s physiology for future spaceflight on the shuttle.
Twelve military nurses volunteered for the five-week long experiment that specifically
tested weightlessness and the response of female bodies to G forces. 13 On 18 October
1973, NASA completed the tests. They released to the public the names and biographical
information of the female volunteers. 14 In March 1975, NASA informed the public that

281

the administration was going to “ease” the astronaut requirements for “non-pilot crew
members.” 15
Much like the effort to create Cold War masculinity in spaceflight, the push to
integrate the astronaut corps also appeared in sources such as print news, public
organizations, and politicians’ speeches. In the Real Stuff, Joseph D. Atkinson Jr. and Jay
Shafritz deftly recount the steps to integrate the astronaut corps. The August 1972 edition
of Jet magazine quoted Representative Charles B. Rangel (D-NY) after he argued for the
U.S. Civil Rights Commission to conduct an investigation into the employment at NASA.
The congressman proposed that “‘Something is seriously wrong when not a single
member of the forty-two manned astronaut corps is female, Black, or Hispanic.’” 16 That
same summer, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples
(NAACP) met in Detroit. The Executive Director, who had recently praised a NASA
exhibit, conveyed his alarm at the all-white male corps when he said to the crowd,
“‘NASA had not sent a black astronaut into space. Just as shocking, we have no black
astronauts in training; nor women.’” 17 The National Urban League expressed its concern
regarding the absence of African-Americans, Chicanos, and women astronauts. 18 As a
result of Rangel’s statement, the director of the Office of Federal Civil Rights Evaluation,
Jeffrey M. Miller, sent a letter on 12 August 1972 to NASA stating that the Commission
recently reviewed Rangel’s statements that all of the NASA astronauts were white males.
Miller wrote, “‘In view of the important part that this program plays in our lives and the
great psychological impact that media coverage of our manned space efforts has on
millions of people around the world, this figure if true is most distressing.’” 19 Miller
asked NASA’s EEOC director, Ruth Bates Harris, to provide him with details concerning
the past and present astronauts’ sex, race, and ethnicity. He also wanted an explanation of
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the underutilization of minorities in the astronaut corps, as well as what programs NASA
had in place to recruit future minorities within the corps. 20
Senator William Proxmire (D-WI), chairman of the Space Science and Veterans
Committee, began investigations on 11 January 1975 into NASA’s equal employment
policies. His main concern was that no minorities were currently astronauts. Even
Proxmire knew the cultural importance of the astronaut image. He argued, “‘Nothing has
exemplified NASA’s achievement more than our astronaut program, and…the fine
character and achievement of the young astronauts. It has been not only the Agency’s
showpiece but indeed the country’s showpiece.’” 21 NASA’s Associate Deputy
Administrator, Willis Shapley, responded to Proxmire. He admitted that NASA failed to
recruit minorities in the past. However, the new Shuttle program would “definitely
include the provision for female astronauts.” 22 The shuttles were built for passengers, not
rugged individualist astronauts attempting to control the ship. The presence of minorities
as passengers made sense on the shuttle.
The Second Wave of Feminism in the late 1960s reprimanded NASA for the lack
of women in the American space program, specifically, their nonexistence in spaceflight.
Papers carried the headlines “Women Demand Astronaut Roles, Court Posts, Storm
Names Changed.” Speaking as president for the National Organization for Women
(NOW), Betty Friedan reasoned: “‘Equality for women would bring male liberation, too,
since men also are victims by laws and practices which limit the roles of individuals in
modern society.’” 23 In 1969, veteran space journalist, and author of the column, “Men
and Missiles” for the Daytona Beach News-Journal, Sue Butler, joked that if journalists
would be sent to the moon, she should be sent first. She reasoned, “I’m 5’1” and weigh
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100 pounds, so I take up less room in a spacecraft and am lighter than any male
colleague. Besides, I eat less, so it also would be cheaper to let me go!” 24
In 1972, the Miami Herald ran the headline “Lady Astronauts Not Far Off?”
Gerald Carr, the director of Skylab 4, told an audience at a Minnesota space symposium
that he believed with the importance of both “advanced degrees” and “physical
condition” he foresaw NASA selecting women astronauts. 25 Media reports that
surrounded women as astronauts in the early 1970s continued to emphasize women in
space in traditional roles, as passive actors, helpers, or passengers. For instance, the local
newspaper in Ephrata, Pennsylvania, ran a headline claiming, “Women as Space Shuttle
Passengers Under Study.” The report was referring to the twelve Air Force flight nurses
that NASA was conducting tests on at the Ames Research Center. The research
laboratory tested women’s reactions to gravity free environments, tolerance for g-forces,
psychological and other biological changes to the environment of space. 26 NASA still
received mail from the general public condemning the experiment as a waste of tax
dollars even though the administration tested the women as passengers and not pilots. 27
American women and minorities had made strong headway since the initial
launching of Sputnik in 1957. Nevertheless, the media attention surrounding the use of
women stayed steadfast to women in traditional Cold War roles. NASA was not
necessarily acquiescing to the public’s cry of equal rights for women in spaceflight. In
1978, NASA chose thirty-five astronauts for Group 8. The group contained six women,
three African American men, and one Asian American man. The United States left the
deadly duty of blasting into space up to men until the United States launched Sally K.
Ride in the space shuttle Challenger on 18 June 1983.
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Overwhelmingly, as women entered the all-male astronaut fraternity, Americans
celebrated the achievement. American men and women throughout the country displayed
patriotism and pride for the flight by adorning t-shirts that read “Ride, Sally Ride.” 28
Ride’s flight was epic and its historical importance two-fold. Publicly, Ride’s flight
represented two parallel historical narratives of the image of the space shuttle. STS-7
represented the beginning of the democratization of both spaceflight and space
technology. At the same time, this democratization of spaceflight also highlighted what
Americans thought was the end to the dangers of space travel and the continuation of the
routinization and domestication of spaceflight.
While Ride, among other female astronauts from Group 8, may have been
accepted into the prestigious astronaut fraternity, she and the other women did not stand
on equal footing. Ride’s flight represented a long tradition of spaceflight serving to
reinforce traditional American domestic roles. What made it possible for Sally to ride was
not necessarily the Women’s Movement alone, but also the idea that spaceflight had been
routinized. NASA broadened the image of who could fly. Unlike the women who
endured the Lovelace program, Ride was not a pilot before she entered NASA. Therefore,
Weitekamp concludes, Ride’s flight “did not excite the women who had participated in
Lovelace’s testing program. They did not identify with scientists who held advanced
academic degrees.” 29 Ride and the other women were passengers. They were not in
control of the craft. They did not pilot the shuttle. They, literally according to news
reports and the seating configuration, remained behind the commander and the pilot.
NASA did not acquiesce to the Women’s Movement and its accentuation of equality or
pressure from either the government or Americans to create equality in space. The image
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NASA offered the public stayed steadfast to traditional American domestic roles. The
image of the actual flyer remained male.
In the same month as Ride’s flight, the cover of Space World suggested that the
shuttle was “Designing a Home in Space.” 30 Creating a home in space domesticated the
once dangerous feat of spaceflight. Average Americans with no flight or engineering
experience eagerly awaited news of the Citizen Astronaut Program. As early as 1978,
articles filled magazines and journals dedicated to spaceflight predicting who the first
civilian flyer would be and how much space fare would cost for a ride on the shuttle.
Overall, media reports surrounding Ride and Group 8 fashioned the shuttle image as not
only a beacon of American democracy, but also, and unfortunately incorrectly, as a
symbol of the routinization of space travel. In 1995, Eileen Collins became the first
woman to pilot a space mission. The image of a woman space pilot caught attention
within the media. Space journalist depicted her demeanor as “nice” compared to the old
“rowdy” image of the first astronauts. 31 Despite her domesticated image, Collins’s flight,
according to Weitekamp, meant something to the Lovelace women. 32 NASA invited all
of the FLATs to watch the feat. 33
The discourse of the early American Space Race was not only about rocket
payloads and thrusts. The importance of the crisis of masculinity is also evident within
the early race. The discourse suggested that the United States did not simply follow the
Soviets. The print media, politicians, astronauts, and at times NASA created an image of
masculine control over a space capsule. In creating this image of astronaut-pilot control,
Americans advocated traditional Cold War familial roles of man as the warrior who flew
in space while the woman remained on the ground to eagerly await his return.
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